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Abstract 
Fisheries management in New Zealand has reached a turning 
point in its history. The concepts of Optimum Yield ~Y) and 
fisheries management planning have been adopted to form the 
basis for the future management of New Zealand's marine 
fisheries. One implication of these innovations is that 
recreational fisheries now have the opportunity to feature 
more significantly in the overall management of the inshore 
fisheries. Optimum yield requires that recreational factors, 
among others, be considered when determining yield. Two 
purposes of Fisheries Management Plans ~MPs) are to promote 
and develop both recreational and commercial fisheries, and 
to allocate fish resources with reference to optimum yields. 
However, to ensure that the fish stocks will be allocated to 
each of the potential user-groups in a manner which reflects 
the best interests of society a number of issues must be 
addressed. A solid theoretical basis for management needs to 
be developed, for both recreational and commercial fishing. 
Essential to the development of such a theoretical framework 
is a comprehensive information and data base. Information is 
needed to determine the ecologic, economic and social 
benefits from fishing, to develop integrated models of 
fishing for use in long-term planning and policy development, 
and to ensure that management is both specific and effective. 
Meaningful allocations can only be made if they are based on 
comparable values. The theoretical basis for recreational, 
commercial and joint recreational and commercial fisheries is 
reviewed. Fisheries management in New Zealand is discussed 
and a number of implications for joint fishing management 
noted. 
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-CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
Background. 
Marine farming is an important human endeavour. In the past, 
sUbsistence and commercial fishing have been the major uses 
made of the ocean's fish resources. More recently, the 
amounts of fish caught by amateur fishermen have become more 
significant and the whole range of uses has become more 
diverse. Recreational fishing is one type of amateur use of 
marine fish resources which has increased in popularity and 
significance worldwide. Hence, the major benefits which can 
accrue from fishing are of three types: economic income; 
protein; and recreational pleasure. 
As the diversity of fishing activities has increased, so too 
has the number of people involved. Accordingly, the demand 
for fish resources has increased. The quantities of fish 
available for the competing activities, however, cannot 
increase. Fish stocks are capable of biological 
regeneration, but this is limited by the available food and 
fish habitats. As a consequence, too many fishermen may end 
up pursuing too few fish. The results may be, at best, some 
unsuccessful fishermen or mild conflicts between the various 
competing activities. At worst, the result might be an 
over-fished stock or direct confrontations between competing 
users. Therefore, scarce fish resources may need to be 
allocated amongst the various users to ensure potential 
conflicts are minimised. 
Fisheries management is the mechanism which society commonly 
uses to allocate fish resources and to resolve any conflicts. 
One purpose of fisheries management, therefore, is to weigh 
the needs and aspirations of each user group and allocate the 
scarce fish resources in a manner that reflects the best 
interests of society. In the past this has often resulted in 
the major portion of the fish resources being caught by large 
scale commercial fishing operations. The increasing 
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significance and recognition of recreational fishing 
activities, however, has precipitated the need for other 
users to be given equal importance when making allocation 
decisions. 
Fisheries Management in New Zealand. 
In New Zealand the responsibility for the management of 
marine fisheries 
Fisheries Management 
lies with the 
Division. The 
Ministry of Fisheries; 
history of marine 
fisheries management in this country can be described as less 
than successful. However, fisheries management is currently 
at a turning point. A new management philosophy and approach 
is presently in the process of being implemented. These 
major changes result from the introduction of the new 
Fisheries Act 1983, because it has specific provisions to 
facilitate the allocation of New Zealand's fish resources. 
The innovations of the Fisheries Act 1983, which should be 
significant to resource allocation decisions, are first, the 
introduction of Optimum Yield as a management objective, and 
second, provision for the Fisheries Management Planning 
process. As a management objective optimum yield requires 
social, economic, ecological and recreational values to be 
considered when determining the optimal harvest. As a first 
step in the allocation process, the determination of an 
optimum yield requires that a great deal of information be 
collected and this will necessarily include data on 
recreational fishing. Fisheries Management Plan's (FMP's) are 
the other important new initiative for allocation decisions 
between recreational and commercial fishermen. 
The provisions of the FMP's include three aspects which 
should prove significant to the allocation of New Zealand's 
fish resources. The first is an explicit legislative mandate 
to provide the mechanisms which will allocate the resources 
between the competing user groups. The second provision of 
management plans is the requirement to use the concept of 
optimum yield when allocating the resources. The final 
important provision of the FMP's is that they are required to 
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give equal consideration to the conservation and development 
of both recreational and commercial fisheries. It is 
suggested that, when considered together, these management 
innovations require marine recreational fisheries to be given 
more prominence in fisheries management generally, and fish 
resource allocation decisions particularly. 
One further, more pragmatic, reason for fisheries managers to 
seriously consider recreational fisheries involves the 
potential significance of the catches and values they appear 
to offer. There is an indication, albeit imprecise, that 
marine recreational fisheries are growing in importance in 
New Zealand, as they have already done elsewhere in the 
world. The available data and informed opinion suggests that 
catches of some recreational fisheries represent significant 
proportions of the total catch. For example, recreational 
fishermen could be credited with nearly one third of the 
Hauraki Gulf snapper catch, but the lack of precise data 
precludes definitive answers being available for the 
recreational fishing sector . 
. If the catches or social and economic value of recreational 
fisheries prove to be significant, then the recreational 
fishermen should receive appropriate recognition within the 
overall fisheries management strategy. Before much can be 
done, however, the roles of the recreational and commercial 
fisheries within fisheries management need to be clarified. 
The theoretical analysis of each type of fishing is 
different. In addition, the values accruing to each seem 
incomparable, and the traditional management practises of 
each have little in common. Therefore, before the new 
management framework can fully incorporate the values of both 
fisheries and make the resource management decisions it is 
required to do, it is useful to review the available 
fisheries management literature for guidance and assistance. 
such a review forms part of the present report. 
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Report Aims and Objectives 
The following report on the principles, practise, and policy 
of marine commercial and recreational fisheries manag·ement 
set out to achieve two aims. The primary aim was to provide 
a source of information for the various interested parties 
concerned with the joint management of recreational and 
commercial marine fisheries. The principal need for such 
management is to allocate scarce fish resources between the 
two major fishing sectors. A secondary aim was to encourage 
discussion and debate of the implications raised by the 
current fisheries 
the recreational, 
fisheries. 
management 
or joint 
policies, and particularly for 
recreational commercial 
To meet the primary aim, three objectives were established. 
These objectives were: 
1. to review the fisheries management and analysis 
literature relevant to the theory and 
management of commercial and/or recreational 
marine fisheries; 
2. to review the state of fisheries management in 
New Zealand IS inshore cornmercial and 
recreational fisheries, with emphasis on the 
role of recreational fishing in both the 
fisheries and management process; and 
3. to provide 
urgent and 
management 
fisheries. 
Because of the paucity 
relative youth of the 
much of the following 
a discussion of some of the more 
important issues relevant to the 
of New Zealand's joint marine 
of actual fishing data, and the 
new fisheries management structure, 
concerns theoretical aspects of 
management. It was unfortunate that more information was not 
available for recreational marine fishing in New Zealand, and 
thus the report has emphasised material contained within 
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fisheries management theory. The successful practise of 
fisheries resource management needs to evolve from a solid 
theoretical foundation, but the development of such a 
foundation has only recently begun for joint recreational and 
commercial fisheries. 
Report Content and Format 
The body of this report is divided into two parts. Part I 
presents a review of the principles of fisheries management 
and analysis. It consists of five chapters, each dealing 
with the social-institutional, biological, and bio-economic 
theories of fishing and management. Each chapter presents 
one facet of fisheries management analysis and covers issues 
such as: property rights; biological yield models; the 
economic theories of both commercial and recreational 
fishing; 
of joint 
and the attempts to produce a 
fishing. Part II provides 
bio-economic theory 
a description and 
discussion of New Zealand's inshore fisheries and their 
management. In addition, this Part presents a discussion of 
some of the major issues raised in earlier chapters. Among 
the issues discussed are: the role of management policy; 
user group conflicts; the need for information; and a 
marine recreational license. The report concludes with a 
short section in which suggestions for future research are 
outlined. 
A final note concerns the technical content of this report. 
In some of the more technical biological or economic analyses 
reviewed, readers will note that some of the alphanumeric 
symbols used to represent particular concepts or parameters 
differ from the original analysis. As far as possible, in an 
effort to maintain consistency and avoid confusion, one 
symbol has been used to represent one concept. With due 
respect to the original analysts, the changes are superficial 
and intended to improve clarity for a wider audience. A 
change was not always possible, but in the majority of cases 
a particular symbol used in one section of this report has 
retained its meaning in subsequent sections. 
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PART ONE. 
An introduction to the Principles of 
Fisheries Analysis and Management. 
The management of fish resources involves more than just 
regulating the use of particular fish stocks. A major part 
of fisheries management is research, and more particularly, 
the analysis of the information gathered. Information on the 
biological, economic and social aspects of fishing needs to 
be gathered and incorporated into planning and management. 
For this information to be useful, it is necessary to know 
how the different components of a fishery the fish, the 
fishermen and 
important is 
strategies or 
management interact and interrelate. Also 
a knowledge of how the various management 
policy instruments will affect the other 
components of the fishery. A term for the study of the broad 
range of information related to fisheries management does not 
appear to exist at present. However, I will use the term 
Fisheries Analysis. 
The range of disciplines associated with fisheries analysis 
has increased over the last century. In the years prior to 
the 1950s the analysis was almost exclusively biological. In 
the 1950s an economic analysis was developed for commercial 
fishing and eventually bio-economic theories and analyses 
became more prevalent. Closely associated with economics are 
the social institutions which can be used to manage fisheries 
and so this sphere of socio-economic analysis has also become 
associated with fisheries analysis. Each of the~e areas of 
analysis is briefly introduced and discussed in the chapters 
which constitute Part I of this report. 
One aim of this investigation is to examine the bio-economic 
theories of recreational fishing and the fisheries which are 
exploited jointly by both commercial and amateur fishermen. 
The development of a theory of recreational fishing has been 
instrumental in providing a more solid theoretical basis from 
which to build a theory and analytical framework for the 
investigation of joint fisheries. Tuomi (1977) was among the 
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first fishing administrators and managers to see the need for 
further development of the analytical framework for amateur 
fishing ~rimarily recreational fishing), as had been done 
for commercial fishing. Tuomi saw this as necessary, despite 
the distinctly different directions the analyses had taken in 
the past. 
If the objective of fisheries management is to allocate fish 
resources to the various competing users so as to maximise 
the benefits, - tangible or otherwise - from a fishery, then 
the development of an integrated analysis is a necessary 
prerequisite. Both types of fishing must be able to be 
represented in the analysis in a compatible manner. However, 
efforts to produce such an analytical framework have, until 
recently, offered little help. This is due partly to the 
inability of economic analyses of recreational fishing to 
recognise the scarcity of the fish stock. Since 1975 a 
number of authors have addressed the related problems of 
developing a bio-economic theory for amateur fishing, and the 
integration of the commercial and amateur fishing sector 
analyses. Chapter six provides a review of the more recent 
. literature. 
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CHAPTER TWO. 
Fish as a Natural Resource. 
2.1 Introduction. 
The exploitation of natural resources such as air, water, 
land, forests, game animals and minerals or even human 
resources, such labour and knowledge occurs because humans 
value the results of the exploitation. Hence, a resource can 
be defined as something which either is useful and valuable 
in itself, or can be used to produce something of value, 
(Randall, 1981). Since the definition of whether something 
is a resource or not can differ depending on the time or 
place, and the people concerned, the concept of what 
constitutes a resource is a dynamic one. Thus resources must 
be considered to be multi-attribute and have quantity, 
quality, time and space dimensions. An example could be 
water. In the desert where water is scarce for much of the 
year, water of most qualities is a valuable resource. Yet if 
it were to rain producing a flood then the water could be 
considered more of a nuisance than a resource, despite large 
amounts of water being available. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore and discuss fish as 
a resource and fishing as a resource use. This will be done 
primarily at a theoretical level so the major emphasis will 
be on a discussion of what constitutes a fishery and how its 
components interact. The discussion will briefly cover the 
attributes of fish and their habitat, the fishing industry 
and consumers, and then concentrate on the nature of the 
property rights involved in exploiting a fish resource. At 
the conclusion of the chapter it should be more clear as to 
why fish as a natural resource (although it is not unique in 
this) appears to pose so many problems to management. 
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2.2: The Fishery. 
The term 'fishery' is used in many cases to describe the 
stocks of fish which fishermen harvest. The term 'fishing 
industry' is often used to describe the fish harvesting and 
processing sectors. I believe that the latter is correctly 
used to describe the resource users, but the former term 
should apply to everything connected with the harvest of 
fish. The fish stocks can be called just that - fish stocks. 
Under my definition a fishery comprises three major 
components: 
1. the biological component 
habitat; 
the fish and their 
2. the human component - the fishermen, and consumers 
of fish products; and 
3. the social institutions - which govern the use of 
the resource, primarily ownership or property 
rights. 
It is possible to recognise similar sectors in other resource 
use 'industries' but the fishery has some special attributes 
inherent in each of these three components which sets it 
aside from many other industries. Copes (1980) describes the 
fishery as: 
' •.. the only significant sector of the economy 
engaged in the exploitation of a "fugitive 
resource" under conditions of "common 
property" ownership.' 
In that statement Copes captures the essence of the special 
nature of the fishery, but as will be discussed below 
perpetuates the "common property problem" myth. 
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The Biological Component. 
Consider first the biolog ical components of the fishery. 
These are the fish stocks and the habitats in which they 
li ve. Both of these are diverse and almost infinitely 
variable. The fish and their habitat are intimately 
connected and each can affect the other in many ways. The 
basis for these ecological relationships and connections is 
energy. 
engine 
An ecosystem can be considered to 
(Cushi ng , 1976) where speci es , 
be a productive 
populations or 
individual organisms are organized by three processes 
and symbiosis - and constrained by 
natality, growth, and mortality. 
the ecosystem from the sun to the fish 
competition, predation, 
three other processes 
Energy flows through 
via a host of intermediate organisms. In many cases the fish 
are harvested to provide a source of food energy for people, 
although this is not always the purpose for fishing. 
Many of the fish species which fishermen pursue are elusive 
and often highly mobile. It is often difficult to identify 
and separate different portions of a fish resource in order 
to harvest the most preferred species, or individuals within 
a species or to define and allocate the harvest among 
different users. Migratory or wide ranging local species 
often traverse the human-defined boundaries of the 
Territorial Sea or Exclusive Economic Zone ~EZ). Fish move 
over large areas of ocean and through great depths creating 
unevenly distributed aggregations of fish. In doing so, the 
fish populations are merely distributing themselves in 
response to the physical and biological stimuli of the marine 
ecosystem, which itself tends to be complex, dynamic, 
variable and often stochastic in nature. 
Despite the assumptions often made in many of the biological 
or bio-economic models of fishing, it is difficult to 
adequately describe the biological and physical environment 
of fish. A large number of physical factors such as light, 
water temperature and sea currents have major influences on 
fish populations. Many models also discount the 
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interspecific relationships such as competition or predation 
by using simple single species or even single stock yield 
models. Furthermore these models have yet to demonstrate 
that they can adequately describe and analyse the important 
parameters affecting one stock of fish such as birth, death 
and growth rates. Hence, uncertainty characterizes the 
dynamics of fish populations, so the future effects of 
present conditions are often unknown, or at best educated 
guesses (Sissenwine, 1984). 
The fishery is, however, an industry based on the harvest of 
a living resource. Some fish stocks exhibit economically 
significant rates of reproduction and growth, and hence, can 
be harvested profitably without the prospect of biological 
over-fishing. Thus, not only are fish stocks biologically 
replenishable - within limits - they can also be economically 
important renewable resources. Unlike depletable resources 
such as coal, fisheries, in theory, have the option of 
harvesting fish at rates which can allow sustainable yields 
to be taken. By harvesting only the excess production in the 
stock due to growth and reproduction, and leaving the 
reproductive capacity of the stock relatively constant, it is 
possible to harvest an amount of fish biomass ad infinitum. 
However, the unpredictable nature of natural fish stocks 
makes sustainable yields much more difficult to achieve in 
practice than it is to enunciate in theory. A better 
understanding of fish 
to ensure long-term 
ecology is not, in itself, sufficient 
sustainable yields; the effects of 
harvesting need also to be considered. 
The Human Component. 
The users of the fish resource fall into a number of 
categories. However, these catagories are by no means 
separate and discrete, some overlap may occur. The fish 
resource can provide for two main types of use; extractive 
and non-extractive. An extractive use occurs when fish are 
caught, and removed from the stock. Very often to be 
consumed. A non-extractive use normally means the fish are 
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under no direct threat of death and may be considered to be 
an aesthetic amenity. Fishermen, either 
amateur, are normally extractive users of 
although some sport fishermen do attempt to 
commercial or 
the resource, 
return a live 
fish to the sea after capture. However, the chances of such 
a fish surviving may be adversely affected. Among the other, 
often less obvious users of the resource are the fish 
consumers an extractive user-group and passive 
recreationalists to whom the fish have a scenic or aesthetic 
value - non-extractive user-groups. 
The benefits or value each user-group gets from exploiting 
the fish stock can also vary. For recreational fishermen the 
benefit may come from the satisfaction of catching a large or 
trophy fish, eating the fish caught, or the enjoyment of the 
fishing experience. A part-time commercial fishermen or a 
subsistence fishermen may seek high quality fish for food, 
where other protein sources are not available or more 
exp~nsive to obtain. Being self-sufficient in a major food 
source may also have a value to a subsistence fisherman. 
~Full-time commercial fishermen exploit the fish resource by 
selling their catches and obtain an income with which to 
purchase other products of society's use of natural 
resources. The fish consuming public purchase fish to eat 
and thus receive benefit from its final consumption. A more 
extensive discussion of the amateur users of New Zealand's 
fish resources can be found in Chapter seven. 
The problems of identifying and measuring the benefits gained 
by each user-group of a fishery are recognized as being 
difficult to solve, ~audet, 1980). This makes it even more 
difficult to compare the benefits each user-group receives 
when an allocation of a relatively scarce fish stock must be 
made. Some people may argue that it is not possible to 
measure or compare the benefits directly. However, when the 
value of a commercial fishing industry is compared to the 
value of an recreational fishing sector, where each is 
attempting to catch the same fish, some criteria must be used 
to provide for a rational decision. At present economics 
provides at least a partial solution to this allocation 
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problem, pending the development and use of a better system. 
Complexity and uncertainty also characterize the economic and 
social aspects of the fishery's human component. The skill 
of a fisherman, including the ability to effectively employ 
technology to aid fishing, has been shown to be a significant 
factor in determining competitve success, (Wilson, 1982). 
The costs associated with aquiring skill and information can 
be used as one measure of the quality of an individual 
fishermen and the value placed on being a fisherman. Whether 
commercial or amateur, fishing involves a continuous learning 
process. Often it is the fishing itself which provides the 
education, via direct participation in the fishery and the 
information provided by other co-operative fishermen. 
The variability in fish populations, the fishing industry and 
consumers, and in the weather and sea conditions create 
uncertainty. Fishermen are mobile like the species they 
harvest. The target species, the fishing gear used or the 
amount of time fished can vary enormously depending on the 
factors mentioned above. A particular harvesting technology 
normally provides access to a number of fish species. The 
stock sought or caught on any particular day can depend on 
the weather, fish market prices or management rules. 
Furthermore, these condi tions of uncer tainty and complexi ty 
can lead to much higher costs for accurate information. The 
fisherman must purchase the latest technology such as echo 
sounders and spotter planes in order to locate the fish and 
compete successfully within the fishery. Management has the 
problem of collecting, analysing and interpreting the data it 
requires for management. This can be made more difficult by 
variable fishing methods, multi-species catches and improving 
harvesting technologies. The pressure to have more accurate 
estimates of stock sizes and sustainable yields will grow in 
response to the increasing harvesting pressures brought to 
bear, yet this concerns the commercial sector only. The need 
becomes even greater when other user-groups also need to be 
considered. 
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The Institutional Component. 
The social institutions which govern the ownership or 
property rights associated with fishing, and the transfer and 
distribution of these rights form the third component of the 
fishery. Property rights are one mechanism by which order 
can be instituted in the allocation and management of natural 
resources where otherwise a situation of 'first come first 
served' open-access would prevail. In other words the 
resource would belong to 'no-one' or 'everyone' until the 
time of harvest, at which point ownership rights can be 
claimed. Such a resource has been called a 'common property 
resource' by economists. However, the term is at variance 
with the established legal definitions of the two property 
right situations of 'no-ones' property (res nullius) and 
'every-ones' property (res communes), (Howe, 1979). It may 
be better to call a resource, subject to either of the two 
above ownership regimes, a 'commons' resource as both have a 
similar character. 
Christy (1975a,b) has succinctly described the character of a 
'commons' resource: 
A. the resource can produce a product or service which 
has economic [or social] value.; 
B. the resource can be treated as being indivisible; 
i.e. impractical to separate it up into specific, 
identifiable and exclusive pieces; 
c. many users may use the resource at one time; 
D. use of the resource by anyone user diminishes the 
value to other users; and 
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E. there is no agent or institution able to control 
the total amount of the resource used, i.e. the 
"open-access" condition. 
The most important conditions are the last two. The 
diminishing value is caused by adverse interactions between 
the many users. These interactions are known to economists 
as externalities. The externalities may take the form of 
congestion among users, or a decrease in the quantity or 
quality of resource due to over-exploitation. Open-access is 
the other important condition. Under either 'res nullius' or 
'res communes' access to the resource is unrestricted. 
Although it may be possible to restrict the numbers of people 
using the fish resource, without further expression of 
ownership, no valid user of the resource has the right to 
restrict the harvest of another. 
Johnston (1965) argued that the question of distinguishing 
'res nullius' from 'res communes' is improper, serving only 
to confuse an already complicated issue. However, a 
distinction between the two should be kept, as the management 
solutions for each situation can be different ~iriacy -
Wantrup and Bishop 1975). The use of property rights in 
management will be more useful in the res communes situation 
where a nation or other group already has the right to deny 
access to other users. Res nullius resources are very rare 
nowadays, the only ones left being associated with the high 
seas and even they are being allocated property rights under 
the International Law of the Sea Conferences and hence are 
becoming res communes to some degree. 
In fisheries both the res nullius and the res communes 
property right situations still exist. The fish resources of 
the high seas, where no country or nation has any rights at 
all, is an example of a res nullius situation. The fish 
belong to no-one and so every-one has the right to fish, but 
no-one has the right to exclude others. The fish resources 
of the New Zealand EEZ belong to the people of New Zealand. 
As a group, New Zealanders have co-equal rights to harvest 
the fish and to exclude non-New Zealanders. This is an 
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example of a res communes property situation. The term 
'commons' can apply to both situations as there are no 
restrictions on the total amount of catch taken or effort 
applied under either situation. Nor is it truely possible to 
specify ownership of the fish before they are caught due to 
the impractibility of identifying and demarcating separate 
and distinct units of the elusive fish stocks. Hence, 
ownership is the final complicating factor in the character 
of a fishery. 
Ownership does however, form one of the major theoretical 
components in fisheries analysis and the rest of this chapter 
will be devoted to discussing it further. The biological 
relationships and the major commercial and recreational user 
components will be discussed in chapters three, four and five 
respecti vely. 
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2.3 The 'Commons' or Open-Access Fishery. 
The economic and institutional circumstances affecting 
open-access fisheries have only come to be analysed and 
understood in the last 30 years. The intensive economic 
analysis of the fishery was initiated by Gordon (1954). The 
primary purpose of Gordon's analysis was to investigate the 
declining profitability of fishing in many parts of the 
world. Graham (1949) had already noted that 'fisheries~n~ 
are unlimited become unprofitable'. Graham was primarily 
concerned with the declining productivity of fish stocks, as 
the 'inexhaustabi1ity of the sea' concept had long since 
shown to be a myth mie1sen, 1976). Gordon (1954) concluded 
that the traditional situation of open-access to a commercial 
fishery results in the attraction to the fishing industry of 
excess amounts of effort; capital and manpower. The reasons 
for this result lie in the behaviour of the 'commons' fishery 
user. 
The Behav iour of the "Commons" Fisherman. 
In a "commons" or open-access fishery individual fishermen 
are subject to a number of behavioural pressures. If we 
assume that each user treats the resource as a free-for-all, 
with each competing with the others for a greater share, then 
each of the following conditions apply, (adapted from Hardin 
1968; Copes, 1980; Keen, 1983;): 
A. where the resource is not of homogeneous quality, 
there is incentive to take the best first; 
B. each user will try to increase their share of the 
ca tch , as long as their per sona1 costs of 
exploitation are exceeded by their personal 
benefits, even after the resource has been greatly 
reduced in productivity; 
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C. if consumer demand forces the value of the resource 
upward, there is the incentive for each user to 
increase their personal investment in exploitation, 
even after the maximum sustainable yield has been 
exceeded; 
D. there is no incentive to leave a less productive 
unit of resource to increase in value, as other 
users would remove it anyway; and 
E. there is not incentive to invest the in enhancement 
of the resource as the full return on the 
investment would not be realised, because others 
would benefit from it as much as the invester. 
In the long run the fishery becomes overcapitalized with any 
potential economic surplus (rent) becoming totally 
dissipated. This is not an economically efficient allocation 
of resources. The extra capital and labour invested in the 
fishery, as excess effort, could have been invested more 
productively elsewhere in the economy. 
Although the benefits to amateur fishermen may be slightly 
different, an analogous situation can be described for 
recreational fisheries. It is the pleasant experience and 
satisfaction of fishing which the recr~ational angler seeks. 
There are costs associated with amateur fishing, just as with 
commerical fishing. Anglers must outfit themselves, get to 
the fishing site and forego the satisfaction of other 
activities while they fish. Hence, each fisherman will 
participate until the economic or other benefits they receive 
only from fishing no longer exceed the perceived costs of 
going fishing. If the recreational fishery is open-access, 
either as a res nullius or res communes situation, then 
effort can also become unlimited. 
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The amount of fishing effort, determined by the number of 
trips each fisherman makes, would probably result in a large 
catch. This in turn effects the stock size via a stock 
externality and would decrease the size of the catch in 
future years. Increasing effort in the present could well 
result in lower levels of satisfaction for the angler in the 
future. But each fishermen does not perceive this decrease 
in future benefits as a cost to themselves. The amount of 
satisfaction a fishermen perceives they are getting will be 
greater than it actually is, as they do not account for these 
decreases in future benefits. Thus each fisherman will 
continue to apply more effort than they otherwise would, and 
some fishermen enter the fishery who otherwise would not. 
The result is again too many fishermen, too much effort and 
probably a decrease in stock size. 
waste in the fishery, in the 
The extra effort produces 
sense that the total of all 
fishing net benefits over all future years could be greater 
if the present effort levels were lower. 
The consequences of open-access. 
Wilson (1982) very neatly describes the consequences of 
allowing open-access to a fishery. Three of the four types 
of over-fiShing Wilson identifies have been discussed before, 
~annesson 1978~ Anderson, 1977; Pearse, 1980; Gordon 
1954), but Wilson provides a good summary. Over-fishing is a 
generic term used to describe the effects of fishing on the 
stock, the harvest and the benefits other fishermen receive 
as income and enjoyment. Externalities is a term used by 
economists to describe similar effects in other resources, 
but over-fishing provides a better description of the 
externalities associated with open-access fisheries. 
The first effect is the recruitment problem or recruitment 
over-fishing. 
exploitation has 
This is 
decreased 
reproduce and maintain its 
harvested before reaching 
spawning fish are depleted 
simply 
the 
the situation where 
ability of the stock to 
future productivity. If fish are 
maturity, or the numbers of 
in other ways, the recruitment of 
juvenile fish to the stock may be affected. Whales are a 
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good example of a population fished so hard that reproduction 
could not keep up with harvesting ~ould, 1972; Gulland, 
1980). 
Another biological problem is called growth over-fishing. 
Due to the opportunistic nature of fishing there may be a 
tendancy for fishermen to exploit younger and smaller fish. 
These fish do not get the opportunity to go through their 
major growth phases before capture and a substantial portion 
of production can be foregone. Hence, the total revenue to 
the fishery may be less than if the stock were allowed to 
reach greater total biomass levels. 
Wilson speculates about a third form of biological 
over-fishing, one that has seldom appeared in the fisheries 
economics literature before. It may be termed ecological 
over-fishing and arises due to an ecologically unbalanced 
harvest regime. If one species is selectively exploited, 
then it may cause an energetic or ecological imbalance in the 
food webs it is a part of. A destabilizing change in the 
entire ecosystem could occur, which may result in lower total 
productivity from the entire system, or a change in species 
composition. Multi-species fisheries models and ecosystem 
models may be useful ways of investigating the phenomenom of 
ecological over-fishing in the future. 
The final type of over-fishing is the crowding problem, or 
economic over-fishing. The result is the impairment of 
economic efficiency as discussed above. Excess effort is 
applied resulting in overcapitalization and rent dissipation. 
Wilson identifies two distinct circumstances in which the 
attainment of economic efficiency will be impaired. 
The first circumstance is physical interference or 
congestion. Due to the high costs of gathering information 
about the location of fish, fishermen often fish in the 
proximity of one another to take advantage of information or 
knowledge held by another fisherman. Behaviour such as this 
can often lead to gear entanglement or gear loss. Both 
involve fishermen in the inefficient practises of replacing 
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gear or time spent untangling. Anything which decreases the 
benefits gained by fishing, such as the presence of one 
recreational angler diminishing the enjoyment of another, can 
be called congestion. 
The second circumstance is the more common situation of one 
fisherman's harvest reducing the harvest of another. This is 
called a stock externality. It occurs either when the catch 
of the fisherman is actually decreased or when more effort 
and hence, higher costs are needed to maintain the same level 
of catch. A stock externality can occur as a result of an 
increase in the numbers of fishermen, by decreasing the 
average catch, and/or a decrease in the size of the stock 
which decreases the total catch. 
It was mentioned above, but bears noting again, that the 
existence of such biological and economic externalities is 
crucial to the theory of open-access resources. If the fish 
resource was, for all intents and purposes, infinite or 
ubiquitous, then the "commons" problems of over-fishing would 
not arise. The amount of use would have no effect on the 
stock or other users and economic scarcity would not exist. 
The resource would have no value and would violate the first 
of Christy's (1975a,b) five conditions of a "commons" 
resource as noted earlier. 
The 'Res Communes' Solution 
A final incentive which could be added to the list of 
behavioural incentives for users of resources subject to 
open-access noted earlier in this section might be 
F. due to all the problems faced by having open 
access to a resource, there is an incentive to 
attempt to 'overcome these in the most simple 
and cost-effective manner. 
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It would appear that fisheries economists and managers have 
realised this dictum far too late in many cases. Hardin's 
(1968) example of the English common pasture provides a good 
example of this. The animals were owned privately, but the 
pasture held in common as a res communes resource. Strong 
pasture use rules existed and included: official openings 
and closings of the grazing season; grazing only during 
daylight hours; and the practice of "stinting" ~ordon, 
1954). Stinting involved setting elaborate schedules which 
set rules concerning the number of animals and the hours they 
could graze; all designed to prevent overgrazing of the 
common pasture. Pearse (1980) even provides an example of 
present-day stinting in a fishery; the Bay of Fundy herring 
fishery in Canada. 
Gordon (1954) suggests that stable primitive cultures may 
have survived by creating res communes ownership institutions 
for the rational use of "commons" resources. Ciriacy-Wantrup 
and Bishop (1975) also suggest that the common property (res 
communes) institution is much maligned as a management tool. 
They present a valuable discussion of historically successful 
management of resources under the property institution of res 
communes. Howe (1979) notes that the English and Welsh 
commons still exist after hundreds of years of exploitation, 
as do the Alpine meadows of Bavaria, Switzerland and Austria. 
The strict riparian doctrine of English and German law, only 
repealed in New Zealand in 1967, is another example of a 
funtioning res communes institution. Under this body of 
common law the riparian doctrine guarantees the owners of 
land bordering a stream access to the water. They may use 
it, but can exclude potential users who do not own land. The 
use made however, must not have adverse impacts on downstream 
users. In this case, uses such as extraction of water for 
consumption or irrigation, or the pollution of the water are 
severely restricted. 
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Thus when faced with an open-access or IIcommons" resource, it 
would appear to be prudent to attempt some form of management 
that overcomes the inherent problems. The challenge is to 
find a form of management which decreases the open-access 
problem, but does not add significantly to the costs of 
management. 
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2.4. Management of the Open-Access Fishery 
Dual Objectives; Biologic and Economic. 
As discussed in section 2.3 the unmanaged open-access fishery 
results in two major types of inefficiences. Biological 
inefficiencies result in the stock at best, not producing 
maximum yields of fish, and at worst, endangering the stock 
by over-harvesting the recruitment capacity of the stock. 
The economic inefficiences arise due to the pursuit of 
short-term profit maximisation by fishermen without regard 
for the effects this might have, either on other users or on 
future yields. The over-capitalisation results in the 
dissipation of any potential resource rent. 
Pearse (1980) suggests that these two problems, although 
obviously related, ought to be tackled separately. 
Determination of the desired size and quality of the harvest 
(refered to as the prescribed harvest) ought to be considered 
separately from the economic inefficiencies. Often in the 
literature the two problems of the open-access fishery have 
been turned into two management objectives, then melded into 
one overall objective, the bio-economic optimum yield. This 
is the point of maximum economic efficiency, subject to 
biological yield constraints. However, this is still an 
amalgam of two problems and hence, these often need separate 
consideration for management. Two policy objectives usually 
need two policy instruments to effect solutions. Even if 
total catch (a prescribed harvest) could be controlled by, 
for example, a quota, it could be taken by many levels of 
effort. The objective of economic efficiency has not been 
addressed. 
The biology of fish populations often result in large and 
Attempting to change unpredictable stock size fluctuations. 
the level of fishing effort to reflect these fluctuations 
will result in a constantly changing fleet structure. The 
time lag between a change in stock size and a change in 
effort will cause short-term economic inefficiencies. 
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Fisheries biologists also warn against attempting to harvest 
a constant yield. The fluctuations in stock size could cause 
a stock extinction if fishing pressure does not reflect the 
lower fish numbers. Hence, without separate controls on both 
fleet and catch, economic and biological waste could occur. 
The final reason for having separate management objectives is 
the apparent political acceptability of principles, such as 
maximum sustainable yield MSY or total allowable catch TAC. 
Once the long-term TAC is determined, either by politicians 
or fisheries biologists, economic efficiency during the 
harvest of the TAC becomes a separate management issue. 
Pearse (1980) argues that a separate control structure could 
also simplify management. With a prescribed harvest level in 
place (such as TAC) the fishermen can consider this as a 
predetermined flow of available raw material and plan their 
harvest accordingly. Once appropriate measures have been 
taken to ensure only the prescribed harvest is taken, then 
appropriate measures can be taken to ensure the catching 
sector is economically efficient or at the very least 
cost-eff ecti ve. 
Fisheries Management and the use of Property Rights. 
It is obvious from the above discussion that the problems of -
open access to a fisherYi and the possible management 
solutions have been given a lot of attention by resource 
economists. The one pervasive thought in all the literature 
is the concept of property. The lack of property rights 
institutions which clearly define the rights to use the 
fishery is the focus of much of the discussion. One tends to 
be left with the thought, that if we could only make 
everything of value someone's property, all of the problems 
could be solved. Although, in economic theory, this may be 
so through the concepts of non-attenuated property rights and 
Pareto-efficiency (Randall, 1981), reality forces economists 
to accept otherwise. The high costs of specifying and 
enforcing fully non-attenuated property rights such as 
identifying individual fish or fencing off an EEZ, would make 
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doing so totally impractical; the costs would exceed any 
benefits to be gained. 
However, a set of non-attenuated property rights is an ideal, 
because it it is based on the assumption that transaction 
services (i.e. providing information, policing and 
contracting) are costless. The set of non-attenuated 
property rights would be: 
1. Completely specified, i.e. a perfect information 
system must exist which describes all the rights 
associated with ownership, any restrictions on 
those rights, and the penalties for violation; 
2. Exclusive, so that 
associated with the 
owner; 
all costs and benefi ts 
property rights accrue to the 
3. Transferable, so that all rights should gravitate 
to their highest value use; and 
4. Enforcable and completely enforced. An unenforced 
right is not a right at all. (Randall, 1981). 
Pareto-efficiency is a concept of total economic efficiency 
Production, trade, and consumption are organized within a 
total market system and a full set of non-attenuated property 
rights are used to provide order. Pareto efficiency can be 
defined as a situation in which everyone is so well off that 
no one can be made better off without causing someone else to 
be worse-off (Randall, 1981). 
Although Pareto efficiency can provide a useful criterion for 
assessing economic theory and analysis, it has no value in 
the real world, as it is based on the notion that a set of 
fully non-attenuated property rights exist. This cannot be, 
due to the real costs involved in the transaction services 
associated with having real world property rights. 
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However, property rights and property institutions are one of 
the mechanisms which society uses to ensure the allocation 
and perpetuation of resources it deems necessary for survival 
(Burch, 1976). The satisfaction or utility of having 
property lies in the ownership of certain "bundles of rights" 
associated with the use and enjoyment of the property. The 
owners of the rights possesses the consent of others in that 
particular society to act in particular ways, and society, in 
return, can expect the owners to act only within their 
rights. Possession of the property rights leads to the 
expectation that, under normal circumstances, the community 
will recognize the rights and protect the property owner from 
being interfered with whilst exercising the rights ~emetz, 
1967) . 
Pearse (1980) describes the different types of property right 
institutions; from sole ownership to res 
nUllius, as they apply to fisheries. 
relative level of exclusiveness of the 
associated with each, Pearse produced 
non-attenuation i.e. exclusivity and 
rights, reproduced in Table 2.1. 
communes to res 
By comparing the 
fishing rights 
a gradation of 
specification) of 
By investigating the costs associated with the development 
and maintenance of each type of property right institution, 
Pearse has also developed a descriptive model showing the 
relative distribution of these costs. Those costs borne by 
the fishermen are called transactions or private costs and 
include both their internal fishing expenses and any costs 
associated with their compliance with any management regime. 
The costs borne by the management agency are called 
administration or public costs. Included in this category are 
costs of gathering information, internal administration and 
the regulation, policy and enforcement of any management 
rules for the fishery imposed to combat inefficiencies and 
over-fishing. Together transactions and administration costs 
form the aggregate organizational and institutional costs of 
a fishery. The model is depicted in figure 2.1. 
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Table 2.1. 
The Different Forms of Property Rights and the varying Degree of Exclusivity 
of ownership and Use the holder is provided with (from Rparse lQ801, 
right of right to right to a 
access to restrict the spec if ic 
the resource access of quantity 
other users of resource 
Res Nullius YES NO NO 
Res Communes 
open-access YES NO NO 
restricted-access YES YES NO 
stinting YES YES YES 
Sole Ownership YES YES YES 
Figure 2.1 
The Distribution of the Costs of Fishin~. 
$ 
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s 
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s 
" l?ubli c 
total org an isa t ional cos ts 
ad min is t ra t ion 
costs 
res communes 
right to exclusive 
spec if ic possession 
resources of the 
resource 
NO NO 
NO NO 
NO NO 
NO NO 
YES YES 
Increasingly specified and exclusive fishing property rights. 
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In the res nullius case administration costs are high due to 
the virtually impossible task of attempting to administer a 
fishery to which access is totally unrestricted. Fishermen's 
private costs are low because there is no need for any 
private negotiations, only to fish as much as possible. 
The opposite situation occurs under sole ownership. The 
difficulties and costs associated with having private 
ownership over mobile and fugitive fish are borne by the 
individual fisherman. They may receive all the benefits from 
having sole ownership of all the property rights, but the 
costs of policing and enforcement of the rights also fall to 
the owner, and these may exceed the benefits. The public 
costs would be low, as they would only be used to provide the 
necessary legal structure for fishermen to contract, dispute 
and legitimise their private ownership claims. 
Over the range of ownership regimes the public costs would 
decline from no ownership (res nullius) to sole-ownership. 
The market would increasingly control and internalize costs, 
(assuming of course 'that all resources are privately owned) 
particularly the costs of externalities such as over-fishing. 
The public costs can be added to the private costs of the 
fisherman to produce the sum of the total organisational 
costs associated with fishing. 
A minimum total cost for a fishery would occur at some point 
between the two ownership extremes. This may be one reason 
why many of the worlds fisheries are now managed under 
various forms of the res communes property institution. The 
establishment of EEZs has all but eliminated the res nullius 
condition in fisheries. 
Property Right Allocation Mechanisms. 
In fisheries we are essentially dealing with two types of 
property; "res communes" as publically owned property, and 
sole ownership as privately owned property. Add to this two 
types of property rights holder, public and private, and a 
four way allocation matrix can be generated, (Burch, 1976). 
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Table 2.2 shows the relationships between the property rights 
institutions, the property rights holders and the allocation 
mechanisms available. 
Table 2.2 
priva te 
public 
Property Right Allocation Mechanisms. 
(after Burch ,1976) 
private property 
rights 
property the market 
property regulations 
The four allocation mechanisms are: 
public property 
righ ts 
tradition 
legislation 
1. The market which allocates private rights to private 
property. Where a private owner has the responsibility 
for maintaining property, the market is able to generate 
a price for the use of the resource by another party. An 
example of this is the leasing of fishing privileges in 
Britain. 
2. Tradition can allocate public rights in private property. 
The legal system recognizes tradition in the doctrine of 
public trust. A local example could be the use of the 
Reserves Act 1977, to create covenants. The land is 
still held in private tenure but public access and use is 
also recognized. These situations do not reflect a 
commons situation as the rights can be managed by 
particular agencies to ensure rational use. 
3. Regulation is used to provide private rights to public 
property. A number of common fisheries management 
practices such a limiting entry, or licences are used to 
do this. The use of quotas (stinting) provide even 
stronger private rights by allocating a portion of the 
catch to a fisherman, not merely the right to harvest. 
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Private rights mean that those holding the rights have 
the right to exclude non-holders from the fishery. 
4. Legislation allocates public rights to public property. 
Included in this category are all the fisheries 
management methods which affect everyone that uses the 
fish resources in a more or less equivalent manner. 
Catch limits, fish size limits, gear restrictions, closed 
areas or seasons and total catch quotas are examples. If 
you assume that the fish stocks are a public resource 
(i. e . res communes of the nation), then the use of a 
public agency such as the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries (MAF) to manage the resource on behalf of the 
nation effectively creates a sole ownership. The 
management agency holds all rights, but transfers some to 
the public, retaining others. The justification for the 
retention of certain rights over the fish by the MAF 
stems from the legislative mandate it has to manage the 
fisheries in the best interests of New Zealand. The 
mandate should, in turn, reflect some form of overall 
public consensus. 
The property right definition and allocation paradigm which 
Burch (1976) proposes is an obvious simplification of 
reality. However, it does provide an analytical framework 
within which the important characteristics of the property 
rights associated with fishing can be identified and 
examined. A marine fishery, commercial or amateur is a 
property in which a variety of rights are distributed to a 
variety of people in a variety of ways. Burch's model 
identifies each of these three elements: the rights; the 
the rights allocation mechanisms; and can be 
in the evaluation of both the policy 
holders; and 
used to assist 
Objectives and the policy instruments of fisheries 
management. 
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Having identified the property rights associated with various 
policy objectives and instruments, it is then possible to 
evaluate the consequences of using the particular management 
options available. Property right institutions are a social 
mechanism for producing order in society and so the affects 
of any action can be determined by following the creation and 
transfer of property or other rights within society. Thus 
the effects of a particular management objective - such as 
economic efficiency - and the policy instruments used to 
achieve the objective - such as a royalty on catch or the use 
of individual quotas can be described and evaluated in 
terms of property rights, in addition to any other criteria. 
Whereas both instruments can, in theory, achieve the 
objective, each has an entirely different set of property 
rights associated with it. 
A royalty may involve limited property rights to a fishery 
where the numbers of fishermen are also limited by licencing, 
but economic efficiency is determined by restrictions on the 
total catch via the royalty imposed. On the other hand, the 
royalty could be used in association with a policy of 
open-access and so the property rights would be primarily 
with the public agency. The economic consequences may be the 
same, but the effects of open-access on other factors, such 
as who now has access to the fish, will be quite different. 
Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) effectively give the 
fisherman a private property right to an amount of catch. 
Economic efficiency results from the best fishermen buying 
the property rights and fishing in the most cost-effective 
manner. Using ITQs, the management objective is achieved, 
but with vastly different consequences for society, than if a 
royalty were the policy instrument used. The resource is 
alienated from public ownership and all income accrues to the 
private owner (the fisherman). Chapter seven provides a more 
detailed description of the proposed use of ITQs in New 
Zealand. 
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Hence, it is important for fisheries managers to be aware of 
the nature of the property rights they seek to create, or do 
create, when they pursue specific objectives, using 
particular policy instruments. More than just biological and 
economic criteria are needed to evaluate management policy 
and practice. 
It is not really appropriate to discuss here either the types 
of management instruments available or the various criteria 
against which management can be evaluated. These are 
presented in appendices A and B respectively and will be 
referred to in later chapters when pertinant to the 
discussion. Peacey (1985) and Anderson (1983) provide the 
basis for the material provided in Appendices A and B. 
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2.5. Common Property in Fisheries: a Conclusion. 
Gordon (1954 ) provided the economic analysis of Graham's 
(1949 ) ear Ii er observations about open-access fisheries. 
Hardin (1968 ) provided a general exposition of a similar 
nature. Both recognized the 'tragedy' of the commons as 
waste; both as over-investment and over-exploitation. 
Since, a great deal has been done to ameliorate the effects 
of the commons problems so succinctly summarized by the maxim 
I everybody's property is nobody's property' (Ciriacy-Wantrup 
and Bishop,1975). 
Societies logically abandon open-access when it is realised 
that management can prove effective. Fisheries managers 
appear to have been slow to realise this, but are now making 
progress. Regulations which prevent excessive exploitation 
and investment have all been proposed, as well as the 
establishment of property rights, as mechanisms to manage 
fisheries. It is now up to the fisheries managers to use the 
available techniques to ensure the continued ability of fish 
to provide protein, incomes and enjoyment to the wide range 
of society which uses them. 
The following chapters discuss the biological and economic 
analysis of fishing in much greater detail. The objective is 
to provide a grounding in fisheries analysis before beginning 
a discussion of the attempts to integrate the theory and 
analysis of recreational and commercial fishing. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
37 
Introduction to the 
Biological Analysis of Fishing. 
3.1. Introduction. 
Fish are a biologically renewable resource subject to natural 
laws which govern the amount of the fish stock available to 
be harvested. The study of fisheries biology has attempted 
to describe the natural parameters which determine the yield 
the fish stock can produce. The other aim of fisheries 
biology has been to develop models of the optimum yield that 
a harvested fish stock can produce. The effects of the 
harvest on the fish stock are investigated and the objective 
is to determine the maximum yields a fish stock can endure 
without it being biologically over-fished. This chapter is a 
brief introduction to fisheries biology and yield production 
models. The full extent of the present biological analytical 
framework can not be adequately presented in the space 
available, so I have chosen to concentrate on the major yield 
models used in bio-economic analyses. This discussion will 
provide a basis for later chapters on the bio-economic 
analyses of fishing. 
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3.2. Early History .. 
Nineteenth century Fisheries Biology. 
prior to the beginning of the 20th century the notion of the 
inexhaustibility of the world's fisheries was firmly 
entrenched. It was not until this century that it was 
officially recognized that fish stocks were, in fact, finite 
(Crutchfield, 1982), and in some cases were being depleted 
rapidly ~arstang, 1900). The cause of the decline in stocks 
was widely held to be over-fishing, due to both too much 
effort and improper fishing techniques, ~etersen, 1894). 
Anadromous and freshwater species had to contend with the 
additional problems of habitat destruction, pollution and 
river development. Despite the obvious need for fisheries 
management to address and correct these problems, would-be 
managers faced a deplorable lack of knowledge about many 
aspects of fisheries, ~ielsen, 1976). The affects of 
fishing on fish stocks was virtually unknown. 
In many cases management decisions were made despite the lack 
of information. Early fisheries management developed from a 
'logical analysis' of the problems faced, as fisheries 
biology was still in its infancy and incapable of producing 
the required information. The concept of catch quotas arose 
from an analogy of fish stocks to a [inancial 
'capital-interest' system. The obvious evidence of declining 
catches and catch-rates dispelled the myth of ever-increasing 
yields from increasing effort. For a given a stock of fish 
some intermediate level of effort logically should produce a 
yield, whilst still preserving the ability of the stock to 
produce its' 'interest' again the following year. Too much 
effort reduces both the stock and its ability to produce a 
harvest; too little effort conserves the stock, but wastes 
the 'interest' produced, mertram, 1873). Hence catch quotas 
were introduced to some fisheries. These were initially set 
low to allow the depleted stock to rebuild and were then 
gradually increased. A good example is the North Sea Plaice 
(Pleuronectes platessa) harvest ~ussell, 1942). 
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Biological experience suggested that the yield from the 
fishery was somehow related to the numbers of eggs laid. To 
ensure that fish were allowed to spawn before being caught, 
minimum sizes for fish landed, as well as mesh size 
restrictions were also introduced, Wohnstone, 1905). Catch 
quotas, limited fishing seasons, gear restrictions and fish 
size regulations have all become standard fisheries 
management tools. These tools all developed from an early 
logical analysis of the over-fishing problem, prior to the 
development of the theoretical analyses to be used later. 
The Development of Biological Analysis. 
The theoretical analysis of both fishing and the dec~ine of 
fisheries began well into the 20th century. Russell (1931) 
was the first to describe succinctly the interaction between 
fish stocks and fishing. The simple input - output model 
stated in equation 3. ~ links changes in stock biomass (B) to 
additions from growth ~) and recruitment (R) and losses due 
to natural mortality ~) and fishing mortality (F), where; 
B = R + G - M - F (3.1 ) 
The same relationship is sho~n diagramatically in figure 3.1. 
(R) . RECRUITIlENT . (+) 
FIGURE 3.1 
FISHING 
110RTALITY 
(F) 
(-) 
STOCK 
BIOI-lASS 
(B) 
(-) 
NATURAL 
MORTALITY 
(M) 
SIHPLE STOCK DYNAHICS !'toDEL. 
(after Sissenwine, 1981. ) 
(+) GROHTH (G) 
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Hence, in a stable fishery, where the stock biomass is not 
chang i ng much 
mortality or 
from year 
harvest (F) 
to year, the 
should relate 
amount of fishing 
to the natural 
population parameters in the following manner; 
F = R + G - M (3.2) 
This relationship implies that for a constant stock size a 
sustainable level of harvest can be taken if Rand/or G 
increase or M decreases. The crucial question which then 
ar ises is: at which level of stock biomass does the greatest 
sustainable harvest become available? Put another way the 
question is; what will the maximum sustainable yield ~SY) 
be? (since stock size and harvest seem to be related). It 
is this question which fisheries biologists 
investigating for many years. 
have been 
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3.3. yield Models. 
Yield models are the mechanisms which fisheries biologists 
use to describe the relationships which relate the biological 
parameters of the fish stock to the harvesting sector of the 
fishery. The models are an abstraction of the real situation 
in the fishery. They arose out of a need to provide a 
rational means to analyse the various kinds of catch data 
collected in an attempt to better describe the fisheries 
system. The biological management of fisheries has become 
built around the concept of a fish 'stock'; a concept which 
arose in response to th€ need to define more clearly the 
groups of fish under consideration ~ickie, 1979). 
The Stock Concept. 
As much of the following discussion centres around the 
concept of the fish 'stock' this is a useful place to 
introduce the concept properly. The term stock has a very 
particular meaning in fisheries analysis and 
Although it may appear to be a synonym for fish 
management. 
population, 
this is not the case. The two concepts are quite distinct. 
Whereas the term population is used by ecologists to describe 
a group of animals they may be studying, the term stock is 
more artificial and defines a group of fish, not by natural 
criteria, but by yield or production criteria. 
Populations are essentially , [interbreeding] groups of 
organisms of the same species occupying a particular space at 
a particular time' ~rebs, 1978). Gene flow - from breeding 
- within the group would be much greater than between groups 
of the same species, hence, populations may have discernable 
differences in gene frequencies and exhibit different 
characteristics. The recent identification of separate and 
distinct populations of snapper (Chrysophrys auratus) at the 
northern end of the South Island is an example of this. 
Previously, these fish populations were thought to form one 
large population, but differences have been detected, 
mrummond and Mace, 1984). 
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The term 'stock' is an operational one ~ulland, 1969). 
Essentially a stock is a statistical unit of fish. It has 
special defined characteristics that enable fisheries growth 
and yield models to work. The models need information such 
as birth rates (cohort strength), growth rates, recruitment 
ages, natural mortality rates and fishing mortality rates. A 
stock should be homogeneous for these parameters, so that any 
sample of fish taken from a stock will exhibit similar 
characteristics to any other sample from the same stock. 
This means that a stock mayor may not equate to a natural 
population of fish. Occasionally a stock may include only a 
portion of a population, for example mature adults, or may be 
a conglomeration of similar portions of a number of 
populations. If all of the New Zealand snapper were to be 
managed as a single stock, all population and production 
parameters would have to be similar throughout the country. 
This is clearly not the case, as a number of different stocks 
have been identified. 
The Development of Yield Models. 
The models developed for the analysis of the interactions 
between fish stocks and fishermen have traditionally been of 
two types: descriptive and analytic. In descriptive models 
the parameters used are calculated from observed changes in 
the stock, particularly size, whereas in analytical models 
they are derived independently. Other differences will be 
noted in the discussion of each type of model below. 
Descriptive models developed from the early work of Graham 
(1935). The model is based on the logistic growth equation 
originally developed 
populations. 
to describe changes in human 
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The logistic growth equation is: 
(3-3) 
where t = the time interval; 
N = the population number; 
r = the instantaneous rate of increase; and 
K = population saturation level or environmental 
carrying capacity. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates these relationships. 
Logistic growth models do not distinguish between growth, 
recruitment or natural mortality. All these are combined 
into a single measure, the surplus production, which is 
assumed to be a function of stock size. In a simple linear 
case, the function of population size for the above logistic 
equation is; 
j(N) 
If fishing mortality is included in a logistic 
equation then: 
((N) 
where E=amount of fishing effort; 
q=a constant; and 
qE=the fishing mortality rate W) 
for stock level N. 
growth 
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FIGUER 3.3 
(a) population size change over time. 
(b) change in population with a change in 
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stock size B 
I 
I 
Bmax prod. 
+ ..... 
THE'SCHAEFER (1954) SURPLUS PRODUCTION 
MODEL. 
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Schaefer a954) developed the logistic growth model further 
by relating the equilibrium stock size (B~) to fishing 
effort, based on the assumption that fishing effort can be 
measured so that it is proportional to the fishing mortality 
rate ~issenwine, 1984). The surplus production equation is 
now: d!3* 
dt == ff!3' = r j3/1 (D/J1IJZ - g*)- C 
C :: r g~( !3/J1aZ -3:t) 
where B~::: equilibrium stock size; 
Bmax ::: K ::: carrying capacity; and 
C = total catch or yield. 
(3'6) 
(3·1-) 
This relationship gives an assymetric production function 
which is zero when the stock size is either zero or Bmax and 
has production at its maximum for the middle stock si ze, (see 
f i gu r e 3. 3) . 
In the static equilibrium situation where the long-term stock 
size is unchanging i.e. ~B=O, then the yield for the year C -is a function of the average stock size ~); 
Y 
C ~f(l3) 
MSY 
EFFORT (E) 
FIGURE 3.4 THE SCHAEFER (1954) SURPLUS 
PRODUCTION MODEL YIELD-EFFORT 
CURVE. 
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The ratio of catch to effort can be used as a rough 
indication of the stock size through the equation; 
c 
/3=£ 
'2 
where E denotes effort, and 
q is the catchability coefficient. 
(3'j) 
Hence, effort can also be expressed in terms of stock; 
C 
E" 8't (3'/O) 
and catch (C) can be expressed in terms of effort. The 
general case being; 
where the coefficients 0<.1 and 0\2. represent stock parameters 
such as the Bmax, reproduction, growth, recruitment and 
natur al mortali ty of the stock (Ander son, 1980) • Thus the 
equilibrium harvest or sustainable yield Y associated with 
each level of effort can be shown on a Schaefer surplus 
production model yield-effort di agram, (see figure 3.4). 
One of the great advantages of the Schaefer surplus 
production model 
fishing effort. 
is that the only data needed is catch and 
Exact aging of fish stocks and estimates of 
growth, mortality and reproduction rates are not necessary. 
The simplicity of the data requirements and ease of 
application of surplus production models may be the major 
reasons for their frequent application to real problems 
(Gulland, 1977a). Surplus production models are particularly 
suited to situations where fishing mortality is the major 
cause of population changes, particularly decreases for 
example the blue whale 
~ulland, 1976). Cushing 
using surplus production 
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(Balaenoptera musculus) harvest, 
------~~--------------
U975) also suggests that when 
models the chances of either 
recruitment or growth over-fishing causing a stock failure 
are minimised. 
Despite these advantages, a great deal of criticism has been 
leveled at surplus production models. Sissenwine (1984) 
summarized the five major disadvantages as: the models are 
biologically unrealistic; it is difficult to characterize 
and meaningfully compare effort values; the assumption of 
having a stable equilibrium stock; the amount of yield known 
to exist that is not explained by the model; and the manner 
in which the data for the model is collected. 
The models are biologically unrealistic as surplus production 
is assumed to be an instantaneous function of stock size. 
Such a simplistic relationship is unlikely to be an adequate 
description, given the inherent complexity of multi-species 
ecosystems, the stochastic physical environment and the 
biology of fish reproduction and recruitment. Fish have a 
set breeding season which results in a pulse of new biomass 
rather than a continuous addition as occurs in other species 
such as humans. Also since recruitment is an important 
component of production the time lags must be considered. 
These occur between spawning and recruitment to the stock, 
and between recruitment and the stock attaining a particular 
size. 
A second criticism of surplus production models concerns the 
specification of fishing effort. This is a notoriously 
difficult parameter to measure accurately or to standardize 
throughout a fishery. The use of different harvest methods 
in multi-gear fisheries poses particular problems. So too in 
multi-species fisheries where effort also has to be 
apportioned amongst the catch. Hence, the catch-per-
unit-effort ~) is often exceedingly difficult to estimate. 
The assumption that fishing mortality (F) is proportional to 
effort (E) is thus often violated, leading to incorrect 
management as trends in catch and stock sizes are 
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misinterpreted. 
Surplus production models also assume that the catch 
effort data are related to a stock in equilibrium. 
fluctuations in yield or effort will invalidate 
and 
Large 
this 
assumption, as will dramatic changes in environmental 
conditions. Sissenwine (1984) refers to work by Knights and 
Pope (1975) where serious problems were shown to exist when 
determining the relationships between the catch, effort and 
catch-per-unit-effort data. Effort (E) is the independent 
variable and catch-per-unit-effort ~) is the dependent 
variable. Even when using randomly generated numbers, 
confounding was shown to occur between these variables as 
they are not truely independent. These results bring the 
apparent successes of the surplus production model into 
question due to the statistically significant confounding 
between supposed independent parameters. 
A fourth criticism concerns the amount of the stochastic 
component of surplus production. The amount of yield 
variability observed, but not explained by stock size is 
often ignored by both analysts and managers. Any uncertainty 
in the results of the model relevant to management - such as 
MSY, stock size or fishing effort levels are rarely 
expressed. These important characteristics are merely 
assumed to be valid on average. Sissenwine (1978) has 
already demonstrated the fallacy of this assumption. 
Although not specifically a criticism of the surpll;ls 
production model, a final component open to criticism is the 
types of data which are used in the model and the manner in 
which these data are collected. Catch and effort estimates 
are added each year as a single pair of figures. Cushing 
(1975, 1977) suggests that at least 20 years data from a wide 
range of stock sizes is needed to produce a result. 
presumably this will also include cases where effort has been 
extremely high and over-fishing - at least in the short-term 
- is already occurring. Over time periods of the order of 
twenty years fishing effort has changed dramatically in some 
fisheries due to either technological innovations or the 
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economic climate. The time delay also means that management 
can also be slow to develop, without any consideration of any 
inherent uncertainty in the results of the model. 
The primary assumption of descriptive yield models is that 
production is a function of stock size. If, for some reason, 
the fish stock or harvest declines unexpectedly, the model 
can incorporate the new data, but provide no insight into why 
the decline occured. The other stock characteristics, 
environmental factors or even changes in fishing behaviour -
other than total effort are superfluous to the data 
requirements of surplus production model. 
Analytical yield models are the second major way of 
investigating the relationships between fishing and the fish 
stock. Ricker (1948, 1958) and especially Beverton and Holt 
(1957) were able to incorporate the other stock parameters 
such as growth, recruitment and 
analytical models of fishing. 
(1931) as illustrated in figure 
natural mortality into their 
The simple model of Russell 
3.1 was the forerunner to the 
much more complex analytical models to be described below. 
These models concentrate on recruitment as a major component 
of stock production and develop Yield-per-recruit ~PR) 
relationships. The starting point of these models is 
individual fish. 
Yield-per-recruit (yPR) models assume that recruitment is 
related to the size of the spawning stock, i.e. the biomass 
of the sexually mature fish. The density-dependent nature of 
stock-recruitment relationships has been modeled by both 
Ricker (1958) and Beverton and Holt (1957) . Ricker proposed 
pr imar ily to that the mortality 
cannibalism by older 
of young 
fish of 
fish is due 
the same stock. Cannibalism 
would lead to a dome shaped stock-recruitment curve where 
maximum recruitment occurs at intermediate stock levels, (see 
figure 3.5). Beverton and Holt hypothesised that mortality 
results from density-dependent growth of young fish over and 
above the usual age-dependent mortality. Density-dependent 
mortality leads to an asymptotic stock-recruitment 
relationship (see figure 3.5). These are generalized curves 
50 
and a great number of variations or families of both types of 
stock-recruitment curves can be derived. 
STOCK SIZE (N) 
FIGURE 3.5 POSSIBLE STOCK RECRUITIiENT 
RELATIONSHIPS. 
b 
(a) equilibrium· condition 
(b) Beverton and Holt (1957) 
(c) Ricker (1958) 
Unfortunately these elegant stock-recruitment models are 
seldom adequate to explain 
still highly variable and 
observed 
often so 
aim to 
data. Recruitment is 
management strategies 
each fish that recruits 
should 
to 
actual size of ·the year 
unpredictable that 
maximise the yield of 
regardless of the 
is the purpose of 
the stock, 
class. This 
yield-per-recruit analyses. 
Yield-per-recruit analysis is based upon the 
single year class (or cohort) of fish. 
dynamics of a 
The production 
dynamics of a cohort over its lifetime are described in 
figure 3.6. These diagrams assume no fishing occurs. As the , . 
numbers of fish in the cohort declines, the mean weight of an 
individual fish increases dramatically at first then more 
slowly, and the total weight of the cohort increases to a 
peak, then decreases due to mortality losses exceeding 
somatic growth. Based on these assumptions the obvious 
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(a) 
time' (t) 
FIGURE 3.6 A HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF THE 
POPULATION DYNAMICS OF AN UNEXPLOITED 
COHORT OF FISH FROM THE TIME OF 
RECRUITMENT TO THE STOCK. 
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fishing strategy would be to wait until the total cohort 
weight peaks, then harvest the cohort instantly without 
disturbing younger cohorts. This is not a practical fishing 
strategy as it is extremely difficult to be so selective as 
to take only a particular cohort of fish. Even within a 
particular cohort fish size will vary about a mean size and 
it is possible for the smallest fish of one cohort to be 
smaller than the largest fish of the next cohort. The 
strategy of instantaneous fishing is also impractical and 
inefficient as it would require large amounts of fishing gear 
to ensure the harvest was successful, which would then sit 
idle for the rest of the year. The next best solution is to 
maximise th~ total yield-per-recruit by catching from the 
stock a proportion of fish of all ages - i.e. different 
cohorts. 
Yield 
Y 
Yield 
Y 
F=<>o (a) 
age (t) 
(b) 
F=Oo 
age (t) 
FIGURE 3.7 YIELD FROM A SINGLE COHORT AS A 
FUNCTION OF TIME OR AGE OF RECRUITHENT. 
F - FISHING MORTALITY RATE. 
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FIGURE 3.8 A THREE DI~fENSIONAL YIELD-EFFORT 
DIAGRAM - with yield as a function 
of both age and effort. 
Beverton· and Holt (1957) develop their YPR model by assuming 
that if all the fish of a particular cohort could be 
harvested at a particular time (i.e. fishing mortality W) is 
infinite), then the total yield curve would look like figure 
3.7. Infinite fishing effort would not allow any fish to 
escape at whatever age was chosen to harvest them. If 
however, some fish escape, then the yield curve for the 
cohort would be less than where effort is infinite, so 
fishing mortality (F) would be less than infinite. Some of 
the escaped fish will die naturally and some will be caught 
at a later time at a greater age and weight. By creating a 
third axis to the yield-age diagram above (figure 3.8) - that 
of fishing mortality (F) - a series of such yield age curves 
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could be developed. Contouring the three dimensional diagram 
- to a two dimensional plot - gives a series of equal yield 
lines or yield isopleths. For a particular level of fishing 
mortality and age at recruitment to the fishery stock (tc) a 
yield-per-recruit can be derived from the equal yield lines, 
also called yield isopleths. An example of a yield isopleth 
diagram is shown in figure 3.9. 
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The total yield from a cohort will also need to include those 
fish which escape and are caught later. The number of fish 
surviving to be caught again is a function of the survival 
rate (5) and the number of fish starting the year ~i) , 
where: 
-(F+f7J) 
-e (3·/2 ) 
(3-/3) 
where F = the fishing mortality rate; and 
M = the natural mortality rate. 
The total number of fish caught ~) during any year (i) 
depends on the number at the beginning of the year (N). The 
Baranov (1918) equation calculates this where: 
C1 =N F~fYl (J._e--(F-rfYllj (J'//;-) 
This relates catch to physical population size and the rates 
of mortality. 
The weight of the fish can be calculated using the von 
Bertalanffy (1938) size at age function: 
(3 -/5) 
where W is the asymptotic weight maximum for the 
particular species. 
By then following the iterative flow for each year up to the 
year n, where the numbers of fish left in the cohort become 
zero, the total yield for the cohort is the value Y where: 
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n 
L (we); 
1=0 
(3-/6) 
Figure 3.10 shows the full flow diagram for a calculation of 
this kind. 
eq.3.13 
eq.3.1S 
.' 
N" - N'e- M Slack size at 't> - , . age of first capture . 
1 1 
N· - Ne-(F+M) ~ ~ Ci=N,.-L- (l_e-(Ft>M)) 1 .. 1 - , 
... FT'M 
eq.3.14 
1 1 
Survivors after 
fa-
Numerical catch at 
year of fishing age i after year of fishing 
t.. ./ 1 . 
Wi:; Woo(l-e- K \1-/0 )) 
~ Catch : W· C· 
size of age calculation weight " 
n 
"Tolal 
cohort = (WC)·+(WC). ,+" ,+(WC) co Ich 'It 'M 
eq.3.1S 
weighl 
aqe I 
FIGURE 3.10 AN ITERATIVE FLO~l DIAGRAM 
FOR COHORT YIELD - IN TERMS 
OF YIELD PER RECRUIT. 
(from Tyler and Gallucci(1980) 
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From this method a number of assumptions need to be made in 
order to obtain an estimate of the stock yield. If the 
number of recruits each year is constant, and the growth and 
natural mortality rates are constant for each cohort, then a 
year by year plot of a single cohort would produce identical 
yield results to that for a whole stock in any single year, 
if the yield were to be derived cohort by cohort. However, 
the actual number of recruits in any year is rarely constant, 
so this is rarely valid. The usefulness of the 
yield-per-recruit isopleth plot (figure 3.9) is that it is 
dependent on rates, not absolute numbers, so the shape is 
independent of cohort size. This means that if estimates of 
natural mortality ~), present fishing mortality (F), and the 
growth rate can be obtained, a stock size (B) can still be 
calculated, ~yler and Gallucci, 1980). Yield-per-recruit 
curves can then be drawn for particular values of F and M, 
(see figure 3.11). 
FISHING MORTALITY RATE (F) 
FIGURE 3.11 YIELD-PER-RECRUIT CURVES FOR A COHORT 
SUBJECT TO DIFFERENT NATURAL MORTALITY (M) 
RATES - BUT FOR A CONSTANT AGE OF RECRUITMENT 
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If the fish stock is assumed to be in equilibrium, the total 
annual yield will be equal to the total yield of a single 
cohort over its entire life span, given the assumptions made 
above. Increasing fishing mortality will have two effects on 
the sustainable yield. More fish are taken immediately 
although this may, in turn, decrease the amount of fish 
available to be caught later. Whether the sustainable yield 
will increase with increased fishing mortality depends on 
which of these two effects is strongest at that paricular 
point in time, as it depends on whether the stock is being 
under- or over exploited to begin with. An unexploited stock 
will have a total biomass diagram similar to figure 3.12 
where bu is the biomass path over time. The time tm 
corresponds to the maximum biomass of the cohort. This is 
when the somatic growth of the cohort is equal to the natural 
mortality rate. After this time mortality exceeds growth. 
Bmax 
Biomass 
(B) 
- - - .....;-;;;;..-~--
tmax 
unexploited 
cohort 
age of cohort or time (t) 
FIGURE 3.12 BIOMASS PATH OVER TIME FOR LN UNEXPLOITED 
FISH COHORT. 
Biomass is greatest <. Bmax ) at time ( Tmax) 
59 
Now suppose that the cohort were to be exploited to produce a 
constant fishing mortality, so that any fish recruited to the 
fishery at age tc would have an equal chance of being caught. 
Adding a fishing mortality will increase the total mortality 
and slow growth of the cohort so that it attains a smaller 
maximum biomass at a time earlier than it would under no 
fishing. This is biomass time path bc. The fishing 
mortality will also produce a yield from the fishery, noted 
by the time path Yc in figure 3.13. 
Bmax 
Bc 
Biomass 
(B) 
- - -:...-;;;-----
age of cohort (t) 
FIGURE 3.13 BIOMASS' PATH OVER TUfE FOR A COHORT 
WHICH IS EXPLOITED AT A CONSTANT 
FISHING MORTALITY RATE STARTING AT AGE 
tc. 
Yc is the harvest yield time path. 
Bc is'the maximum biomass attained by 
the cohort. 
From this analysis we can conclude that the sustainable yield 
associated with harvesting the cohort at age tc will 
initially increase as the fishing mortality 
then fall asymptotically to the level of 
fishing mortality further increases to 
is increased, and 
biomass at tc, as 
infinity. The 
sustainable yield curve for the biomass Bc available at time 
tc will look like figure 3.14. The curve Bmax represents the 
yield curve if fishing mortality begins only when an 
unexploi ted cohort has reached the total maximum weight, (see 
figure 3.13). Increasing fishing mortality means that the 
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yield-per-recruit for the curve Bm (in figure 3.14) 
asymptotically approaches the maximum for the cohort. The 
maximum value is obtained when the cohort maximises its total 
biomass and then is subject to immediate and instantaneous 
harvesting from infinite amounts of fishing effort. 
----~~--------------
FISHING MORTALITY (F) 
FIGURE 3.14 SUSTAINABLE YIELD CURVES FOR DIFFERENT 
AGES OF RECRUITMENT TO THE HARVESTED 
STOCK. 
tc tmax 
tmax 
Fo::> 
It is possible to calculate the sustainable yield curves for 
each age of recruitment (ti) and the corresponding biomass at 
infinite harvesting or fishing mortality. A series of these 
curves can be developed as shown in figure 3.15. Drawing the 
envelope of all of the separate age-at-recruitment 
sustainable yield curves yields a locus of points which 
becomes the Beverton and Holt (1957) Eumetric yield function t 
(Hannesson, 1978). This curve represents the maximum 
sustained yield from any given level of fishing mortality and 
age of recruitment of the cohort to the fishery. Note that 
all yields from this model are given in terms of 
yield-per-recruit. 
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Brnax 
-' - - - - - - - - - - - .:=.,- ---:::-::;:;?;;;;;.-,.,,;;;a..---
FISHING MORTALITY RATE (F) 
Foe 
FIGURE 3.15 SUSTAINABLE YIELD CURVES FOR DIFFERENT AGES OF 
RECRUITMENT (t.) TO THE HARVESTED STOCK. THE 
1. 
trnax 
YIELD 
t4 
LOCUS OF EACH t. FORMS THE EUMETRIC YIELD CURVE 
FOR A YIELD-PER~RECRUIT MODEL. 
If the fishery is not in equilibrium the YPR can still give 
guidance about sustainable levels of fishing mortality or 
fishing effort. However, to calculate the actual total yield 
from the fishery an estimate of stock size is needed. The 
techniques of cohort analysis and virtual population analysis 
(Cushing, 1975; Sissenwine, 1981) can be used to obtain an 
independent estimate of the stock size, with which the 
yield-per-recruit is multiplied to give a total yield 
estimate. 
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Although far more complex than the surplus production models-
and hence, possibly less accessible to fisheries managers- a 
YPR model can exploit available data on growth, mortality and 
stock age structure. The advantage for management is that 
advice on policy can be given soon after the necessary 
parameters are determined. The need no longer exists to 
accumulate the 20 years or more of data required by 
descriptive models. If it is available, such data may make 
YPR models more precise and possibly more accurate. 
One of the major disadvantages or weaknesses of using 
yield-per-recruit models relates to the ability of the 
analysts to obtain estimates of the necessary population 
parameters. The rate of natural mortality is often assumed 
to be constant across the whole fish stock, but Sissenwine 
(1984) argues that this is an unrealistic assumption. There 
is evidence to suggest that predation is a major source of 
natural mortality as is disease and that in a 
multi-species ecosystem constant natural mortality rates for 
single species may be inappropriate. The natural mortality 
rate of a particular fish species probably varies as a 
function of the state of the whole ecosystem rather than as a 
result of the state of that single species. 
Other Criticisms of Yield Models 
There are a number of other possible criticisms of both types 
of yield modes. Some of these concern the single species 
nature of the models. Whereas another criticism notes that a 
basic assumption of yield models is that the stock production 
parameters do not change. Such an assumption ignores the 
potential for fishing to change the stocks genetic make-up. 
The criticisms which relate to the single species nature of 
the models include the problems of species replacement, 
multispecies productivity and the general productivity of a 
marine ecosystem. If a particular fish stock is subject to 
heavy fishing pressure, it is possible for other less 
desirable fish to displace the over-fished species from its 
place in the ecosystem. One well documented example of this 
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phenomenom of species replacement is the increase in the 
numbers of antarctic seals since the dramatic decrease in 
whale populations. ~nox,1983 pers.comm.) If such an 
replacement were to occur in a depleted fish stock such as 
rig or snapper, a simple yield model might predict an 
increase in the stock if fishing ceases, it may not occur. 
The second criticism of single species yield models relates 
to their inability to describe or analyse the important 
ecosystem parameters which can affect stock productivity. 
Multispecies ecosystems are far more complex than the single 
species models can describe and hence, their results are 
simplistic and often erroneous. This problem has been 
circumvented to a large extent by the fisheries analysts 
developing both mUltispecies and ecosystem models of 
fisheries. Such models are by their very nature much more 
complex than the single species yield models, and as yet 
economists have shown little desire to develop multispecies 
or ecosystem-based bio-economic models. Mercer (1982) and 
Stauffer U983) provide a greater discussion of the use of 
the more complex biological models of fisheries and for 
further discussion the interested reader is refered to these 
authors. 
A final criticism of yield models of all types is that they 
ignore the great potential of harvesting to change the fish 
stock characteristics. The models assume that the average 
genotype of the stock remains unchanged, yet fishing 
mortality has the potential to be a significant evolutionary 
selection force. Gear or size restrictions can result in the 
selection of smaller adults or slower growing fish, which 
will consequently result in a major and perhaps deletrious 
change in the average genotype. If such changes occur, then 
fishing activity, the objective of the yield model, changes 
the basic assumptions of the yield model, and so invalidates 
its continued use. (Duncan, 1985 pers.comm.) 
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3.4 Sustainable yield Philosophy. 
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). 
The primary objective of yield models is to determine the 
sustainable yield associated with particular levels of 
fishing effort. Since the 1930s the concept of maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY) has dominated fisheries management 
(Larkin, 1977). MSY is easily calculated in surplus 
production models, being the point of greatest surplus 
(figure 3.l6a). For YPR models the maximum average yield 
(MAY) for a year or fishing season can be calculated by 
multiplying the maximum YPR - associated with Fmax fishing 
mortality - with the average annual recruitment, (figure 
3 .16b) • 
+J 
'''; 
::1 
I-i 
U 
(]) 
I-i 
I-i 
(]) 
0.. 
'0 ,..., 
(]) 
'''; 
>t 
MSY 
EFFORT (E) 
(a) Schaeffer (1953) Yield-effort curve. 
FO.l Fr:lax 
FISHING MORTALITY (F) 
(b) Beverton and Holt (1957) Eumetric 
Yield curve. 
~.l =10% fishing mortality rate. 
FIGURE 3.16 SUSTAINABLE YIELD CURVES 
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The idea of maximising the biological yield of a fish stock 
became a principle objective of fisheries management for 
three reasons. The first is that fisheries biologists were 
the first fisheries managers. Economic efficiency as a 
management objective was still to be discovered for fishing. 
The second reason is that it provided a supposedly 'sound 
scientific and logical foundation' for management and avoided 
any need to deal with the problems in fisheries nebulously 
labelled 'social, political and economic' (Nielsen, 1976). 
Finally, maximising the production of an ostensibly free food 
resource also seemed to be a worthy public goal, mielsen, 
1976). 
Larkin's (1977) epitaph for the concept of MSY suggests 
strongly that the use of MSY poses a number of problems for 
fisheries managers. In particular, it has the potential to 
cause instability in the fish stock if pursued too rigidly. 
MSY strategies may: 
1. suggest the harvest of some fish at too young an 
age; often soon after their age of first spawning 
which, in some species, is the least successful 
spawning; 
2. create an illusion of the long-term sustainable 
yield being greater than it actually is 
particularly in a virgin or lightly exploited 
stock; 
3. cause a stock or population crash if applied to a 
young cohort due simply to the large natural 
fluctuations in recruitment success; 
4. cause the depletion of some species ahead of others 
in a multi-stock or mUlti-species fishery. This is 
possible particularly where the stocks vary in 
productive or reproductive capacity and the less 
productive are vulnerable to excessive 
exploitation; and 
5. have no real value in determining the bio-economic 
yield of a fishery. 
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Larkin (1977) concludes that, from a biological perspective, 
MSY simply is not a sufficient objective for management. It 
does, however, have the redeeming feature of being a valuable 
indicator of the production potential of a fish stock. 
Other Yield Values. 
Despite the lack of success of the biological objective of 
MSY, it has become an integral part of the other objectives 
developed to provide a basis for management. Since the 1950s 
economists have suggested that, although the yield of fish is 
the fishery's product, the real yield of the commercial 
fishery is the net economic benefits it is able to produce, 
(Christy and Scott, 1965). Even if the physical yield of 
fish could be maximised, applying excessive effort to harvest 
would be wastefu11 ~rutchfie1d and Pontecorvo, 1969). 
Consideration of the role of economics in the analysis of 
fisheries actually preceded Gordon's (1954) seminal analysis 
of the fishery as a 'commons' resource. However, Gordon's 
work is usually regarded as the beginning of the more 
rigorous economic investigation and analysis, (see Chapter 
Four). Economists have since elaborated their analyses of 
commercial fishing and management and made in roads into the 
development of an economic theory of recreational fishing. 
These econ~mic analyses are discussed in later chapters. 
The most recent development in the 
philosophy of sustainable yield has 
evolution of the 
been the attempts at 
incorporating social, cultural and political aspects into the 
analysis. One result of this process has been the 
development of the concept of the optimum sustainable yield 
(OSY), as described by Roeda1 (1975). As managers have 
perceived more fully the disadvantages of the older 
objectives of MSY and MEY, criteria other than simple 
economic efficiency or maximum fish yield have been 
increasingly included in the management framework. 
Consideration of the physical yield or net economic returns 
now take their places alongside other objectives such as 
providing recreational fishing opportunities, retaining 
aesthetic values, or ensuring cultural values are considered. 
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All can be equally valid objectives when it comes to 
allocating and managing publicly owned resources - such as 
fisheries - so as to maximise net social benefit, to society 
and not just to fishermen. The difficulties of using OSY as 
a management objective usually arise when fisheries 
management attempt to maximise many or all of the different 
objectives. The problem can get rather complex and various 
authors have noted that such an optimum is virtually 
impossible to achieve. Peacey (1985) provides a fuller 
discussion of OSY and related management objectives. A 
further discussion of the utility of OSY as both a management 
objective and a management philosophy will be undertaken in 
chapter eight. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
The primary purpose of the review of the fishing yield models 
presented in Chapter Three is to introduce the biological 
component of the term 'bio- economic'. The discussion could 
not be comprehensive enough to cover the full range of the 
biological analyses of fishing and fish biology. However, 
for the purposes of this report it is enough to review the 
major yield models which constitute the biological basis for 
the bio-economic models of fisheries economics who often 
appear to use biological models in an extremely incritical 
manner and very rarely appear to question the assumptions on 
which they are based or the results which they produce. 
The two major 
theory are 
(1954,1959) 
yield models used in 
the surplus production 
and the Beverton 
bio-economic fishing 
model of Schaefer 
and HoI t (1957 ) 
yield-per-recruit model. The simple nature of these yield 
models, especially the surplus production model, may explain 
their extensive use, both in fisheries economics and 
fisheries management. 
which is the cause 
However, it is 
of the criticisms 
this simple nature 
leveled. The most 
serious criticisms of the surplus production model are: (1) 
that it is biologically unrealistic; and (2) that the 
results produced are based largely on assumptions, about the 
fish or the fishing fleet, which are far to simplistic 
(Sissenwine, 1984). The model simply fails to recognise and 
account for the inherent complexity of a fishery. The 
criticisms of the more complex YFR model are similar in 
nature, but concentrate more on the validity of the data 
obtained. 
Both models are built almost entirely on one primary 
assumption, the 'stock' of fish. This is a production 
oriented concept based on the precept that all the fish 
within a stock have simil ar production characteristics. 
These characteristics or production parameters such as 
mortality, growth and recruitment are used to define and 
describe the stock and ultimately the expected yield. The 
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assumption of a 
sustainable yield 
within which the 
homogeneous stock of fish producing a 
ignores all of the rest of 
fish stock lives. The 
the ecosystem 
complexity and 
uncertainty inherent in such 
assumed to be insignificant. 
an ecosystem is ignored or 
Unfortunately the uncertain or 
stockastic components of fishing are often very significant 
and if not considered, tend to prove to be somewhat difficult 
to manage for. 
The final criticism of these yield models is not of their 
mechanics, but of their objective. Sustainable yields of 
fish are, in my oplnlon, a worthy objective, however to 
attempt to define a Maximum sustainable yield and expect it 
to be achieved is sheer folly. By its very nature MSY is a 
single point; a greater catch will start to overfish the 
resource, and a lesser catch lead to the physical waste of 
potential catch. Neither the theoretical models nor the 
harvesting sector has the accuracy or 
determine or achieve such an objection. 
would be a delusion. 
precision to either 
To suggest otherwise 
In the following chapters, which deal primarily with the 
various economic facits of fisheries analysis, the biological 
yield is relegated to a secondary role. Nevertheless, it is 
the biological yield of fish which provides the basis for the 
economic revenues or other benefits the fishery produces. It 
is important that the assumptions which underly the expected 
yields are understood. Being able to understand and be 
critical of all aspects of a bio-economic model and the 
management advice bio-economic analyses produce is an 
important part of fisheries management. The development of 
the bio-economic analyses of commercial fishing follows in 
Chapter Four. 
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CHAPTER FOUR. 
The Bio-Economic Analysis of Commercial Fishing. 
4.1 Introduction. 
Economists have also developed theoretical frameworks for the 
analysis of fisheries. Whereas the biological analyses 
described in chapter three were concerned with the physical 
yield of fish and how it could be maximised over the 
long-term, economists had as their objective the economic 
efficiency of the fishery. The economic theory and analyses 
did, however, use the biological models and concepts as a 
basis. Regardless of the economic benefits from fishing, the 
fish and the amount of effort required to catch it are major 
inputs into the economic analysis. Hence, bio-economic 
theories of fishing were developed. 
Commerical fishing came under serious scrutiny first as 
economists used the principles of market supply and demand to 
develop the analysis. The economic theory of recreational 
fishing is by comparison relatively new. Gordon (1954) 
produced the first, albeit simple, static analysis of an 
open-access commerical fishery using a model based· on the 
Schaefer (1954) surplus production yield model. In doing so 
he produced the first bio-economic analysis of a fishery. 
Other economists soon followed and the development of 
economic fishing theory has steadily advanced since. Copes 
(1972) extended the theory so that it could have not only 
economic efficiency as an objective, but also have some 
regard for the distribution of the different benefits fishing 
can produce. More recently the theory has evolved to such an 
extent that, the more complex dynamic models of fishing are 
being used more often, in order to adequately describe the 
fisheries under scrutiny. The basic objective is still, 
however, the investigation of economic efficiency and the 
effects various forms of management may have on the 
distribution of the economic benefits. 
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This chapter follows and describes the development of the 
economic theory of commercial fishing. It starts with the 
simple model of Gordon (1954) and ends with a brief discussion 
of a more complex dynamic bio-economic fishing model. The 
principles remain the same. It is merely the mathematical 
expression of these bio-economic principles which bec?me more 
complex. I have endeavoured to keep the discussion as simple 
and clear as possible, in order to dispel some of the mystery 
which occasionally surrounds economic theory. It's not that 
it is any more or less difficult than biological theory, just 
different. 
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4.2 From Gordon to Copes. 
Graham (1949) was the first to seriously remark on the 
economic inefficiency 
fish. Gordon (1954) 
that could occur 
followed with the 
in the harvest of 
first economic 
analysis of a simple commercial fishery. He developed a 
simple analytical economic model based on the Schaefer (1954) 
surplus production yield model and in doing so produced the 
first bio-economic analysis of a fishery. Gordon assumed 
that the physical yield of fish produced a related revenue, 
and that increasing effort increased costs. 
Q $ 
qH pH -
qB pB -
pA pA 
o 
- - -
- - -- .......... 
2 3 EFFORT 
FIGURE 4.1 THE STATIC BIQ-ECONCMIC ANALYSIS 
OF THE OPEN-ACCESS FISHERY, (after 
GOROON,1954) 
TC = TOTAL COSTS 
TR = TOTAL REVENUE 
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Figure 4.1 illustrates the simple, steady-state relationship 
between catch and effort, which Gordon used. The vertical 
axis can represent either the total catch, or if the total 
cost or revenue in dollars. The horizontal axis represents 
the amount of fishing effort applied in order to harvest the 
catch. The total revenue curve (equivalent to a total 
sustainable catch curve if price for fish landed is assumed 
to be constant) shows that greater total quantities of fish 
are harvested as effort is increased. The maximum yield 
level ~SY) is taken by E2 effort. The total catch then 
decreases even with increasing effort. The total cost curve 
is represented as being linear. It assumes a constant 
increase in total costs for each unit increase in effort. 
As illustrated any level of effort less than E3 creates a 
surplus of revenue over costs. This 
represents the economic rent accruing to the 
The existence of such a rent, collected 
surplus income 
fish resource. 
by fishermen as 
"supernormal" profits, will attract extra effort (either more 
fishermen or larger boats etc. for present fishermen) until 
it is all dissipated. This situation occurs at effort equal 
to E3. The level of effort which produces the greatest 
amount of economic rent is El. 
Early economic analyses were primarily concerned with 
maximising the economic yield of the fishery. The physical 
yield was incidental for the most part.-If the the fishery 
were owned by a single owner and run as a business the 
primary motive of which is assumed to be to maximise profit, 
then MSY would not be the owners goal as it does not produce 
. the greatest profit. The greatest profit or net economic 
yield from the Gordon model of a fishery would occur at a 
physical yield less than that of MSY. At this economically 
optimal level of output from the fishery the difference in 
the revenue obtained from selling the fish and the cost of 
catching it (ie the rent) would be greatest and would hence, 
equate to the maximum economic yield, ~EY). True sole 
ownership is, however, rare in fisheries management. Open 
-access or public agency management are far more common 
situations. Yet the objective of maximising the net economic 
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yield of a fishery has been the focus of much of the economic 
literature since the 1950s. 
Since Gordon's simple model economists have explored a range 
of simple and sometimes more complex fisheries situations, 
see for example Clark U972, 1976, 1980, 1982); Clark and 
Munro (1975); Crutchfield (1961, 1965, 1973, 1975); Scott 
(1955, 1979); Smith (1969); Christy (1975b, 1980). In 
these analyses a range of bio-economic models have been 
developed and used; some simple static models; others 
dynamic and much more complex. Much of the analysis and 
discussion has focussed on the related problems of economic 
overfishing economic inefficiency and resource rent 
dissipation - and the evaluation of potential institutional 
measures designed to overcome economic inefficiency. The 
institutional arrangements were analysed in order to address 
the distinct but related question of how the rent produced 
could be captured by society. The question of whether the 
rent produced should accrue to society is a political one. 
Economics can measure the size of the economic benefits and 
suggest ways to improve efficiency, but can not alone decide 
to whom the benefits should accrue. 
Of all the institutional remedies suggested for the problem 
of achieving economic efficiency the most common appears to 
be the implementation of a type of sole ownership in the form 
of a public agency. The management agency is given the power 
to control use of the fish resource by using various 
management tools. These tools or controls are designed to 
affect the prices or quantities of either the inputs to the 
fishery, such as effort, capital or labour, and/or the 
outputs of the fishery, normally fish or economic yield 
(Anderson, 1983b). Among these control measures are some, 
such as taxes and royalties, that ensure at least some of the 
economic surplus or resource rent from a fishery is 
collected. by society. Where this rent is spent is often a 
political decision. It may go into a general fund, or may be 
used specifically for fisheries management purposes. 
Appendix A provides an extended discussion of the various 
management tools and controls discussed in the literature. 
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It was the work of Copes (1972) which took the economic 
analysis of commerical fishing past the preoccupation with 
rent maximisation and into a second stage of analysis (Tuomi, 
1977). Copes extended the simple static model of Gordon 
(1954) by relaxing a number of the strict assumptions Gordon 
had incorporated. The extended analysis was now able to 
explore the other types of benefits which could accrue to a 
commerical fishery. These economic benefits were called the 
Consumer Surplus and the Producer Surplus. They measure the 
net benefits which can accrue respectively to the consumers 
and producers of a product such as harvested fish, in much 
the same way as resource rent measures the benefits which 
accrue to the economic scarcity of a resource. 
In order to clearly define the important roles of consumer 
and producer surplus in fisheries economics, the following 
sections provide a brief introduction to their roles in a 
general economic context. 
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4.3 The Market. 
In a normal simple economic market situation the prices and 
quantities of commodities are determined by the interaction 
of supply and demand. The demand schedule for a particular 
commodity represents the relationship between what a consumer 
is willing to pay for a good and the quantity of the good 
they require. This relationship can be expressed 
diagramatically as a line (a demand 
pri ce-quantity gr aph (see figure 4.2). 
stated, a demand curve ~) is normally 
downwards from left to right. The slope 
curve) 
Unless 
on a 
otherwise 
assumed to slope 
shows that the 
consumer is willing to pay less for a good as the quantity 
available increases, i.e. as the good becomes less scarce. 
s 
p 
o quantity Q 
FIGURE 4.2 THE t-1ARKET EQUILIBRIUM. 
The supply curve $) relates the quantity of a good produced 
to the amount the producers are willing to sell at various 
prices. At a low price the producer may only be willing to 
produce small quantities of a good. However, as the price 
rises more producers may find it attractive to produce the 
good and the total quantity available increases. The price 
later producers need to obtain for their production is often 
higher than that required by early producers because the 
former are normally employing higher cost inputs to 
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production. Their cost per unit of output is therefore 
greater. Hence, supply curves typically slope upwards from 
left to right (see figure 4.2). This is an expression of a 
commo~sense idea that suggests that you will nearly always 
find the cheapest resources begin used first in production. 
By superimposing the supply curve on demand for a particular 
commodity, a simple market diagram can be formed. The 
intersection of supply and demand denotes the market 
equilibrium (z) which in turn signals the equilibrium price 
(p) and quantity (q) of the good. At quantity (q) the 
willingness-to-pay ~TP) of consumers equals the 
willingness-to-sell of producers, so exactly the some 
quantities of the good are sought and supplied. The market 
is cleared. It is important to note at this point the role 
of property rights in the functioning of the market. 
Both property rights and the economic market can be 
considered to be institutions of society ~andall 1981). 
They order the relationships among individuals within 
society. There is a subtle difference in the role played by 
the market and property rights. Although both have rules 
associated with them, property rights specify the manner in 
which we perceive the ownership and use of goods, whereas the 
market provides the means by which ownership and use is 
transferred within society. An economic market would simply 
not exist if there were no property rights as there would be 
no property and no way of specifying ownership and use of 
resources and commodities. Because property rights can never 
really be fully non-attenuated - due to the problems 
associated with transactions costs and occasionally their 
variance with other social institutions such as laws, customs 
and traditions - a perfect economic market can never exist in 
practice. The market does, however, form a very useful 
institutional framework within society. 
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Consumer and Producer Surpluses. 
From the slope of the demand curve it can be noted that some 
consumers were actually willing to pay far higher prices for 
the commodities than the price ~) that they actually had to 
pay. The difference in total revenue between what consumers 
did pay for the quantity ~) of goods - given by the area 
(opzq)- and what they were willing to pay - given by the area 
(oDzq) - is called the consumer surplus. On figure 4.3 the 
consumer surplus is the triangular area pDz under the demand 
curve. 
If, for some reason, the supply schedule were to shift from 5 
to 5' - due to a cheaper source for an input or a new 
technology - then a change in the level of consumer surplus 
will also occur. The addition to consume surplus is 
represented by the area p'pzz' (in figure 4.3b) Of course the 
supply curve may shift in the opposite direction due to input 
costs increasing (if for example a tax were imposed or a 
cheaper source of raw materials was exhausted). Demand can 
also shift and affect the quantity of consumer surplus 
produced. 
Producer surplus measures the difference between the revenue 
received by producers and the costs of production as 
determined by the supply curve. As can be seen in figure 
4.4a the price ~) paid for a good at the market equilibrium 
(z) is in excess of what producers are willing to sell their 
products for at lesser quantities of supply. Hence, the area 
opz represents the total producer surplus for the total 
quantity ~) of the good sold at price ~). 
If, the demand schedule were to change - due possibly to an 
increase in total income or an increase in the price of a 
sUbstitute good - then producer surplus will also change as 
the market equilibrium alters. In figure 4.4b the demand 
curve has changed from D to D' and the producer surplus is 
now the area op'z and is greater than in the previous case. 
The change in the demand may due to an increase in income or 
a change in consumer tastes. There are many reasons that 
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(b) Change in the Demand schedule and in 
the amount of Producer Surplus. 
FIGURE 4.4 PRODUCER SURPLUS. 
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would cause a change in either demand or supply or both. 
Again, it is possible for demand to decrease - due to an 
increase in the price of a complementary good or a decrease 
in real disposable income and the producer surplus will 
also decrease. It is of course also possible for both demand 
and supply to shift simultaneously. Both the consumer and 
producer surplus values will alter as a result. 
Given that supply and demand schedules do not change then the 
price p is the only price which maximises the sum of both of 
the surpluses and thus the net economic benefits from the 
production and consumption of the commodities. Figure 4.5a 
shows the consumer and producer surpluses together for an 
equilibrium market. If a price (p I ) were set for the good 
which was different to the market price (P) then the sum of 
the surpluses would be less than their maximum. Figure 4.5b 
shows the result of setting a price (PI) - for example, by 
regulation as is done in the milk industry. The quantity 
demanded is now ~') and the economic surpluses less than in 
figure 4.Sa. 
D=Marginal Social 
Benefit (MSB) 
Q 
(a) Social Benefits Maximised. 
$ S 
'lost' social benefit 
D=MSB 
~----~r-------------~--Q 
(b) Some social benefit dissipated but 
some resource rent now available. 
FIGURE 4.5 THE SOCIAL SURPLUSES 
(a) maximised 
(b) partially dissipated 
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4.4: The Bio-economic Supply Curve for Fishing. 
The major analytical connection between the biological and 
economic analyses of commerical fishing is in the supply 
function of fish, hence, the term bio-economic supply. This 
supply function is composed of two components: 
1. the biological relationship between catch or 
yield (Y) and effor t (E); and, 
2. the economic relationship between total costs 
of fishing and the level of fishing effort (E) 
(Bell, 1980). 
The biological yield relationships have already been 
discussed in section 3.3. The effects of catch on a fish 
stock can be described by a range of models of varying 
complexity, however it is notable that economists tend to use 
simpler yield models such as the Schaefer (1954) surplus 
production function. The total catch or sustainable yield 
(Y) from such a model can be expressed as: 
(from 3.11) 
which forms a yield-effort parabola as in figure 4.6b. 
The costs of fishing must be included next. These costs can 
be of two types; actual and opportunity costs. The actual 
costs are normally direct inputs to effort and include 
expenses such as fuel, food and fishing gear. The 
opportunity costs are associated with the fishermans use of 
other scarce economic resources such as labour and capital. 
Both of these could be invested elsewhere in the economy 
instead of in fishing and give a return on the investment -
this is the opportunity cost associated with their use in the 
fishery. It is assumed, of course, that both the capital and 
labour markets have no excess capacity. Total costs (TC) for 
the industry is the cost of each unit of effort multiplied by 
COSTS 
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(b) 
FIGURE 4.6' THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COSTS 
OF FISHING, THE YIELD OF FISH AND 
THE AMOUHT OF EFFORT REQUIRED. 
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the total amount of effort. Thus total cost is normally a 
function of effort (E) . The total cost curve in Gordon's 
(1954) analysis is linear but this need not always be so. 
Diminishing returns is a characteristic of fishing as after 
some point catch-per-unit-effort ~) begins to decline. 
The other costs to be considered are average cost (AC) and 
marginal cost ~C). As effort increases the average cost of 
any fish caught rises where: 
AC = TC 
--Yi (4.1 ) 
where Yi = the yield corresponding to effort level Ei. 
Initially average cost rises with effort as a result of the 
decreasing catch per unit effort. Effort is assumed to be at 
a constant unit cost. After effort increases to El the 
average cost curve then bends backwards after MSY as further 
increases in effort (to E2) result in decreasing total 
catches. This is the concept of the backward bending supply 
curve, shown in figure 4.6a. 
The marginal cost curve ~C) is also important. It measures 
the relative changes in total cost (DTC) and yield (~Y) 
where: 
MC = ,6.TC 
/1Y (4.2) 
Marginal cost is initially above AC as the change in yield is 
less than the change in costs for any increase in effort. 
The Me is asymptotic to the MSY and increases to it as long 
as total yield is less than MSY. If the backward bending 
portion of average cost were also to be considered, a 
negative MC curve could also be drawn, but this is of no use 
to the present analysis. 
86 
Yield Yl on figure 4.6b can be taken with two quite different 
levels of effort - El and E2 - where E2 represents economic 
overfishing. Since, for a given yield from the fishery, 
total costs equal average costs multiplied by total effort, 
then: 
The point El represents the economically more efficient level 
of effort. Both AC and MC are bio-economic supply curves 
since they represent the costs of producing various levels of 
yield from the fishery. A more detailed discussion of the 
role of bio-economic supply curves in the overall economic 
analysis of fishing follows in the next section. 
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4.5: The Existing Economic Analysis of Fishing Extended. 
Consumer Surplus Reconsidered. 
The work of Copes (1972) was intended to extend the existing 
formal analysis to include consideration of the other social 
benefits that could accrue from the harvest of a fish stock. 
The previous emphasis on the maximisation of resource rent 
was shifted to incorporate the analysis of both the consumer 
and producer surpluses of fishing. Copes used a static 
equilibrium model of the fishery to analyse the- distribution 
of the benefits He used a standard economic price-quantity 
diagram rather than the yield-effort diagram of Gordon 
(1954), as in figure 4.7. 
The analysis included many of the assumptions used by Gordon 
to describe and simplify the fishery. Fixed combinations of 
labour and capital inputs were assumed. It was also assumed 
that the inputs used were technically the best available. 
Any effects on income within society due to changes in prices 
occuring due to the inputs to or yield from the fishery were 
ignored, which effectively assumes the fishery to be a 
insignificant price-taker in a much larger fishing sector of 
the economy. Changes in effort within the fishery due to 
increased total catches which may have resulted in decreases 
in catch-per-unit-effort were allowed for. Other possible 
externalities of fishing are assumed not to occur. The total 
economic benefit is measured in terms of consumer 
willingness-to-pay ~TP) - ie the total area under the 
demand curve - for fish caught and supplied onto the market. 
Costs are measured as the opportunity costs of labour and 
capital. 
The long-run supply schedule ~) is the locus of the static 
yield equilibria for various prices. By assuming all fishing 
units to be identical, all fishermen theoretically face the 
same opportunity costs and have the same fishing 
efficiencies. Hence, all units of output are produced at the 
same cost. The supply curve then represents both the average 
social cost . of fishing ~SC) due to the assumption of 
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EFFORT 
FIGURE 4.7 STATIC BIOECONOMIC A~ALYSES OF THE 
OPEN-ACCESS FISHERY. 
TC - TOTAL COSTS. 
TR - TOI'AL REVENUE 
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constant opportunity costs - and the average private costs of 
fishing (APC) - due to the constant unit cost of all fish 
caught. This condition will be relaxed later in the analysis 
so that APC = ABC. 
The supply curve represents a similar production function to 
that of Gordon (1954), but is also backward-bending. Maximum 
yield (qm) is reached at price (pm) • Further increases in 
costs (or effort) produce less total yield, (see figure 
4. 7a). 
Assuming both a perfectly elastic demand schedule (D) which 
gives a constant price per unit of fish caught, and and 
open-access management regime, the long-run equilibrium for 
the fishery is A in figure 4.7a with qA yield. No surplus is 
earned by the fishery as total cost (TC) is equal to total 
revenue (ie TC = AC.qA = TR = AR.qA.). The marginal cost 
curve ~C) suggests a socially optimum level of output to be 
qB. If effort within the fishery could in some way be 
limited so as to cost only pC, at which level of effort 
quantity qB produces price pA for fish sold, then a maximum 
economic surplus is generated. At this ~B) level of effort 
and production total revenue - the area OpABqB and total 
costs - the area OpCCqB have the greatest difference 
between them. The difference or excess revenue is the 
resource rent accruing to the fishery and is represented on 
figure 4.7a as the area pCpABC (the hatched area). 
Therefore the quantity qB represents the physical yield of 
fish which maximises the net economic benefits from the 
fishery. 
catch ql 
This is directly 
on figure 4.7b 
equivalent to the quantity of 
which maximises the rent from the 
fishery by maximising the difference between total costs and 
total revenue. Increasing effort to E2 in figure 4.7b 
increases the total yield and total revenue from the fishery, 
but gives a lower rent and begins the intrusion of economic 
inefficiency. Increasing effort even further Feduces both 
the rent and total yield, which increases the economic 
overfishing and introduces biological 
assuming a constant output price i.e. 
overfishing. By 
perfectly elastic 
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demand - Gordon did not have to consider consumer surplus as 
part of the net economic benefits of the fishery. Relaxing 
this assumption produces a downward sloping demand curve 
making the market diagram now like that shown in figure 4.8. 
$ MC 
pB __ _ 
pA 
pC 
o qB qA qM 
FIGURE 4.8 STATIC ANALYSIS WITH A DCWNTm\RD 
SLOPING DEMAND CURVE. 
S=AC - SUPPLY or AVERAGE COSTS 
M::: - MARGINAL COSTS 
D - DEMAND 
AR - AVERAGE REVENUE 
MSR - MARGINAL 'SOCIAL' REVENUE 
Q 
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Open access results in a market equilibrium A as in the first 
analysis above, with price pA and quantity qA. This 
generates a consumer surplus of the area pADA. Again the 
social costs equal the private costs and both equal the 
market revenue at A so no rent accrues to the fishery under 
open access conditions. 
If however the socially optimium output from the fishery ~B) 
could be attained, then the price would rise from pA to pB. 
The intersection of the marginal cost ~C) curve and the 
demand curve determines the socially optimal equilibrium as 
demand represents consumer WTP which in turn is assumed to 
represent the marginal social benefits if total WTP is 
assumed to measure total benefits. The price rise from pA to 
pB and yield decline from qA to qB causes the total amount of 
consumer surplus to decrease also. However the resource rent 
now available under the socially optimal access conditions 
more than offsets the loss of consumer surplus. Hence, a 
maximum net economic benefit is attained - given by the sum 
of the consumer surplus and resource rent. 
Copes considers that the only management regime which would 
operate a fishery at a socially optimal level of harvest 
would be a public agency. A private owner would have little 
interest in the amount of consumer surplus generated and - if 
it were following the profit maximisation rationale - would 
attempt to maximise the resource rent of the fishery which 
would accrue to the private owner as supernormal profit. To 
the private owner the market demand curve would represent 
average revenue, not marginal revenue. A corresponding 
marginal revenue curve would have to be determined for the 
private owner and this would lie below the present demand 
curve (see figure 4. 9) • 
The supply curve would remain the same for the private owner 
as under open access - still representing the average cost 
curve or the market determined opportunity costs of inputs to 
fishing. 
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The intersection of the market marginal cost curve with the 
private owners marginal revenue curve is at E on figure 4.9. 
The maximum resource rent able to accrue to the private owner 
is the area pGpFFG. The consumer surplus at this equilibrium 
is the area pFDF. However, maximising the sum of the 
resource rent and the consumer surplus to get the greatest 
net social benefit would occur at the output level qB. 
Hence, if a public management agency could observe marginal 
social cost pricing it would operate the fishery to get 
output qB and price pB, whereas the private owner would not. 
$ 
pB 
pG 
o 
D=AR=MSR 
q 
FIGURE 4.9 STATIC FISHING ANALYSIS FOR THE 
PRIVATE cmNER. MR t- MSB 
MR - MARGINAL REVENUE (incane) 
Q 
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producer Surplus Reconsidered. 
The concept of producer surplus has hitherto not been 
considered in the economic analysis of commercial fishing. 
Turvey (1964) had observed that producer surplus is the third 
component of social net benefit to be gained from the 
exploitation of a fish stock - the other two being resource 
rent and consumer surplus. Relaxing the assumptions that 
fishing units are identical and that these fishing units face 
identical marginal opportunity costs for their major inputs 
of capital and labour results in a portrayal of the fishery 
in a more real manner. Not all boats or crews are the same. 
Boat sizes vary, the skills of the skippers and crews also 
vary and each boat will employ different combinations of 
labour and capital. The result is a heterogenous catching 
sector of varying efficiency. 
The producer surplus comes from this variation in efficiency. 
Not all fishing units will have to pay the current market 
rate for capital or labour. Some are able to obtain these 
inputs at lower than the current rates - i.e. intra-marginal 
rates - or use them more efficiently. The result is a return 
on the input which is in excess of the average and so a 
producer surplus is created. 
where intra-marginal inputs 
opportunity costs below that 
This 
of 
of 
is particularly obvious 
capital and labour have 
other inputs. since all 
fishing units are facing the same average market price per 
unit of fish caught these inputs produce revenue in excess of 
their costs. 
There are two major reasons why intra-marginal input factors 
occur. First, differences in alternative employment and 
income opportunities may exist for fishermen or gear. One 
can imagine a situation where the oportunity cost for a very 
specialized item of gear such as a trawl net or even a 
fishing boat may be close to zero, simply because there is 
nowhere else to use it and it cannot be readily sold. The 
same may be true 
particular type of 
for a fisherman who has expertise in one 
fishing, but cannot be as usefully 
employed elsewhere - either in another fishery or outside the 
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fishing industry. 
A second, and 
difference in 
units. Skill 
possibly more important 
catching efficiency between 
has already been mentioned 
issue, is 
various fishing 
as a major 
determinant of competitive success, although other factors 
also playa role. Productivity will depend on the choice of 
crew, the use of the boat, the setting of the gear and at 
least a small amount of luck. It can be shown however, that 
even in a depressed or declining fishery that some operators 
still manage to make money simply because they are "better" 
fishermen. Since these fishermen can still manage to more 
than cover costs the notion that open access fisheries yield 
no rent is not strictly true. Rent does accrue - but only to 
individual fishermen not the fishery as a whole - due to the 
use of intra-marginal (cheaper) fishing inputs. It would 
appear that this portion of rent - the true producer surplus 
- has previously been ignored by economists as being 
insignificant (Copes, 1972). For labour this may be a valid 
assumption, but the use of the new technologies available can 
significantly alter harvesting efficiencies and so producer 
surplus may be more significant than it would otherwise seem. 
The analysis of producer surplus using the model developed so 
far requires that the social cost of fishing be 
differentiated from the private or market cost of fishing. 
This is illustrated in figure 4.10. Recall that the average 
social cost of fishing was taken to be equal to the average 
private cost due to the assumption of constant opportunity 
costs for inputs. The average market cost (AMC) still 
represents the supply function of the previous figures 
4.7a,4.8 and 4.9. It represents the long-run supply curve 
for the yield-price market equilibria. The marginal market 
cost curve ~C) represents the actual increasing cost per 
unit of producing the fish yield where the fisherman has 
exclusive rights to the resource, but must obtain the other 
factors of production such as labour and capital at the 
marginal opportunity cost - effectively the market rate. 
$ 
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FIGURE 4.10 STATIC FISHING ANALYSIS WITH 
THE SOCIAL VALUES SEPARATED FRCM 
THE PRIVATE OR MARKET VAIlJES OF 
FISHING TO NOI'E PRCDUCER SURPLUS. 
AMR - AVERAGE MARKET REVENUE (incane) 
MSR - MARGmAL SOCIAL REVENUE 
ABC - AVERAGE SOCIAL COSTS 
N-i:: - AVERAGE MARKET COSTS 
MM: - MARGINAL MARKET COSTS 
MSC - MARGINAL SOCIAL COSTS 
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The average social cost curve ~SC) is obtained by 
subtracting the average producer surplus accruing to the 
fishery from the average market cost of each unit of 
production. This represents the average true opportunity 
cost for the inputs of capital and labour for each unit of 
yield. A marginal social cost curve (MSC) is drawn marginal 
to the ASC curve in figure 4.10. Copes notes that the MSC 
curve will lie below the MMC curve because increases in the 
social costs associated with increasing yield will be less 
than the increases in market costs. In order for more fish 
to be caught greater amounts of market priced inputs must be 
used relative to the social opportunity costed inputs of 
labour and capital (Hannesson, 1978). Hence, the size of the 
producer surpluses will also rise. 
The demand curve shown in figure 4.10 functions as both the 
average market revenue curve ~MR) and the marginal social 
revenue curve ~SR). For any level of output the demand 
curve measures both the additional value or benefit enjoyed 
by consumers at the increased price and the average price per 
unit of output. The marginal market revenue curve (MMR) 
shows the marginal revenue enjoyed by the sellers of the fish 
as the output in the fishery increases. 
The model developed in figure 4.10 can now be used to 
identify and analyse the different equilibrium conditions 
that would stem from each of five different property right 
situations: 
a. open access and free market; 
b. public management; 
c. consumers monopsony (buyer's collective); 
d. producers monopoly (fishing collective); and 
e. resource owners monopoly. 
TABLE 4.1 
The benefit characteristics of equilibrium levels of effort in a commercial fishery 
under different modes of access management. 
(adapted from Copes,l972) 
FORMS OF 
ACCESS 
MANAGEMENT 
(Al OPEN-ACCESS 
AND FREE 
MARKET 
(B) PUBLIC MAN-
AGEMENT FOR 
MAXIMUM NET 
SOCIAL 
BENEFITS 
(Cl CONSU1ERS' 
MONOPSONY 
(D) PRODUCERS' 
MONOPOLY 
(El RESClJRCE 
OWNERS' 
MONOPOLY 
CATEGORIES OF 
SOCIAL BENEFITS 
MAXIMISED 
NONE 
COMBINED TOTAL 
OF CONSUMERS' 
AND PRODUCERS' 
SURPLUSES, AND 
RESOURCE RENT 
COMBINED TOTAL 
OF CONSU1ERS' 
SURPLUS AND 
RESClJRCE RENT 
COMBINED TOTAL 
OF PRODUCERS' 
SURPLUS AND 
RESClJRCE RENT 
RESOORCE RENT 
INCIDENTAL 
AMOUNTS OF 
BENEFITS 
SOCIAL 
BENEFITS 
DISSIPATED 
BOTH CONSU1ERS' RES ClJ RCE 
AND PRODUCERS' 
SURPLUSES 
NONE 
PRODUCERS' 
SURPLUS 
ONLY 
CONSU1ERS' 
SURPLUS 
ONLY 
BOTH CONStMERS' 
AND PRODUCERS' 
SURPLUSES 
RENT 
NONE 
NONE 
NONE 
NONE 
RELATION TO 
SOCIALLY 
OPTIMUM CATCH 
INDETERMINANT 
OPTIMAL 
LESS THAN 
OPTIMUM 
LESS THAN 
OPTIMUM 
LESS THAN 
OPTIMUM 
RELATION OF 
CONSUMER PRICE 
TO SOCIALLY 
OPTIMUM PRICE 
INDETERMINANT 
OPTIMAL 
ABOVE OPTIMUM 
ABOVE OPTIMUM 
ABOVE OPTIMUM 
RELATION TO 
SOCIALLY OPTIMUM 
LEVEL OF EFFORT 
ABOVE OPTIMUM 
OPTIMAL 
LESS THAN 
OPTIMUM 
LESS THAN 
OPTIMUM 
LESS THAN 
OPTIMUM 
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Three distinctly different interest groups ought to be 
recognized. Consumers would benefit from a regime which 
maximises consumer surplus. Private resource owners would 
want to maximise resource rent. The harvesters or fishermen 
would want to maximise the profit to be made from inputs in 
the form of producer surplus. The major characteristics of 
the five property right ~rimarily access) regimes with 
respect to the three social be~efit categories are summarized 
in table 4.1 and in figure 4.11. 
The general result to come from Copes analysis was that 
public control is the only case where the full social net 
benefits can be maximised. All of the private ownership 
cases result in underfishing by having the fish yield 
artificially constricted so as to force prices up - as would 
be expected in a monopoly situation. The open access and 
free market is clearly not optimal as all the resource rent 
is dissipated and any consumer or producer surplus is 
incidental. That is not to say that the levels of consumer 
and producer surpluses will be insignificant (see figure 
4.l1a). To a large extent that will depend on the actual 
situation. The consumer surplus exists due to the WTP of 
consumers reflected in the demand curve. Producer surplus 
exists due to the problems associated with moving effort -
mainly labour and capital in and out of a fishery in response 
to their opportunity costs of investment. This is reflected 
in the difference between the average social cost curve ~SC) 
and the average market cost curve AMC in figure 4.1la. 
Thus there is nothing in this analysis which would suggest 
that - in terms of benefits produced - any form of sole 
ownership (as represented in figures 4.1lc,d and e) is a 
priori preferable to open access as a management regime. The 
only exception might arise where sole ownership would produce 
a rent which can be removed by society as a tax or royalty. 
The problem then becomes empirical and includes 
distributional questions involving wider issues than merely 
fishing. Such questions - although of interest to a really 
socially aware management agency - are beyond the scope of 
this present analysis. 
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Copes concluded by discussing the implications for management 
regimes that the analysis points out. Three of the major 
conclusions are as follows: 
1. the producer surplus yielded by the use of 
intra-marginal inputs are not dissipated by an 
open access regime and may in fact form a 
significant portion of any net social benefit 
to be derived from the fishery; 
2. management of the fishery under private sole 
ownership is generally non-optimal from a 
societal standpoint as the sole owner has no 
concern for any of the societal surpluses 
except resource rent; and 
3. it has not been shown that sole private 
ownership of a fish resource is inherently or ~ 
priori superior to open access in terms of the 
benefit to society with the possible 
exception being the situation where society was 
able to appropriate all of the resource rent 
via a tax. 
The recognition of the existence of other economic surpluses 
particularly producer surplus requires that public 
management agencies need to be aware of how the benefits of 
fishing are going to be distributed within society. When 
management regime changes are contemplated, more than just 
the magnitude of any benefits needs to be determined. 
The only criticism I have of the work of Copes is that no 
attempts have been made to consider the costs associated with 
the operation and management of each of the five management 
regimes. These are likely to be significant and will affect 
the total net social benefits obtained from each property 
right case. Although primarily empirical, it is precisely 
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these kinds of issues which now need to be addressed. The 
theoretical foundations have been developed and now real 
fisheries need to be explored. 
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4.6: Dynamic Bio-economic Analysis of Fisheries. 
All of the above discussion of fisheries theory and analysis 
has been formulated in static terms. Both of the 
bio-economic models developed by Gordon (1954) and Copes 
(1970,1972) are unable to analyse the effects of present 
harvests on future stocks and ultimately, therefore on future 
harvests. The view of fishing obtained by using a static 
bio-economic model is akin to a snapshot in time. The 
addition of time to the analysis allows the broader resource 
management problem of maximising social benefits through time 
to be addressed. In terms of fishing the analysis changes 
from being one of choosing an optimal harvest to one of 
choosing a series of optimal stock sizes and harvest rates 
through time. Several attempts have been made to develops a 
dynamic theory of fishing, the most notable being Scott 
(1955) and Clark and Munro (1975). 
Scott (1955) provided the first attempt by casting the 
management of a fishery in terms of a problem in economic 
capital theory. Despite this pioneering step the static 
equilibrium theory of fishing became the standard approach to 
fisheries analysis. Clark and Munro (1975) suggested that 
there were two reasons for the prevalance of the static 
theory among economists. The first is the extreme complexity 
introduced into the analysis by incorporating a temporal 
element. The second is that capital theory was at that time 
not mathematically adequate to cope with the increased 
complexity produced by a dynamic fisheries model. The first 
problem remains today, although the greater present use of 
dynamic models has apparently led to a greater acceptance of 
more complex models. The second problem of inadequate 
techniques has largely been eliminated by the development of 
optimal control theory (Dorfman,1969). Several attempts to 
use the theory of optimal control to extend the analysis of 
fisheries economics have been made since including Clark and 
Munro (1975); McConnell and Sutinen (1979) and Bishop and 
Samples (1980). 
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For the purposes of this introduction to the dynamic 
bio-economic theory of commercial fishing only the simple 
linear, autonomous case will be developed. The model is 
linear due to the assumption that prices both for the 
inputs of fishing and the output ~ield) of fish are 
constant, i.e. the demand for fish is perfectly elastic and 
the costs per unit of effort are equal. The autonomy 
assumption means that the position of the demand schedule or 
the supply schedule will not change. Recall from the 
discussion of consumer and producer surpluses earlier in this 
chapter that the position of the demand curve can shift due 
to changes in income etc, and the supply function can also 
shift due to changes in production technologies or costs (see 
figures 3.3 and 3.4). The assumptions of linearity and 
autonomy can be relaxed, however, they simplify this 
introduction and so will be left in place for the moment. 
Production of fish biomass is represented by the Schaefer 
(1954) surplus production function were B = B (t) is the stock 
biomass at time t. For each level of population biomass 
there is a natural rate of increase, f (B) where: 
dB 
dt = f (B) (4.4) 
so that equation 4.4 represents the surplus production of the 
unexploited stock. Adding a harvest, g (t), at time t, alters 
the production function to: 
dB 
dt = f (B) - g (t) (4.5) 
where the growth of the stock at any t determined by the size 
stock f (B) less the harvest g (t). Society's problem then 
becomes to determine the optimal harvest rate at any time to 
ensure that the benefits of fishing are maximised over time. 
The economic expression for this is" to maximise the net 
present value (NPV)" of the resource, all the while being 
constrained by the natural growth rate of the fish stock and 
the harvest rate of the fishing sector. 
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Harvesting fish is not free and so the cost of effort is: 
c = aE (4.6) 
where c = the total cost; and 
a is a constant due to the assumption of constant 
costs of supply. 
It needs also to be assumed - although in many cases it is 
obvious - that as the amount of effort increases so do total 
costs and as the size of the stock increases, the 
costs of harvesting the same size yield decrease. 
assumption is that the price paid for fish directly 
average 
The final 
measures 
the marginal social benefit to be obtained from consuming the 
fish, and is constant - as depicted in the inelastic demand 
curve. The theory so far is no different to that of 
Copes U972) original analysis except for the addition of a 
time constraint. One can imagine that if the analysis done 
by Copes could be repeated every second for the length of 
time under scrutiny, the result obtained after summing all 
these analysis would be little different from the result to 
be obtained using optimal control theory, which has its basis 
in the mathematics of calculus. The linearity assumptions 
ensure that there will be no producer or consumer surplus and 
hence, all social benefits will be in the form of resource 
rent (C) which is the difference between costs (c) and price 
(IJ) • 
Optimal Control Models of Commercial Fishing. 
In an optimal control model of a fishery the biomass of the 
stock B = B (t) is called the state variable. It describes 
the state of the stock at any time and is in effect analogous 
to the dependant variable of a two dimensional function. In 
order to provide a starting point for the analysis it is 
necessary that the initial stock size B(O) is known. The 
harvest level g = g (t) is known as the control variable as 
this is the function which controls the level of the stock 
and also determines the yield, and hence, the net benefits, 
to be had at any given time. It can be expected that there 
is a maximum harvest rate for the fishery due to a limit on 
105 
the capacity of the fishing fleet. 
The objecti ve is now to maximise the economic rent (C) the 
commercial fishery can produce over time. The objective 
functional can be expressed as; 
NPV = r:-J'i{c [B (t) ] } . g (t) dt (4.7) 
This equation states that the net benefits over all future 
time can be determined by the sum of all the rent available 
for each stock size B(t)and harvest rate g (t), subject to a 
discount rate of G %. (See Randall, 1981; pp:2l0-2l2, 
230-231, for a discussion of the use of discount rates in 
resource economics and fisheries.) The problem is now to 
choose values of g (the harvest rate) which maximise equation 
4.7. Since the control variable g = g(t) is linear, the 
problem is straightforward. The maximum principle - also 
called the Hamiltonian {H}- is developed as follows: 
H = e-a~c (B)g (t) - ~(t){ f (B) - g (t)}] (4. 8) 
where the first part of the right hand side of equation 4.8 
represents the economic benefits and the rest represents the 
biological growth and harvest constraints. The important 
parameter to emerge is the variable A(t) in equation 4.8. 
The A(t) is called the adjoint variable and represents the 
user cost associated with a particular level of harvest g at 
any time (t). The user 
opportunity cost associated 
cost represents the social 
with the harvest of fish now as 
opposed to later. To gain the benefit of consuming a fish 
now, there are 
cost associated 
in the future. 
time (t) will 
time. 
losses in continued growth, etc, as well as a 
with not being able to consume the fish again 
Thus A(t) measures the effects a harvest at 
have on any benefits to be had after to this 
$ 
gmax 
geE') 
(+) 
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OPTIMAL STOCK SIZE. 
marginal benefits 
(b) 
B 
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TIME t 
FIGURE 4.12 OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS TO DYNAMIC 
FISHING MODEL. (after Clark 1976) 
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Another way of considering the concept of user costs is to 
assume that the schedule represents the marginal benefit 
function of future fishermen. So if present catches are high 
enough to decrease the stock, then the ability of future 
fishermen to produce benefits could be impaired. Hence, at 
low present levels of stock caused by heavy fishing 
pressure - the user cost schedule will also be low. On the 
other hand, if present fishermen do not fish much, then 
future stocks will be larger and future fishermen able to 
produce larger net benefits. Thus the user cost schedule 
will be greater at larger stock sizes. The problem then 
becomes one of a trade-off between present and future 
fishing,or between present and future benefits. Equating the 
two marginal benefit schedules at the margin should result in 
an economically optimal stock size. At this stock size the 
benefits of all present and future harvests are maximised, 
assuming, of course that nothing changes in the meantime. 
The two marginal benefit schedules are shown in figure 4.12. 
Without delving into the mathematics of the optimal control 
solution any further it can be shown, ~lark and Munro 1975; 
Clark(1976) that there is an equilibrium solution for the 
stock size B*. Since this is a linear and autonomous model 
this value will be constant through time as none of the 
values which might alter its value are able to change. This 
is the size of fish stock - which if achieved as quickly as 
possible and maintained - will give the greatest NPV to the 
fishery. The manner in which the stock is maintained at B* 
is via the harvest rate, (g). 
The optimal harvest rate for a commercial fishery as modelled 
above can be given by the simple piecewise function: 
g (t) = gmax for all t where B (t) >B* 
g (t) = f (B) for all t where B (t) =B* 
g (t) = 0 for all t where B (t) <B* 
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In effect this relationship states that if the stock becomes 
greater than the optimal size, then the harvest should be at 
the maximum ~max) to return the stock to the optimum size as 
quickly as possible. The opposite is the case when the stock 
drops below the optimum. Here the harvest rate should be 
zero until the stock naturally recuperates. Finally, if the 
stock is at its optimum level B then the harvest should take 
only the surplus production for that stock size, i.e. f (B). 
Figure 4.l2b shows the harvest regime for any stock level and 
figure 4.l2c shows the effects on stock biomass. 
This result which uses the extreme values of the harvesting 
rate is known as a "bang-bang" solution ~lark 1976). Due to 
the linear nature of the model such extreme adjustment is 
necessary in order to return to the optimal equilibrium stock 
size as quickly as possible. 
Relaxing the assumptions of autonomy and linearity increases 
the complexity of the model but at the same time increases 
the ability of the model to represent real fishery 
situations. Clark and MUnro (1975) first relax the autonomy 
assumption and allow parameter shifts through time. They 
argue that it is reasonable to expect that prices and costs 
will change through time due to shifts in demand and supply. 
The second assumption is then relaxed so that the model can 
be non-linear but still autonomous. Non-linearity is 
introduced by relaxing the assumptions that demand is 
infinitly inelastic - i.e. the demand curve can now slope 
downwards to the night and that costs are linear to 
harvesting - i.e. as effort increases the cost associated 
with harvesting the last unit of fish are now greater than 
the previous unit. Relaxing this latter assumption means 
that there will now be both consumer and producer surpluses 
to consider - in addition to resource rent - when determining 
the NPV of the fishery (see the earlier static version of the 
same problem, Copes 1972). The complexity added to the model 
by incorporating either non-linearity or non-autonomy or both 
precludes useful discussion here, but Clark (1976) discusses 
both in some detail. 
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4.7 Conclusions 
Chapter Four provides an introduction to the bio-economic 
analyses of commercial fishing. In a bio-economic analysis, 
the biological component is relegated to a secondary role and 
the economic theory of fishing dominates the analysis. The 
discussion begins with an introduction to the original static 
economic analysis of Gordon (1954) and then introduces the 
equivalent analysis of Copes (1972). The difference between 
these two analyses is more than just the manner in which the 
fishery is diagramatically represented. 
Copes went much further 
benefits produced by 
in his analysis of the 
a fishery to consider 
economic 
their 
distribution, as well as their size. The 'social' or 
economic surpluses of resource rent, consumer surplus and 
producer surplus that a fishery can produce are defined by 
Copes. In doing so, Copes has not only paved the way for the 
analysis of the social distribution of the economic benefits 
of fishing, but he has also produced an analytical framework 
capable of being extended to other forms of fishing; notably 
. recreational fishing. This is followed up in chapter five 
which discusses the bio-economic analyses of recreational 
fishing. 
The description and discussion of the dynamic economic models 
of fishing in section 4.6 is provided for two reasons. The 
first reason is that despite the obvious complexity of the 
models their use is becoming increasingly popular among 
fisheries economists. A dynamic model has the capacity to 
include a temporal element that a static model can not. The 
second reason for the inclusion of dynamic models in this 
chapter is to provide an introduction to their use in chapter 
six. The joint fishing models of both McConnell and Sutinen 
(1979) and Bishop and Samples (1980) are dynamic optimization 
models based on the same theory as presented in section 4.6. 
Thus the extension of the basic dynamic fishing model to a 
jOint fishing situation need not be totally unfamiliar. 
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CHAPTER FIVE. 
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The Economic Theory and Analysis of 
Recreational Fishing. 
5.1: Introduction. 
Of the identifiable forms of amateur fishing, sport and 
recreation fishing have received the most attention from 
economists. The economic theory and analysis of recreational 
fishing has developed in a distinctly different direction to 
that of commercial fishing. The market structure is well 
developed for the commercial fisherman and for his customers 
and suppliers, so that analyses of bio-economic supply of 
fish and consumer demand for commercially harvested species 
are well established. The market also provides a mechanism 
for the pursuit of policies aimed at attainment of 
economically ("socially") optimum use of the fish resource. 
An equivalent market structure does not exist for amateur 
fishing so the procedures used by economists to determine the 
supply and demand for amateur fishing are quite different to 
those for commercial fishing. In many instances recreational 
fishing has been treated as merely another form of outdoor 
recreation, (Clawson and Knetsch, 1966; Gordon et aI, 1973; 
McConnell and Norton, 1976; Cauvin, 1980; McConnell ,1981) . 
The output from recreational fishing is not usually measured 
in the physical yield of fish, or even the net revenue of 
fishing, but rather in the less tangible, but none-the-less 
real, satisfaction and enjoyment of fishing. The quantity of 
fish caught becomes merely one ingredient of the total 
benefits created ~opes and Knetsch,198l). Other values 
produced may include the size of the fish caught 
particularly as trophies, where one large fish may be more 
prized than many medium sized fish or even the social 
experience of fishing. until recently there has been no 
recreational fishing equivalent of the bio-economic supply 
curve of commercial fishing (see McConnell and Sutinen, 1979 
in this section). No attempts had been made to incorporate 
the effects of harvesting on the stock size even in the 
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most simple static form or to develop the concept of 
economic scarcity as it applies to a fish stock. 
Increased exploitation of some fish stocks - due to increases 
in recreational or commercial harvests or both has 
highlighted the need for a change in the analytical approach. 
The effects of catches on fish stocks are now being 
incorporated into the analytical frameworks of both 
biologists and economists. The open-access management regime 
has been shown to result in economically non-optimal 
allocation of fish and other resources in commercial fishing 
~opes,1972). However, until recently no attempts had been 
made to determine the commercially optimal levels of 
exploitation for recreational fishing, also often managed 
under an open-access strategy. 
It is unclear from a present perspective whether explicitly 
recognizing the concept of stock scarcity for amateur 
fisheries has been a cause or a consequence of the policy of 
open-access management that is so prevalent in amateur 
fisheries. It is possible that the policy is a historical 
one~ ~cott,1965). The "right" of the public to have free and 
open access to recreational resources at no or nominal cost 
has a long history worldwide. The notion probably arose from 
settlers escaping the restrictive feudal practices of Europe 
where recreation opportunities such as fishing were the 
perogative of the landed gentry. The provision of fishing 
opportunities free of charge - in addition to open-access -
has negated the opportunity for a market demand to be 
established. Without the prices and values provided by a 
market demand schedule other non-market and proxy measures of 
the value of fishing have had to be used. The need to value 
the fishery has arisen in response to the need to allocate a 
fixed supply of fish among potentially competing users. 
Hence, it is these proxy estimations of demand and value 
which have primarily occupied the attention of resource 
economists. McConnell and Norton (1976) provided a state--
of-the-art review of the economic evaluation of marine 
recreational fishing, as it was up until 1976. The major 
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conceptual problem facing economists is that the recreational 
fisherman is simultaneously the producer and consumer of many 
of the benefits associated with fishing. Since 1975, when 
Tuomi (1977) first stressed the need for a more comprehensive 
and formal analysis of recreational fishing, many authors 
have contributed to the development and discussion of just 
such a theory. The concepts addressed include the following: 
a. Bio-economic supply: (Rothschild et aI, 1977; 
McConnell and Sutinen, 1979); 
b. Deri ved demand: (McConnell and Norton, 1976 ; 
Dwyer and Bowes, 1978 ; Charbonneau and Hay, 1978; 
Cauvin, 1980 ; Stabler 1980a; Anderson, 1980, 
1983aj Copes and Knetsch, 1981 ; Boekstal and 
McConnell, 1981 ; McConnell and Sutinen, 
Vaughan and Russell, 1982); 
c. Fishing quality: (McConnell and Norton, 
Weithman and Anderson, 1978; Ditton, 1980 ; 
1982) ; and 
d. Management and policy: (Power s et aI, 
McConnell and Norton, 
Anderson, 1983) 
1976; Berkes, 
1982 ; 
1976 ; 
Bryan, 
1975; 
1978 ; 
The extension of recreational fishing theory has also made 
the theoretical analysis of the interactions between 
commercial and amateur fishing more accessible. A number of 
authors have attempted to integrate the two analysis into a 
single united theory of joint sector fisheries ~othschild et 
aI, 1977; McConnell and Sutinen,1979; Bishop and Samples, 
1980; Sutinen, 1980; Anderson,1980) 
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5.2: Demand, Consumer Surplus and Fishing Values. 
The demand for recreational fishing opportunities is readily 
apparent. Fishermen receive satisfaction and enjoyment from 
the fishing experience, and some fishermen also manage to 
receive more tangible benefits from eating or selling their 
catches. Although this makes recreational fishing a consumer 
commodity, the producer-consumer dichotomy used in commercial 
fishing analysis is not useful for recreational fisheries. 
The fishermen is also the producer of the experience. As 
producer the fisherman puts scarce resources such as his time 
(effort) and money (gear) into fishing and as the consumer 
receives the benefits of the fishing experience. 
The economic benefits associated with fishing can be 
expressed in terms of willingness-to-pay ~TP) for the 
fishing experience. The WTP concept is analogous to that for 
commercial fishing products, except that it here represents a 
non-market demand schedule. ~his makes the values harder to 
measure, but they are no less real because of it. 
Knetsch ,1981)' • 
(Copes and 
The non-market demand curve for an individual fisherman is an 
expression of WTP for the fishing experience. If the amount 
of recreational fishing demanded could be measured - for 
example in days spent fishing - this would be represented on 
the horizontal axis of a price quantity graph. 
Willingness-to-pay or price would be measured on the vertical 
axis. The demand schedule produced would represent the 
amount of fishing days the fisherman would be willing to 
purchase at each price. In other words the demand curve 
represents the fisherman's WTP to ensure access to various 
amounts of fishing days. All other factors such as incomes, 
tastes and the prices of other commodities are assumed to 
remain constant. The demand curve would slope downward to 
the right indicating that WTP falls as the number of days 
fished increases, see figure 5.1. 
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If we assume that a particular fisherman decides to have (ql) 
days of fishing, then given this individuals demand function 
the price the fisherman would be willing-to-pay would be 
Wl), as shown in figure 5.1. The total amount paid for this 
quantity of fishing is represented by the area B, and the 
consumer surplus is area A. At 
- i.e. free and open access -
schedule would indicate that q2 
a zero price for fishing days 
the individual anglers demand 
days of fishing would be 
demanded. The total cost will be zero, and the consumer 
surplus is the sum of all the areas A,B and C. For nonmarket 
commodities - such as recreational fishing - estimating the 
consumer surplus can provide a measure of the total value of 
the commodity, even when the commodity cannot be purchased in 
a normal market (Anderson, 1980). 
To obtain an estimate of the total value of a recreational 
fishing resource two 
must be overcome. The 
components of demand, 
the fishing experience, 
major conceptual and empirical 
first involves the description 
particularly the relationship 
and the fish stock. The 
hurdles 
of the 
between 
second 
difficulty involves the actual measurement of the individuals 
consumer surplus or WTP, and the extension of this to a 
market value estimate. This is discussed below in the next 
section on measuring recreational fishing values. 
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McConnell and Norton (1976) developed a general demand 
function for marine sport fishing which uses a simple 
relationship between the stock and the fishing experience, 
called the success ratio (h). Stevens (1966) used both angler 
success and the degree of site crowding by anglers as 
determinants of fishing quality. However McConnell and 
Norton simplified this by expressing fishing quality in terms 
of the catching success rate per outing. Catch rates are, 
however, not constant and depend, in turn, on other factors 
such as the number of other anglers (N), the size of the 
available stock of fish ~) and angler skill and luck ~). 
Hence, fishing quality is measured by the success rate (h), 
where: 
h = h [ N, B, a] (5.1 ) 
The crowdedness coefficient ~) identified by Stevens (1966) 
is still present, but now expressed in terms of its effect on 
catch rate. Increasing the number of anglers will decrease 
the catch to each fisherman. The question remains of 
course, as to whether a small drop in catch rates, or a small 
increase in the numbers of visible anglers will be noticed by 
the fisherman. The answer must be in the sensitivity of the 
stock to increases in effort and can not be determined a 
priori. 
Additions to the stock-demand relationship have corne from 
McConnell and Sutinen (1979) and Anderson (1980,1983). The 
former explicitly includes a natural growth rate function, 
f (B), for the stock in their analysis as part of a bio-
economic supply curve for the fishing. Anderson (1980,1983) 
employs a static household production function to describe 
demand, and explicitly includes the effects of crowding which 
McConnell and Sutinen do not. The exploited stock growth 
function of McConnell and Sutinen is: 
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dB 
dt = f (B) n.D.h (B) (5.2) 
where B = stock biomass; 
f(B) = surplus production as a function of stock 
size; 
n = the number of fishermen; 
D = number of fishing trips -i.e. effort; and 
h (B) = the quality of the fishing as a function of 
stock, expressed as a catch rate/trips. 
The price of fishing, or WTP for fishing by an individual 
angler is given by; 
d = d[ D, h(B)] 
where d = price or WTP; 
D = number of fishing trips; and 
h (B) = quality (catch rate/trips). 
(5.3) 
Total benefits are calculated by summing the demand curves, 
or consumer surplus values of each fisherman. Assuming 
constant explicit effort costs for each angler the total 
consumer surplus or net benefit value of the fishery is total 
benefits less total costs. The implicit effort costs 
associated with a crowding exteri1ality do not figure in the 
demand function, nor are they included in the total value of 
the fishery. 
Stock Scarcity in the Demand Model. 
Anderson (1980,1983) has however developed a demand curve for 
both the individual angler and the fishery which explicitly 
considers the effects of crowding on demand, in terms of both 
fishing quality (s) and quantity (n). The individual anglers 
household demand function can be formally expressed as: 
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d::::: d[ x, seD}, n(D), j, e] (5.4) 
where d :: price or WTP for a days fishing; 
x :: the number of days fished (i.e. effort) of an 
D :: 
s (D) :: 
n (D) :: 
j :: 
individual fisherman; 
the total number of days fished by all 
fishermen (i. e. total effort) ; 
the relationship between mean fish size and 
the total amount of effort; 
the relationship between the mean number of 
fish caught per day and effort; 
a vector of cost, price and income parameters, 
including fishing expenses and the market 
price of fish caught; and 
e :: a vector of environmental and social factors 
influencing the fishing experience, including 
pleasant surroundings, companions, quiet, 
weather and proximity of other services. 
Anderson (1980,1983) states that the functions s (D) and n (D) 
follow from standard biological analysis of exploited fish 
stocks. As total effort (D) increases both the average size 
of fish and eventually the catch rate will decrease. These 
represent bio-economic constraints on demand 
analogous to a bio-economic supply function. 
and are 
If the cost parameters (j') and (e) are held constant, then 
WTP is a measure of the net benefits over and above the 
costs. WTP will then also vary inversely with the amount of 
effort (D) As total effort increases, each fisherman will be 
willing to pay less for fishing, and vice versa. The anglers 
WTP will also vary directly with charges in both the size of 
fish (s) and number caught (n). These will occur as shifts 
in the. demand curve as happened in figure 4.4. The greater 
the increase in these factors, the greater the demand and 
hence, the greater WTP will become, albeit with diminishing 
returns. Even fishermen can recognise the biological limits 
for growth of fish and size of stock. 
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The WTP for any individual is then dependent on total effort 
as this effects fish size and abundance. Anderson (1980) 
believes it is then impossible to derive a market demand 
schedule by simply summing the individual demand schedules as 
suggested by McConnell and Sutinen (1979). The problem is 
with total effort. Not only is effort measured on the 
horizontal axis, but it is also a shift parameter for the 
individual's demand schedule. The situation is analogous to 
that of congestion ~nderson, 1980), but is actually a 
representation of a stock externality similar to that for 
commercial fishing. Physical interference between fishermen 
and lowered total catches due to crowding lowers both 
commercial incomes and/or recreational benefits depending on 
the circumstances. 
The solution to the problem of being unable to directly 
determine market demand lies in the perception of total 
effort by individual fishermen. For any constant level of 
total effort in the fishery, and hence, a constant level of 
crowding externality, it is possible to derive WTP function 
for the whole fishery by summing individual WTP curves. 
Changing the level of effort changes the stock externality 
and hence, the WTP function. From each of these different 
WTP functions, each associated with a particular level of 
effort, a market demand curve can be derived. This is the 
Leibenstein (1950) method for application to demand 
estimation in the face of congestion. Figure 5.2 can be used 
to explain the method. 
The analysis depends on the assumption of constant total 
effort and develops a series of constant stock externality 
curves ~K curves), each associated with a specific level of 
effort. If the total level of effort is held at Dl by some 
means, then the curve KKl is the sum of each of the 
individual angler's WTP schedules, based on their perception 
of the stock externality. The quality of the fishing is 
effectively set and each fisherman then reacts to that 
perceived level of quality as their personal effort will be 
small relative to total effort i.e. they are a quality 
taker. Thus for a constant stock externality the individuals 
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demand ~TP) curve can be completely specified, these being 
summed to KKl. Effort then has a value on the horizontal 
axis, but no shift parameter to change the demand curve. 
If effort were to increase to 02, as in figure 5.2 (b), then 
each individual fisherman would reappraise their personal 
willingness to pay due to the increase in the stock 
externality. The result would be another WTP curve for this 
new level of effort, the sum of each new WTP curve being KK2. 
The actual willingness -to-pay for effort levels 01 and 02 
are A and B respectively. The difference between these two 
points - A and B - represents both the shift in demand due to 
increased total effort and the dedreased quality perceived by 
fishermen, due to the increased stock externality. Note that 
KK2 is everywhere less than KK1. 
There is a constant stock externality curve ~K) associated 
with every level of total effort, figure 5.2(c). The point 
on each of these curves which is important is that which 
relates WTP to the actual effort. By creating a curve which 
forms the locus of each of these effort-WTP points, market 
demand is established, line CC on figure 5.2 (c). The 
operational market demand curve ~C) shows WTP for a given 
level of total effort and relates the WTP of fishermen to 
their perception of changes in the stock externality due to 
effort changes. 
Thus the CC line can be represented by the equation: 
WTP = d( 0, X(Di) ) (5.5) 
where: 
D = the total number of recreational fishing days; 
and hence, varies for each KK curve; 
X = some attribute of fishing quality which 
remains constant along each KK curve; and 
Oi = the level of effort consistent with the 
prevailing fishing quality due to the WTP of 
fishermen; 
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This effectively states that WTP is dependant both on the 
total level of effort D and the level of fishing quality 
which effort level D results in, i.e. X mi). 
To measure the consumer surplus for a given level of effort 
and WTP it is necessary to use the relevant KK curve, figure 
5.3a. Assume for the moment that no entrance fee need be 
paid, so if effort was 
surplus of amateur fishing 
excluding area 1. This 
at level 
would be 
result is 
D2 then total consumer 
the areas 2 and 3, 
because KKI shows how 
individuals react to different levels of personal effort 
within a perception of some larger constant effort level. If 
effort were to increase to D3 the area of consumer surplus 
would change to now be areas 3 and 5 only, figure 5.3b. Area 
5 is added for the loss of area 2. The actual difference in 
consumer surplus depends on the relative size of the areas 
changed and an increase in effort does not necessarily lead 
to an increase in consumer surplus. This result is critical 
to the analysis of the optimal allocation of fisheries 
resources ~nderson 1980). 
Even when the level of effort is high, as under an open 
access policy (D in figure 5.2c) an amount of consumer 
surplus can still exist. The KK curve for effort level Dl is 
still downward sloping creating the surplus. The quality 
component of the fishing benefits is totally dissipated, but 
there still exists some WTP for the quantity of fishing days 
each fisherman can have, even with the reduced catches 
associated with open-access levels of effort. Thus when 
considering the composition of a consumer surplus - for 
example that associated with effort level D2 in figure 5.3a -
that above the price (area 2) is due to WTP for the quantity 
of fishing days, whereas that consumer surplus below the 
price (area 3) is due to WTP for fishing quality factors such 
as the size of fish and catch rates. This result is 
analogous to that shown by Copes (1972) for the retention of 
producer surplus by intra-marginal commercial fishermen at 
open-access effort levels, when rent is totally dissipated. 
The obviously different origins of the different components 
of consumer surplus will have implications for the management 
$ 
$ 
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effort -
b2 
fishing 
3 5 
D2 D3 
(a) 
days 
(b) 
effort - fishing days 
K2 d(D,X(D2)) 
O/T 
d(D,X(D2)) 
d(D,X(D3)) 
FIGURE 5.3 CONSUMER SURPLUS IN A STATIC 
FISHING MODEL (ANDERSQ-l,198Q ) 
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objectives 
fishery. 
and techniques actually used to manage the 
Anderson (1980) has provided a formal method of determining 
the economically optimal level of effort which maximises the 
benefits accruing to the recreational fishery. Its 
exposition here is unnecessary as the method relies on 
reasonably complex mathematical relationships. However, it 
is enough to say that the optimal level of effort occurs when 
the WTP is equal to the marginal stock externality costs and 
necessarily occurs at a level of effort less than that 
associated with open-access, D. At the optimal effort level 
the value of the last day of recreational fishing is equal to 
the cost that increases in effort impose on all other 
fishermen. 
The theory of recreational demand has now evolved to 
incorporate the effects of the stock size on demand, as well 
as vice versa. The result has lead to the move by economists 
to incorporate bio-economic supply within the demand 
function, as in Anderson's (1980, 1983) household production 
demand functions. The constraints of biological growth, 
recruitment and natural mortality on surplus production are 
now implicit in the function: 
p ::: p ( d, s (D ~, n (D), j, e) (see eq 5.4) 
The terms s (D) and n (D) reI ate 
producing a fishing quality 
effort (D) 
measure. 
to 
The 
reflected in WTP - and consumer surplus reflect 
of fishing and relate to the benefits of fishing. 
stock size, 
price as 
the quality 
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The analogous benefit function for commercial 
incorporates the surplus production curve of Schaefer 
(5.5) 
= dY - cE (5.6) 
net benefits = total revenue total costs 
where: 
nb = net benefits measured in dollars; 
p = price of fish landed per unit; 
c = cost per unit of effort; 
y = total yield of fish; 
E = level of commercial effort; and 
fishing 
(1959) : 
~/and ~are biological coefficients which represent a 
range of stock parameters. 
Three major assumptions underly the demand model of Anderson 
(1980, 1983). First, the biological relationships between 
fishing effort (D), catch rate (n) and fish size (s) are 
simplistic. The true nature of these relationships is much 
more complex and less certain than appears to be the case 
(see section 3.3). However, for the purposes of producing a 
demand model to assist in the development of a theory of 
recreational fishing, simple relationships can be useful as 
analytical indicators, provided it is remembered always that 
they are only indicators and not expected to be accurate 
results. 
The second assumption is that the relationship between the 
recreational fishing experience and the value of the fishery 
can be measured or estimated. The methods of estimating 
demand, willingness-to-pay and net benefits are discussed in 
the next section. There are 
both the empirical methods 
difficulties associated with 
and their results. Nonetheless 
some measure must be used to provide information upon which 
to base resource allocation decisions. 
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The final assumption is that economic optimization is the 
only goal of fisheries management. Just as rent maximisation 
has been shown to be an economically inappropriate objective 
for commercial fishing ~opes,1972), so too may be the 
single-minded objective of maximising consumer surplus in 
recreational fisheries evaluation. The origin of benefits 
and the consequent distribution of these benefits between 
resource rent and consumer surplus have implications for 
management, ~opes and Knetsch,l98l). It may well be that 
the most economically efficient situation will not correspond 
to the socially optimal situation. 
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5.3: Estimating the Value of Recreational Fishing. 
If policy decisions are to be made regarding the allocation 
of resources particularly public funds or scarce fish 
stocks - to recreational fishing, then estimates of the value 
to society of the products of the fishery may be required. 
This would be particularly so if a non- commercially provided 
recreational fishery was in competition with a commercial 
fishery for fish. Monetary values may not always be the most 
appropriate measures, but at least they can provide a common 
basis for initial comparison. The demand schedules discussed 
in the previous section are theoretical, so empirical studies 
are needed, not only to validate the relationship assumed, 
but to also provide real estimates of the worth of 
recreational fishing. The task of actually providing 
estimates of the value of a fishery is made more difficult by 
three not unconnected aspects of recreational fishing. These 
are the complex nature of the products of recreational 
fishing; the nonpriced nature of many fisheries; and the 
lack of a market to assist in the pricing and distribution of 
the products of fishing. 
The multi-facetted nature of the products of recreational 
fishing is normally simplified by analysts only considering 
particular attributes of the experience. As already 
discussed economists have assumed simple product-demand 
relationships. These are lumped into quality or quantity 
parameters and social or environmental factor vectors and 
provide only very general indications of the real situation. 
For some fishermen it may well be that catching fish provides 
the major portion of benefit and the amount would be the same 
whether the fish were caught in a secluded mountain stream or 
a local water reservoir. At the other extreme the outdoors 
experience may provide most of the benefits to anglers and 
the fish merely provide the excuse to "get away from it all". 
In between these values a complete spectrum of different 
combinations of benefits must exist ~opes and Knetsch,198l). 
Often research has been 
assumptions about why 
inappropriate conclusions, 
based on misleading 
fishermen fish and has 
due simply to a 
or false 
lead to 
lack of 
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understanding of why people fish, when and where they do 
~ryan,1976~ McConnell and Norton,1976). 
Also adding to the difficulties of estimating benefits is the 
non-priced nature of fisheries. It is a situation common to 
many natural resource based recreation opportunities that use 
of the resource is provided at no cost to the user other that 
their own expenses, -ie no entrance fee or similar charge is 
levied. The situation arises in many cases as an historical 
result of policies instituted by settlers from Europe, where 
access to recreational resources, such a fish and game, were 
severely restricted 
is particularly the 
under feudal tenure, (Scott 1965). This 
case in North America ~earse(1968) , 
although New Zealand also has examples of natural resources 
for example national parks and marine fisheries where 
recreational opportunities are provided either free or at 
nominal rates to users. 
Non-Market Nature of Recreational Fishing Values. 
Lack of suitable "market" structures for the pricing and 
transfer of recreational opportunities also creates 
difficulties for valuation. Two reasons may explain the 
"non-market ll nature of recreational commodities. The first 
is the "commons" nature of the resource. Establishing 
exclusive property rights to fish resources might have made a 
market possible as was the case in England. There fishing 
rights associated with particular streams are private 
property and can be bought and sold. The second reason is 
the deliberate non-pricing policy for resource use in many 
instances. Cauvin (1980) argues that the absence of pricing 
for scarce fish resources results in "distorted demand 
signals" and creates an economically inefficient allocation 
of resources. Free access to scarce, "free-gift-of-nature" 
fish resources can result in overexploitation (Sutinen 1980) 
(see also chapter Two). 
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Valuation Methods. 
In the absence of market and demand related prices for the 
opportunity to fish, resource economists have developed 
methods of ascribing proxy values to resources. These 
methods are relatively few in number, and in many cases were 
developed for resource uses other than fishing. Hence, they 
are not always notable for their appropriateness to the 
situations to which they are applied ~opes and 
Knetsch,198l). The techniques can be divided in two major 
categories; aggregative studies and local,site specific 
methods, (Stabler,1980b). Aggregative methods tend to deal 
more with identifying issues, important variables and trends, 
and within such a framework economic evaluation will be only 
one component among many. The fisheries manager or planner -
who may be more concerned with higher order problems, 
particularly socially optimal fisheries management would 
find aggregative methods more valuable than the economist 
whose primary concern is economic benefit evaluation. 
Stabler U980b) briefly describes the types of analysis which 
are included in this category. There is no need to discuss 
them further here as they are not central to the present 
discussion. 
The second category - the site or activity specific methods -
are essentially set in a cost-benefit framework. These 
techniques can be further subdivided into two subcategories. 
There are those methods which attempt to determine various 
forms of consumer surplus or WTP and those which estimate 
other types of benefits. The second subcategory has a 
necessarily vague 
unrelated methods. 
description as 
All of these 
it comprises a number of 
methods need not be 
considered at length as each can be shown to be theoretically 
suspect or impractical to use (Stabler,1980b). Those methods 
which estimate consumer surplus, on the whole have been 
considered more seriously by economists and will be outlined 
briefly in the following discussion. 
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Of the methods which are placed into the second subcategory -
those measuring benefits other than consumer surplus five 
will be briefly outlined. 
The market valuation method estimates an entry fee judged to 
be value of the recreation experience to the average user. 
The figure determined is to a large degree arbitrary, and is 
levied indiscr imantly on all users. However ,only those 
users willing to pay the fee in order to recreate are 
counted, and those users to whom the resource has value but 
is less than the fee are not counted. Hence, a great deal of 
the value of the resource is not accounted for. Also missing 
is an estimate of the extra value of the resource in the form 
of the consumer surplus of those users for whom the fee is 
set too low. The single fee provides only one point on a 
demand schedule and all the rest of the information is 
missing. Another problem associated with using the market 
valuation method is that very few resources are provided 
through a market structure where a fee could in fact be 
levied and collected. 
The value of the product method assumes that some tangible, 
monetary value can be derived for the product of an activity 
such as recreational fishing. The commercial value of any 
fish caught has been proposed, (Copes and Knetsch 1981). 
However, this implies that the anglers only objective is to 
catch fish and ignores the other obvious and well documented 
benefits of fishing ~alhelm, 1980). 
The cost of supply is theoretically unacceptable as it 
relates the benefits to the consumer to the costs of supply. 
This leads to the illogical conclusion that the greater the 
cost of supply the greater the benefits. Even where the 
consumer is also the producer and supplier, the cost of 
supply method fails as extra spending would relate to WTP not 
willingness-to-supply. 
131 
Land value models can represent the benefits associated with 
recreation, but would lead to underestimation of the benefits 
as they can not reflect all the benefits associated with 
recreation ~tabler,1980b). 
The gross expenditure method estimates benefits by measuring 
the economic activity generated in the industry sectors which 
service fishermen (eg gear,bait,travel,lodging,food charter 
boats etc). It is suggest that these outlays measure the 
worth of fishing, otherwise fisherment would not spend that 
much to enjoy it. The first difficulty is that this method 
still does not give any clue as to how much each fisherman is 
willing to pay over and above the amount actually paid in 
order to continue fishing, ~opes and Knetsch,198l). Other 
concerns include the danger of double counting, and the 
assumption that resources used to provide secondary benefits 
would not otherwise be employed. Meals eaten or petrol used 
may still have occurred even without the the fishing 
occuring. How also should expenditures be apportioned 
between the items bought and the value of the resource. 
Zivnuska (1961) examined expenditures on food, travel, 
clothing etc, and noted that all the dollars spent were 
accounted for in the value of the purchased goods, and no 
value was left over as a return to the use of the items in 
that particular recreational resource for which they were 
purchased. 
Estimates of consumer surplus - i.e. the WTP over and above 
any costs already incurred are a net benefit measure. 
Hence, the use of WTP establishes a relationship between 
demand and value. McConnell and Norton (1976) describe the 
most basic problem involved in using WTP as one of property 
rights. If the right to fish rests with society, then 
anglers must be willing to pay for the right to fish. 
However if the right to fish belongs with the angler, then is 
the net value to society the amount the anglers must be 
compensated to give up their fishing rights? The difference 
is recognized by economists in two different types of 
consumer surplus: 
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1. the equivalent variation or the maximum sum of 
money a fisherman would pay to gain fishing rights~ 
and 
2. the compensating variation or the minimum amount a 
fishermen would accept to give up their fishing 
right. 
In a number of studies the compensation variation has been up 
to 20 times the amount of the equivalent variation. The 
difference may have several explanations. One is that 
ability to pay is constrained by income, whereas compensation 
is not ~rutilla and Fisher,1975). Other possible 
explanations suggest that the retention of a fishing right -
particularly a commercial fishing right has an income 
associated with it, whereas a non-fisherman must purchase the 
right to fish. The difference in incomes may be significant 
and hence, positively affect preferences. 
Cauvin (1980) suggests these are but partial explanations, as 
income effects will be smaller in sports (recreational) 
fisheries than in commercial. The explanation Cauvin 
proposes instead suggests that people place a lower value on 
money they might receive than to money they have and must 
spend. Consequently more "opportunity cost" dollars must be 
paid as compensation than would be paid out of ones own money 
to retain access. The question of which measure to use in a 
given situation may depend on who holds what rights and the 
direction of change. 
The measurement of willingness-to-pay could involve one of 
three major techniques: 
a. the travel cost method; 
b. direct valuation - such as WTP questionaires; and, 
c. the household production function. 
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The travel-cost method is a common method first used by 
Clawson (1959). It involves estimating a per capita demand 
function from data on visit rates. The consumer surplus for 
the recreational site can then be calculated ~netsch, 1964). 
The per capita demand function is estimated by statistically 
fitting the relationship between trips per unit population 
and the costs of travel to the site. The costs are averaged 
by zone with each zone being a particular distance from the 
site. Trips per unit population are calculated from the 
number of trips to the site from a given zone then dividing 
by the population of the zone. The costs per zone normally 
include both direct expenses as well as any opportunity costs 
incurred, such as time away from work. The consumer surplus 
per capita is calculated by subtracting the actual amount 
paid per zone, from the maximum amount that hypothetically 
could have been paid for that zone. Total consumer surplus 
for that recreation site is then given by multiplying the per 
capita consumer surplus by the zone population for each zone, 
then summing for all zones. 
McConnell and Norton U976) provide a discussion of the 
travel cost method and conclude that it has several 
drawbacks. The two major ones mentioned involve the need for 
the inclusion of the prices of close substitutes and how 
these interact; and the usefulness of the model in highly 
populated areas where travel costs need not be an important 
determinant of fishing demand. 
Stabler (1980b) provides a list of nine specific criticisms 
of the travel cost method. He believes that for fishing 
resources that it fails to account for; 
a. interrelationships between sites; 
b. changes in demand for one site with the provision 
or loss of other sites; 
c. the effect of tourism in a locality on the demand 
for facilities; 
d. the effect of pricing policies on demand, 
particularly dual pricing policies with day and 
season rates; 
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e. the differences in urban and rural recreational 
patterns; 
f. the length and enjoyment of a journey; 
g. the assessment of other factors affecting the 
quality of the experience- e.g. beauty, quiet, 
company etc.; 
h. assessment of site capacity and the effects of 
congestion; and, 
i. the degree of substitutability between different 
sites. 
As a final comment Stabler notes that the travel cost method 
has been found wanting for three reasons: 
1. it does not account for the complexity of the 
recreational experience; 
2. it is empirically difficult and often unworkable; 
and 
3. as resources become more scarce and presumably more 
valuable, the technique fails to capture the 
divergence between willingness-to-pay and societies 
value of the resource. 
Recreational fishing has not only been recognized by 
economists as being difficult to evaluate, but also as being 
a case where resources are at risk. Resource allocation 
conflicts have arisen between commercial and recreational 
fishermen. Other coastal and marine resource uses such as 
ocean dumping, petroleum development and reclamations have 
economic values against which fishing - particularly amateur 
fishing - must compete in public policy decisions. As such 
economists have begun to develop and investigate new methods 
of assessment. 
Direct valuation techniques attempt to estimate consumer 
surplus using questionnaires and interviews. Resource users 
are asked questions about their socio-economic status, 
relative frequency of their use of the resource, amount of 
fish caught, what costs they incurred, and how much more they 
would be willing to pay to remain a recreational fishery 
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user. The final dollar values can be interpreted as consumer 
surplus. A function which relates consumer surplus to 
income, effort, and other variables is then estimated, where; 
CONSUMER SURPLUS = k ( t, y, g, s ••• ) (5.7) 
For each recreationalist the estimated statistical 
relationship for trips (t), income (y), landings per trip (g) 
f size of fish (s) etc, can be used to predict the net value 
of the experience. Combining these for each user gives an 
estimate of total net value to society. 
The method has been criticized by traditional economists as 
being too hypothetical (Scott,1965) and subject to bias 
(Samuelson,1954) as responses to questions will vary 
depending on the present distribution of rights, and by 
respondants attempting to second guess the results. If users 
expect fees to be introduced they may undervalue WTP or if 
they wish to see the opportunities preserved, attempt to 
overvalue WTP, (Stabler ,1980b). Davis (1964) showed that the 
approach could be used in conjunction with other methods 
which can be used as external validity checks to reduce bias. 
Bohm (1972) and Meyer (1974) have both provided valuable 
insight into the use of the interview technique in recreation 
economics. Their work has important implications for the 
evaluation of marine recreational fishing ~cConnell and 
Norton, 1976). The mode of survey is important, so 
interviews are preferable to mail questionaires. The 
questions must not appear to be hypothetical to the 
interviewee, and should be perceived as 
establish the users preferences. 
attempting to 
The direct interview has a number of virtues including the 
ability to adapt to different situations and to provide 
feedback to the respondents to ensure they are aware that 
there are other uses for their time, if they are not fishing. 
Validity can be checked by both simultaneous aggregative data 
surveys and by attempting to derive similar measures from 
different questions within the actual survey. The method is 
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also likely to be more sensitive to changes, especially 
increases, in valuation of resources over time. Deuel (1980) 
provides a more recent review of u.s. survey methods. 
The household production function is the third evaluation 
approach and derives from work by Becker (1965). The approach 
has been widely used in fishery resource management, 
particularly in the analysis of commercial fishing ~nderson, 
1980; Sutinen, 1980; Boekstael and McConnell, 1981; 
McConnell and Sutinen, 1982). The approach views consumers 
also as producers - in that goods and services purchased are 
used as inputs in the individuals personal production of 
utility. In effect, this means that consumers incur the 
marginal costs of selecting a particular mix of goods and 
services. The objective is to maximise utility subject to an 
income constraint, or alternatively minimize cost for a given 
level of utility. The marginal costs incurred reflect 
opportunity costs and enable the opportunity cost of time to 
enter the analysis, which is particularly relevant and 
important in recreational pursuits - fishing included. 
Itis the use of the household production function approach 
which has allowed the development of the first joint 
recreational/ commercial fisheries analysis. Using the 
marginal costs of each sector, an optimal allocation of fish 
between users is theoretically possible. Optimal use of the 
fish resource occurs when the sum of the net benefits over 
time ~PV) is maximised and the respective commercial and 
recreational marginal benefits are equal. (Sutinen 1980). 
The problems of using household production theory lie in the 
difficulties of actually estimating the marginal benefit and 
cost relationships of anglers. The theory has only recently 
been formalized $oekstal and McConnell,1981) and depends on 
assumptions and concepts which may not hold when empirically 
investigated. The complexities of the real world may 
preclude estimation of benefits and costs, however avenues 
for future research have been identified. McConnell and 
Sutinen (1982) suggest that it is due simply to the fact that 
"the household production function is not yet ready to leave 
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the academi c womb". 
Although the techniques described above are able to measure 
the consumer surplus, a number of issues must be confronted 
when using the values they provide. The major issues are the 
effects of income levels and distribution; the measurement 
of net benefits over time ~PV); and the identification of 
users. As noted earlier, income can constrain WTP, but not 
willingness to be compensated. Also if the incomes of two 
fishermen are not equal, then the one on the lower income 
will be constrained more than the recipient of a higher 
income. 
Time also plays a role in the usefulness of net benefit 
measures. Often estimates of net benefit have been made for 
only one year. However, in some cases, it is not the annual 
value, but the total value which is important. Where 
irreversible resource allocations occur the value per year is 
not as meaningful as the discounted flow of future .net 
benefits, the NPV, ~cConnell and Norton,1976). Although is 
it important to measure the variables in a benefit equation 
attempting to measure values in a future time can prove 
extremely difficult. Often merely identifying trends and 
interactions among variables through time can be important. 
Changes through time can be expected in population sizes, 
incomes, the prices of substitutes and presumablT the 
preferences of users~ ·Static analyses can be too narrow and 
will generally underestimate values. 
The traditional approaches in these types of economic 
analyses normally only consider the direct users or 
participants in a marine fishery. Only the benefits which 
accrue to these users are considered when estimating WTP. 
Individuals who do not directly participate may gain benefits 
in the form of option or existence values. Unless these 
benefits can be accounted for by identifying and including 
non-participating individuals, the benefit estimate will be 
lower than is actually the case. 
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Option and existence values relate to non-use benefits 
received by individuals. The former relates to the WTP of 
people for the ability to participate in the fishery at a 
future date. Faced with an uncertain future, the individual 
may be prepared to pay a premium simply to ensure that their 
opportunity to use the recreational resource is retained. 
Relative to user values, option value is small, but normally 
posi ti ve, (Freeman 1984). 
Existence value relates to the worth of just knowing that a 
resource exists. Many people may never see a live wild 
Panda, but are prepared to spend money to save the Panda from 
extinction. An individual can receive benefit from the 
present and continued existence of some resource for which 
they are willing to pay. For a fishery this existence value 
may relate to the continued ability of the stock to provide 
fishing. Even a non-user can get enjoyment from the 
knowledge that other people are enjoying themselves. 
Without extensive surveys of society as a whole it will often 
be difficult to estimate the option and existence value 
benefits of a resource. To assume they are insignificant and 
ignore them may lead to a significant under-valuation of the 
worth of a resource. An individual's valuation of the 
existence of a resource may not be great, but collectively 
society may place a significant value on retaining the 
resource. Information and education must playa significant 
role in the value non-users place on a resource and the 
greater the level of information about the character of the 
resource, the greater value society will place on it. 
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5.4 The Distribution of Benefits from Recreational Fishing. 
Despite the difficulties noted above of identifying non-user 
benefits and incorporating these into the total value 
estimate of a resource, the total should at least include 
consideration of any resource rent accruing to the fishery. 
Copes and Knetsch (198l) provide a discussion of the 
distribution of the various 
benefit of fishing under four 
These are the following: 
components 
different 
of the total net 
management modes. 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
open-access; 
public management; 
private owner; 
a private club. 
$ 
A 
Ul 
~ 
~ 
Cl 
(j 
:z 
H 
::r: 
Ul 
H 
~ 
~ ::r: 
E-I 
~ 
0 
~4 
~ 
~ 
:> 
H 
a 
FIGURE 5.4 
and 
G 
effort - fishing days 
PUBLIC ~~NAGEMENT- COST/BENEFIT 
RELATIONSHIP 
MSB = Marginal social Benefit 
MSC = Marginal Social Cost 
MPC = Marginal Private Cost 
TABLE 5.1 
The benefit characteristics of equilibrium levels of effort in a recreational fishery 
under different modes of access management. 
(from Copes and Knetsch (1981) 
FORMS OF 
ACCESS 
MANAGEMENT 
(AI OPEN-ACCESS 
(B) PUBLIC MAN-
AGEMENT FOR 
MAXIMUM NET 
SOCIAL 
BENEFITS 
(C) PRIVATE 
FISHERY 
OWNER 
(D) RESTRICTED 
ACCESS 
PRIVATE 
CLUB 
CATEGORIES OF 
SOCIAL BENEFITS 
MAXIMISED 
NONE 
COMB IN ED TOTAL 
OF CONS UMERS • 
AND PRODUCERS' 
SURPLUSES 
RESOURCE RENT 
COMBINED TOTAL 
OF RESOURCE 
RENT AND THE 
CLUB MEMBERS' 
CONSUMER SURPLUS 
INCIDENTAL 
AMOUNTS OF 
BENEFITS 
CONSUMERS' 
SURPLUS 
NONE 
CONSUMERS' 
SURPLUS 
NONE 
SOCIAL 
BENEFITS 
DISSIPATED 
RESCURCE 
RENT 
NONE 
NONE 
NONMEMBERS' 
CONSUMER 
SURPLUS 
RELATION TO 
SOCIALLY 
OPTIMUM CATCH 
INDETE RMIN ANT 
OPTIMAL 
INDETERMINANT 
IN DETERMIN ANT 
RELATION OF 
CONSUMER PRICE 
TO SOCIALLY 
OPTIMUM PRICE 
LESS THAN 
OPTIMUM 
OPTIMAL 
INDETERMINANT 
NOT APPLICABLE 
RELATION TO 
SOCIALLY OPTIMUM 
LEVEL OF EFFORT 
ABOVE OPTIMUM 
OPTIMAL 
INDETERM IN ANT 
LESS THAN 
OPTIMUM 
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Producer surplus is not considered as each 
considered both producer and consumer of 
angler can be 
the benefits of 
fishing and consumer surplus can thus be a measure of both. 
The resource rent is the same as that described by Copes 
(1972) for commercial fishing and represents a potential 
payment to the resource owner, over and above the private 
costs of fishing - including of course any entrance fee 
levied. The four management modes are summarized in table 
5.1 and in figures 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6. 
If under public management the costs of collecting any fees 
and the enforcement of any management rules are disregarded 
then the maximum net social benefit to accrue to the fishery 
occurs at effort level G in figure 5.4. The line AB 
represents WTP or demand for fishing days unadjusted for the 
stock externality factor discussed earlier in the chapter. 
The line CD represents the costs to the public agency of 
supplying the recreation. The line CE represents the sum of 
the costs of supply and the costs imposed by anglers on each 
other, as a stock externality. Copes and Knetsch (1981) 
express this in a different, but equally valid, way to 
Anderson (1980,1983). The present analysis incorporates it 
as a cost associated with supply, whereas Anderson uses it as 
a constraint in a household demand function. The difference 
in concept depends on whether anglers can perceive the extra 
costs they bear as a result of the stock externality. Hence, 
in this analysis the line CE repre3ents a social cost of 
fishing and is expressed as a cost, not as a component of WTP 
as Anderson U980,1983) has done. 
The socially optimal level of fishing effort is G 
corresponding to that level of effort where the marginal 
social benefits - i.e. demand - are equal to the marginal 
social costs of fishing. The resultant consumer surplus - as 
shown in figure 5.4 - is the area labelled 1, less that of 
area labelled 3, which represents the stock externality for G 
fishing days. The cost of supply is the area labelled 4 
which leaves the areas 2 and 3 as rent accruing to the 
resource. Empirically the area of total net social benefits 
is equal to the sum of the areas 1 and 2, i.e. all that in 
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RELATIONSHIP. 
MSB = Marginal Social Benefit 
MSC = Marginal Social Cost 
MPC = Marginal Private Cost 
MPR = Marginal Private Revenue 
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excess of the costs of supply (area 4) and the social costs 
of the stock externality (area 3). 
The implications of open access on a public agency can also 
be seen in figure 5.4. There is no rent as the authority can 
collect no revenue at the open access effort level B. In 
fact it costs the equivalent of areas 4,7 and 8 to provide 
the fishing in the first place, so a net financial loss to 
the public management agency occurs. The total number of 
sports fishermen enjoy a significant amount of consumer 
surplus, which is the net of all the area to the left of the 
line AB less the stock externality - the triangle CED. The 
effort level is clearly above the socially optimal level, 
however, due to a lack of any information on the biological 
population dynamics of the stock it cannot be determined 
whether the catch rate will be above or below that of optimal 
management. An increase in effort can produce either an 
increase or decrease in the catch rate depending on previous 
effort levels and the biological response of the stock ~opes 
and Knetsch,198l). 
Private ownership of a fishery as represented in figure 5.5 
illustrates the difference between the privately optimal case 
- maximisation of resource rent - and the socially optimal 
case - the maximisation of the sum of rent and consumer 
surplus. The demand schedule will remain the same, and we 
can assume the costs of providing the facility and the social 
costs of overcrowding are similar. Marginal private revenue 
~PR) will be determined by the position of the demand curve 
- which shows the marginal social benefit (MSB) and will be 
less than demand since it only reflects private revenues and 
not the total net benefit. The private owner is only 
concerned with his private costs and revenue and will set 
effort at L where marginal private costs equal marginal 
private revenue. However demand gives a price or value equal 
to M. Total private costs are represented by the are~7 on 
figure 5.5. The rent is represented by the areas 3, 4, 5 and 
6. Consumer surplus given by the net of areas 1 and 2, less 
areas 5 and 6. Clearly the individual fisherman is enjoying 
significantly less consumer surplus than he would under 
$ 
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public management. The sum of rent and consumer surplus is 
also not as large, so the total net social benefit is also 
less than it would have been under public management. 
The private club which controls access to a fishery and 
restricts use to members acts as both owner and consumer. 
Benefits accruing to members - after deducting the costs of 
providing the fishery and any stock externality which occurs 
- would be an indistinguishable combination of rent and 
consumer surplus. The club would have an interest in 
restricting effort, probably by restricting membership, to 
minimise the costs of crowding and stock reduction. However 
if initial costs of operation are high then a greater intake 
of members may be more desirable in order to spread the 
costs. The club will then continue to expand effort until 
the average net benefits of increasing members begins to 
decrease. The greatest difference between the average cost 
of fishing and the average benefits is given by the line uv 
with effort at W. This is less than the socially optimum 
level of effort G so the additional consumer surplus that 
could be enjoyed by extra members is foregone (see figure 
5.6). 
One benefit not mentioned by Copes and Knetsch is the payment 
to society by the club for the exclusive rights to the fish 
resource. Whether or not this occurs depends on the property 
rights involved, however, it is possible that the operating 
costs of the club could involve a tax or royalty paid into 
the public accounts. 
While the possible situations of a private club or owner 
exercising exclusive rights over a marine fishery are 
unlikely management options for New Zealand, their discussion 
does serve the purpose of exposing the flaws inVOlved in 
pursuing only resource rent or consumer surplus as an 
economic objective. One further point I would like to note 
before concluding the discussion is in the notion of the 
transactions costs of managing a fishery where actually 
providing the fish is not necessary. As the numbers of 
anglers in a marine fishery increase, so does the necessity 
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to police and enforce any management regulations which can 
increase actual costs irrespective of any social costs due to 
congestion or over-fishing. All of these above examples 
involve a fee for use, part of which goes towards the 
provision of the fishery and could just as easily be used for 
management. The question of who should pay for the provision 
of recreational fisheries is a point for some debate. Some 
countries use general tax revenues to finance rcreational 
fishing management, whereas other nations use a user-pays 
approach by imposing fees or taxes on fishing related gear, 
or simply use a fishing license. 
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5.5 ConcLusions 
The economic theory of recreational fishing has evolved from 
the much broader economic analysis of recreational 
activities. The character of recreational activities that 
are based on natural resources such as fish, dictated 
initially that the economaic analysis of recreational fishing 
pursue a much different course to that of commercial fishing. 
The general and pervasive philosophy of open-access to 
recreational fisheries for the public in many nations, the 
non-market nature of the benefits which accrue from 
recreational fishing, and the lack of a bio-economic supply 
component in the analysis were all factors which influenced 
the character of the economic analytical framework devised 
for recreational fisheries. Issues such as the economic 
scarcity of fish, the intangible nature of fishing benefits, 
and the role of property rights in the allocation of fish 
resources are points which recreational fishing theory has 
only just begun to address. 
The work of McConnell and Norton (1976), which further 
developed the concept of demand for recreational, appears 
also to have provided a basis for much of the more recent 
theoretical developments. They noted a number of issues in 
their conclusions which they felt needed to be addressed in 
future work and many other analysts have responded. Among 
the issues and concepts which have been developed further is 
the bio-economic supply function (which can now incorporate a 
biological yield function the same as commercial fishing) and 
the derived demand schedule (through the development of more 
reliable methods for estimating the non-market values of 
fishing). 
It is now possible for a model of a recreational fishery to 
incorporate all the bio-economic theory which also 
characterises commercial fishing analysis. the biological 
and economic scarcity of the stock and its' affects on both 
the supply of fish and the demand for fishing can now be 
explicitly considered. Hence, the stock externalities of 
over-fishing or congestion can be used to determine the 
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economically optimal allocation of the fish stock to the 
recreational angler. Further consideration of the affects of 
the distribution of the economic or social surpluses is now 
also possible using the analytical approach of Copes and 
Knetsch ~98l). 
The developments in the theory and analysis of recreational 
fishing are such that Tuomi's (1977) call for an integrated 
analysis of both recreational and commercial fishing is close 
to realisation. The major components of the two analyses are 
theoretically compatible and a number of authors have 
attempted to produce a single theory and analysis of a joint 
recreational and commercial fishery. A discussion of these 
theories and their results follows in chapter six. 
- 149 
CHAPTER SIX 
The Integration of the Bio-economic Analyses of 
Commercial and Amateur Fishing. 
6.1 Introduction. 
It is now recognised that amateur fishing can form a 
significant component of some fisheries. Amateur fishermen 
may harvest significant amounts of the total catch - thereby 
affecting the commercial fishery. Amateur fishing benefits 
may also represent a significant portion of the total 
benefits the fishery can return to society. Situations which 
involve both commercial and amateur fishing can create 
difficulties for fisheries managers whose job it is to 
allocate the fish resource among the various users. An 
economic model of the allocation of fish to each sector could 
be useful. However, as has been shown in the previous 
chapters, the respective economic theories of commercial and 
recreational fishing until recently have not been compatible. 
Economic theory has been unable to provide an analytical 
framework capable of allowing consideration of the values of 
both sectors of a jOint fishery. 
The economic theory of recreational fishing has now been 
advanced so that it can produce economic values for 
recreational fishing and can also include consideration of 
the affects of stock scarcity on demand. As a result a 
number of attempts have been made to provide an analysis 
which is compatible with both sectors. The development of 
such an analysis should enable fisheries managers, economists 
and analylists to develop an integrated management approach 
for fisheries where a single fish stock is jointly exploited 
by both commercial and recreational fishermen. 
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This chapter provides a review of the economic models and 
analyses of joint fisheries developed to date. The basic aim 
of the economic models is to place a value of the fish caught 
by each fishing sector and then to allocate the fish stock 
based on those values. It is assumed in each model that a 
number of critical 
inputed from the 
parameters are 
values already 
either 
known. 
known or can be 
Among these 
parameters are: the cost and revenue functions of commercial 
fishermen; and the cost and benefit functions of 
recreational fishermen. From these functions it is possible 
to derive the net benefit functions of the fishery. Other 
important parameter which need to be known are: the numbers 
of fishermen; the size of the fish stock; and the size of 
the catch for each of the fishing sectors. The economic 
benefit and cost functions are constrained by the natural 
growth rates, stock sizes and harvest rates of the fish 
stocks concerned. 
The first economic model is the static systems model of 
Rothschild, Gates and Carlson (1977). It was part of a much 
larger systems analysis of a fishing system. The second and 
third analyses are based on dynamic economic models of 
fishing as proposed by Clark and Munro (9175) and reviewed in 
section 4.5. In the earlier of these two analyses McConnell 
and Sutinen (1979) first developed a theory of recreational 
fishing which is briefly reviewed in section 5.2. The 
recreational fishing theory then formed the basis for an 
extension of the analysis to commercial fishing. The dynamic 
analysis developed by Bishop and Samples (1980) is very 
similar to that of McConnell and Sutinen (1979), except that 
it is based entirely on an adapted commercial fishing model 
and develops a simpler theory of recreational fishing. 
The final model of a joint recreational and commercial 
fishery is that of Anderson (1980). The theory is developed 
using a static bio-economic fishing analysis for each sector, 
which are then joined. The significant feature of Anderson's 
model is that it explicitly includes consideration of the 
stock externality effects each fishing sector exterts on the 
catch or value of the other. The simplicity of both the 
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model and the analysis enables 
develop the first of the two major 
joint fishing as stated by Sutinen 
Anderson (1980) to clearly 
economic principles of 
(1980) . 
sutinen (1980) principles of joint fishing theory are the 
following: 
1. in order to maximise the sum of the net 
benefits of both fishing sectors, the net 
benefit functions of each sector must be 
equated at the margin; and 
2. in order to maximise the net present value of 
the joint fishery, the present and all future 
net benefit functions of each fishing sector 
must be equated at the margin. 
The analysis of Anderson (1980) develops the first principle 
very clearly, but cannot address the second principle due to 
limitations of a static analysis. The dynamic models of 
McConnell and Sutinen (1979) and Bishop and Samples (1980) 
use the first principle, but this quickly becomes secondary 
to the need to derive a maximum net present value for the 
fishery. 
In each model, once the marginal net benefit functions have 
been equated, the maximum benefit value is then related to a 
particular stock size. It is this 'optimal' stock size which 
determines the allocation of the available fish resources to 
each of the two fishing sectors. The respective net benefit 
functions will define the effort levels for each of the two 
sectors within 
These 'optimal' 
fishing sector 
fishery, and so 
catch. 
the fishery st this 'optimal' stock size. 
effort levels then determine the catch each 
will contribute to the total catch of the 
effectively allocate the available fish 
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6.2: An Early Systems Approach. 
One of the earlier attempts to develop an integrated theory 
or analysis of fishing was the static analysis of Rothschild, 
Gates and Car Ison (1977). The analysi s was a small er par t of 
a much larger investigation into a systems approach to 
fisheries management. (See figure 6.1) The authors identify 
two markets for fishing, one commercial and one recreational, 
and develop the concepts of resource rent, and producer and 
consumer surplus to describe the economic benefits produced 
in each market. A social welfare criterion - the allocation 
of scarce resources to make society better off - is used in 
the analysis and is measured by the sum of the different 
economic benefits to give a 
fish in the 
net economic surplus. The 
allocation of the 
two marginal value functions 
marginal cost schedules of the 
systems analysis is based on 
the marginal benefit and 
whole fishery. 
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The marginal benefit function developed for this analysis is 
the aggregate of the i ndi vidual willingness-to-pay (or 
demand) functions of the fishermen for each fishing sector. 
These demand functions relate the WTP for each fisherman to 
the stock size or fish density. To obtain the fishery WTP or 
marginal benefit function each of the individual WTPs is 
summed vertically (see figure 6.2). Hence, fish density is 
treated as a public good and no account is taken of any stock 
externalities that arise due to increasing effort. The 
marginal benefit schedule shown in figure 6.3 shows that at 
low stock densities an increase in stock numbers results in a 
greater increase in value associated with it, than would be 
the case at higher stock densities. This kind of situation 
results in the non-linear marginal benefit function shown. 
$ 
FISH s'I'C:(l{ DENSITY 
FIGURE 6.2 THE TOI'AL WILLlNGNESS-TO-PAY SCHEDULE 
FOR THE FISHERY = THE VERI'ICAL SUMMATION 
OF ALL THE INDIVIDUAL MARGINAL VAlliE 
SCHEDULES. 
$ 
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FISH S'lXX:K DENSITY 
FIGURE 6.3 A NCN-LINEAR MARGINAL BENEFIT aJRVE 
The marginal cost curve for the fishery (Me), in figure 6.4, 
represents the added costs associated with supplying 
increasing numbers of fish for recreational fishermen to 
catch. Due to the connection between recreational and 
commercial catches, via the size of the fish stock, the 
marginal cost curve also represents the economic benefits for 
gone in the commercial fishing sector -these are the 
opportunity costs of the fish not being caught by commercial 
fishermen. Included in the marginal cost schedule also are: 
the population dynamics of the fish stock - which constrain 
supply; the effects on the commercial economic surplus of 
changes in the volume of the commercial catch; and the costs 
involved in the specific management strategy needed to attain 
the desired stock size and density. As the analysiS is a 
simple one no other costs associated with fishing are 
included such as: the provision of facilities; the costs of 
fishing gear; or any crowding externalities due to increased 
numbers of recreational fishermen. For each desired stock 
size a different amount of management is needed and hence, a 
different marginal cost curve will result; each with costs 
increasing as fish density increases. Figure 6.4 shows one 
possible marginal cost schedule and the marginal benefit 
schedule developed earlier. 
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If fish density were at point F, then the marginal value ~) 
would be greater than the marginal cost ~). An increase in 
fish density would benefit recreational fishermen to a 
greater extent than it would decrease the benefits of 
commercial fishing. Overall, the total benefits would be 
increased. If it is assumed that fish density is at point G, 
where the cost and benefit values are both equal to H, then 
point A is an equilibrium point. An increase in fish density 
to point K would result in the marginal costs exceeding 
benefits for recreational fishermen, and the overall economic 
benefits would decrease. Only at density G are the economic 
benefits at a maximum, hence, the area JAI represents the 
maximum sum of the economic surpluses available. 
The model and analysis shown in figure 6.4 highlights a 
number of issues which are also going to arise throughout all 
the economic analysis reviewed in this chapter. The first 
issue is that although the diagram in figure 6.4 looks 
somewhat similar to a competitive market situation, and the 
optimum allocation point A mimics a market equilibrium, 
neither is the case. There is no market for recreational 
fishing benefits, so these values must be determined in other 
ways - such as the proxy measures described in the previous 
chapter. Part of this situatiion of being unable to value 
the benefits no doubt stems from the openaccess property 
rights prevalent in recreational fishing management. Another 
reason for the valuation difficulties may be the difference 
in the benefits associated with the two types of fishing. In 
any case, a market does not exist in which both recreational 
and commercial fishermen could bid for changes in fish 
density. 
A second issue to be noted from the analysis of Rothschild et 
al (1977) is that the point which denotes the equilibrium 
~oint A in figure 6.4) is not a true economic optimum. 
Although the point does specify the level of fish density 
which gives the greatest total net benefit value to the 
fishery, it depends on the relative position of the marginal 
cost schedule. Recall that the marginal cost schedule 
incorporates the costs of the management controls used to 
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attain the specific optimal fish density required, once it 
has been determined by the model. Each type of management 
control has different costs associated with its use and so 
will specify a different marginal cost schedule, if all else 
remains constant. 
Before attempting to determine the economically optimal fish 
density for the fishery, the analyst needs to specify the 
type of management to be used to attain the stock density and 
compare the costs of each to get a cost-effective management 
program. Only then may the point A be a true economic 
optimum. 
to have 
Rothschild, Gates and Carlson are the only analysts 
specifically noted this potentially significant 
point. The transactions costs associated with fisheries 
management need not always be significant, but if they were, 
it would- be important to the ultimate total net benefit 
value. 
The final 
Carlson's 
issue 
(1977 ) 
associated with 
analysis is the 
Rothschild, Gates and 
simplistic nature of the 
willingness-to-pay or marginal benefit function of the 
recreational fisherman. The authors assume that the marginal 
cost curve for the commercial fishery can be used to stand as 
a proxy for a true WTP function for the recreational 
fishermen. By focussing on stock density and the opportunity 
costs of commercial fishing as benefit values for the 
recreational sector the authors are assuming that 
recreational fishermen value the fish only as much as 
commercial fishermen. No account is made of the WTP for 
recreational fishing and demand is far more complex than its 
representation in this analysis. Recreational fishing demand 
has been further developed in the previous chapter. 
The static systems model of Rothschild, Gates and Carlson 
(1977) may be of some value as a beginning to the theoretical 
analysis of allocation of fish to recreation and commercial 
fishermen. However, the analysis presented is too simple to 
be any more than a first attempt upon which to improve. The 
points and issues noted above are factors which will be 
explored in more detail in the more recent analyses. The 
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major contribution of the analysis is twohold. The first 
point is the economic principle of joint fishing of always 
comparing the values of commercial and recreational fishing 
at the margin (Sutinen, 1980). By equating the comparable 
benefit values at economically efficient allocations of 
resources can result. If however the allocation of the stock 
is to be a dynamic one, ie. overtime, then the consideration 
of an intertemporal marginal benefit function is necessary 
and a dynamic model becomes useful. 
The second contribution of the analysis has already been 
discussed above. It is the explicit consideration of the 
transactions costs involved in managing the stock to attain 
and maintain the optimal size and fish density. None of the 
next models even mention the costs of management, except to 
assume them to be zero. A convenient, but totally 
unrealistic assumption. 
p 
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6.3: Dynamic Economic Models. 
The following two models of joint fisheries are based on the 
dynamic economic fishing model and analysis of Clark and 
Munro (1975). Both dynamic joint fishing models still 
attempt to fulfil Sutinen's (1980) first principle of 
equating net benefits at the margin to produce economically 
efficient fish allocations. However, by introducing a 
temporal element, the models also attempt to allocate the 
fish resource in an efficient manner over time as well. Thus 
fulfilling Sutinen's second principle of equating marginal 
benefits over time. The theory of dynamic economic models of 
commercial fishing is reviewed in chapter four, and the 
theories of recreational fishing are reviewed in chapter 
five. The models reviewed here merely put the two components 
together. 
The Analysis of McConnell and Sutinen (1979) 
The economic theory of recreational fishing - and hence, the 
analysis of the interaction of recreational and commercial 
fishing - was significantly advanced by McConnell and Sutinen 
in 1979. Their theory of recreational fishing is reviewed in 
chapter five. Their model of recreational fishing is 
significant due to the explicit incorporation of a natural 
fish growth function into the analysis. Hence, the effect of 
a scarce fish stock on the demand for fishing and on the 
value of fishing can be investigated. The major result of 
this investigation is the derivation of a 'social opportunity 
cost' associated with fishing, called the marginal user cost 
( \) . 
Allocation of the scarce fish resource between competing 
commercial and recreational fishermen can now be attempted by 
extending the recreational fishing model to include a 
commercial harvest. A demand function can be derived for 
commercial fishing effort that is directly analogous to that 
for recreational fishing effort, so that demand p is a 
function of effort E and stock size B, so: 
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p :::: (E ,B) (6.1 ) 
The total commercial catch (g) can be given by: 
g::: E.g(B) (6.2) 
where g(B) is the catch per unit effort, which increases as 
the stock size (B) increases. The private costs of each unit 
of effort are assumed to be constant (k), directly analogous 
to the constant marginal costs associated with recreational 
fishing (c). The net benefi ts wi thin any time per iod for the 
commerical fishery are the sum of any consumer and producer 
surpluses arid these are represented by the areas under the 
demand function and above the effort-cost line (k) as shown 
in' f i gu r e 6. 5 • 
$ 
c -------
(b) 
RECREATICNAL 
FISHIm 
FIGURE 6.' 5 THE FISHlN] EFFORI' ALI..CCATICNS 
UNDER CCNDITICNS OF OPEN-ACCESS. 
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In the analysis of McConnell and Sutinen (197 9) the demand 
functions for recreational and commerical fishing are shown 
in figure 6.5. These diagrams represent an static 
equilibrium situation where the stock remains a constant 
size. The points 0° and EO represent the open-access 
equilibrium levels of effort for each sector. The hatched 
areas represent the net benefits, without consideration of 
any user costs associated with the joint harvest. 
If the objective of management is to allocate the fish stock 
to the most economically efficient users, then the problem 
can simply become on of allocating the fishing effort (which 
can determine the catch) of the two sectors so as to maximise 
the net benefits. Here again the Hamiltonian expression is 
useful, although it is now more complex. Both recreational 
and commercial net benefit functions have to be incorporated 
into the expression in order to provide the basis for 
determining the optimal values for recreational effort 0 and 
commercial effort E. It is these values of effort which 
maximise the total net benefits over time - the net present 
value ~PV). The result will be a series of effort levels 
through time which allow the available catch to be shared, 
constrained primarily by the effects of the present harvests 
on the future stock sizes. As with recreational fishing, a 
marginal user cost A(t) is a significant parameter in the 
joint fishing dynamic model. 
When an equilibrium stock size and hence, 
attained, a steady state marginal user 
derived. If this user cost could be levied 
harvest rate are 
cost (A) can be 
against current 
users of the fish stock as a fee or tax on catch, then the 
economically optimal equilibrium levels of fishing effort may 
be obtained. At these equilibrium effort levels - o~ and E* 
for recreational and commercial effort respectively - the sum 
of both economic surpluses is maximised. This of course 
assumes that the demand and cost schedules remain constant 
over time. The economically optimal effort allocations - and 
hence, catch 
values hand 
recreational 
allocations are shown 
g refer to the size 
and commercial harvest 
in figure 6.6. The 
of the respective 
rates and hence, 
$ 
k + Ag 
k 
$ 
C + Ah 
C 
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determine the size of the user cost for each harvest sector. 
An important issue which can be identified in McConnell and 
Sutinen's (1979) model is the way the participation rates 
(effort levels) will change in response to some form of 
management being imposed on an open-access resource. If 
economically optimal effort levels are imposed, using a user 
cost fee in order to maximise the economic net benefits, then 
the optimal levels of effort will be smaller than otherwise. 
In figure 6.6 the recreational and commerical effort levels 
under an open-access management regime are DO and EO 
respectively. These effort levels correspond to the marginal 
private costs of effort being equal to the demand function or 
WTP for each type of effort. Under optimal management the 
effort levels are reduced to D* and E*, as determined by the 
fishing effort cost increases, due to including the user cost 
A in the marginal cost functions. For given values of A 
(the user cost), h (B) (the recreational catch rate) and g (B) 
(the comrnerical catch rate), the changes in effort are 
determined by the respective effort-demand functions. The 
changes in the amounts of effort demanded, due to changes in 
the marginal cost functions of effort, can be measured by the 
own-price elasticity of demand for effort, represented by the 
notation 17 . 
The own-price elasticity of demand for an economic commodity 
such as fishing effort can be represented by the equation: 
~ fishing effort = - change in effort 
change in price 
x 
price 
effort (6.3) 
So the own-price elasticity of recreational fishing effort, 
where the demand for fishing effort (D) is p = P (D,h (B)), is 
the fOllowing: 
17 D = - 4D d 
--x-
6d E (6.4) 
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Similarly the own-price elasticity of commercial fishing 
effort (E), where the demand for commercial fishing effort is 
d = d ~,B) can be defined as: 
17 E = - Ll E P 
--x-
4p E (6.5) 
Although, not quite this simple, it might be easier to 
envisage the 17 values as a simultaneous measure of both the 
shape and slope of the marginal benefit curves. Thus they 
determine the relative sizes of any changes in demand for 
each fishing sector, due to changes in the price of the 
fishing effort in that particular fishing sector. 
If, as is shown in figure 6.6, the ~E is relatively larger 
than the ~ D, then optimal management would require a greater 
decrease in effort from the commercial sector than the 
recreational sector to achieve an equivalent decrease in 
price or value. The optimal effort-mix would then favour 
recreational effort over commercial effort. The opposite 
situation is also possible (if '7) D > "l'E) and hence, 
commerical effort would be favoured over recreational effort. 
These res ul ts suggest that the own-price elastici ty of each 
sectors effort will have a large bearing on the optimal 
allocation of effort and hence, the allocation of the 
available fish catch. 
It is possible for the optimal allocation of effort to favour 
totally one user group or the other. A fishery would be 
exclusively exploited by commercial fishing, for example, if 
the addi tion of a user cost (A) to the costs of recreational 
fishing caused the cost function for recreational effort to 
exceed the demand function. with these new imposed social 
costs of fishing effort, no recreational fishermen would be 
willing to pay the cost (c+ Ah) to fish, so effort would be 
zero as shown in figure 6.7. The opposite situation is also 
possible, where recreational fishermen are willing to pay the 
cost of fishing,but commercial fishermen are not. Thus the 
fishery would have all recreational effort. 
$ 
k 
$ 
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p(E,B) 
E 
effort E 
(a) CCMMERCIAL 
FISHING 
(b) RECREATIONAL 
FISHING 
c +;\h __ 
c 
d (D,h(B) ) 
effort D no D* 
FIGURE 6.7 SI'IUATION WHERE A USER FEE FAVCURS 
A SINGLE-Us:e OF THE FISHERY. 
(there is no recreational fishery 
due to higher costs than benefits 
at all levels of effort D.l 
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These results raise the issue of income being able to 
influence demand, since the costs of fishing are being 
artificially raised to cover the user cost by a management 
fee. The ability of fishermen to pay that fee, depends not 
on their willingness, but the ability to pay. That is 
naura11y a function of income. 
The issue of 
allocation of 
fishing groups. 
generally not 
income is of particular importance in an 
resources between amateur and commercial 
The income of recreational fishermen is 
tied to the allocation of the available fish 
catch, whereas the income of commercial fishermen is. Since 
income can play a significant role in the WTP schedules of 
fishermen, the effect of diminishing catches on the WTP of 
commercial fishermen need to be explored and accounted for. 
Another issue closely related to income is that of asset 
fixity in commercial fishing operations - especially those 
fisheries in economic decline. The effects of this problem 
on amateur fishermen are less as they use equipment which 
normally represents less of an investment and is not expected 
to produce an economic return to the invested capital. 
McConnell and Sutinen (1979) advocate the use of estimates of 
the derived demand for fishing (ie. the marginal net benefit 
schedules) in order to determine the user costs associated 
with the fishing, even when it is not possible to add them to 
the total costs faced by fishermen. Other means of 
management must be found which can serve the same purpose. 
The knowledge of the demand characteristics - gained from the 
marginal net benefit schedules -, and of the social costs -
gained from the user cost estimate - can be provide valuable 
criteria with which to assess the usefulness of management 
policy instruments other than fiscal tools such as fees, 
taxes, royalties or subsidies. 
The value of the information derived from the exercise of 
determining demand and user costs depends very much on the 
capacity of the model to accurately describe the fishery and 
its bio-economic character. Hence, as the quality of any 
policy or management guidance is, in part, also dependant on 
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the value of the information obtained from the model, it is 
important that the model be as accurate as possible. A 
number of assumptions are often used to develope the models 
used by fisheries economists in order to either better 
describe a fishery or to keep the analysis from becoming 
unnecessarily complex. Two of the major assumptions used by 
McConnell and Sutinen (1979) are noted below. 
McConnell and Sutinen (1979) have taken a pioneering step by 
introducing a stock growth function into the net benefit 
function of the recreational fishing sector in the joint 
fishing model. However, the surplus production model is an 
extremely simple one - as noted in Chapter Three and is 
based on stock size and harvest rates only. Although a more 
complex yield model might better describe the stock 
production, it could also serve to complicate the joint 
bio-economic fishing analysis used and hence, produce more 
complex, and possibly less, useful results. 
Also omitted from consideration in the net benefit functions 
for each fishery were any benefits or costs which accrue to 
non-fishing people. The analysis concentrated on the demand 
for fishing effort, so people who gain benefit from the 
fishery, without necessarily fishing themselves, are omitted 
from contributing their benefits to the net benefit 
schedules. The consumers of commercially caught fish would 
be one such group of society, and another would be people who 
value the fish resource for the non-extractive benefits it 
can provide. Commercial fish consumers would face a fairly 
constant market price for fish in the shops if this fishery 
was only one of a number of similar fisheries all 
contributing to a much larger fish marker. Therefore, the 
potential or actual consumer surplus value of the fish 
consuming public is not included in the net benefit values of 
commercial fishing. The existence or option values 
discussed in Chapter Five - which can accrue to non-fishing 
users of the fish stock are also uncounted. 
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The Analysis of Bishop and Samples (1980). 
The second dynamic model and analysis of the interactions 
between commercial and recreational fishermen is that of 
Bishop and Samples (1980). This analysis is also developed 
as a dynamic model, but differs from the previous analysis of 
McConnell and Sutinen (1979), in that the recreational model 
is derived from a dynamic commercial fishing model. The 
dynamic model of commercial fishing used in this analysis is 
the same as that described in Chapter Four. As in the 
previous analysis, optimal control theory is used to aid the 
analysis of the model. The marginal user cost )\(t) is also 
an important parameter developed in this model. 
The measure of the benefits of commercial fishing is given by 
the price per pound of landed fish. Demand is assumed to be 
perfectly elastic, which results in a constant market price 
for the co~~ercially caught fish. The costs per pound of 
fish caught are assumed to be a function of the equilibrium 
stock size (B), where the marginal cost of fishing decreases 
as stock size increases. The net benefits per pound of fish 
caught is the difference between the costs and price. Hence, 
the net benefits C (B) will increase as a linear function with 
an increase in equilibrium stock size, due to the constant 
price and decreasing costs. The result is a constant 
murginal benefit function for commercially caught fish C' (B) 
as shown in figure 6.8a. 
The objective of the analysis is to choose an equilibrium 
stock size (B*) which maximises the NPV of the fishing 
benefits. The optimum equilibrium stock size ~*) is 
determined by the intersection of the present marginal 
benefit function for fishing and the future marginal benefit 
function [the marginal user cost, ~ (t) ] and is represented 
as point A in figure 6.8a. The optimum stock size the 
determines the the optimum harvest rate g (B*). The resultant 
harvesting regime for the commercial fishery as shown in 
figure 6.8b reflects the simple nature of the model used due 
to the assumptions made. Section 4.5 provides a greater 
description of this dynamic model of commercial fishing. 
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FIGURE 6.8 OPTIMAL STOCK SIZE AND HARVEST REGIME 
FOR SIMPLE COMMERCIAL FISHING SECTOR 
(for Bishop and Samples, 1980). 
Adding a recreational 
commercial model is 
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fishing sector 
not difficult. 
to the original 
Conditions such as the 
recreational harvest rate, the demand for fishing and the 
costs per pound of fish caught are assumed to be directly 
analogous to the commercial fishing parameters. The only 
significant difference is that the demand schedule for 
recreational fishing differs from the demand schedule for 
commercial fishing by allowing the recreational catch rate 
h(B) to also influence demand. The catch rate is positively 
correlated to stock size and the benefits received are 
similarly correlated to catch rate, so total benefits are 
assumed to increase with stock size. Hence, net benefits 
R(B) increase with an increasing stock size due to both 
increasing gross benefits and decreasing costs for fish 
caught, and so the marginal benefit schedule for recreational 
fishing R I (B) is also linear. 
The economically optimal solution, to the problem of 
allocating the fishing effort of the harvesting sectors, is 
produced by maximising the NPV of the 'sum of the net benefits 
from the two sectors. Bishop and Samples (1980) recognised 
that the emphasis given to the economic efficiency objective 
may often be inappropriate in fisheries management, but the 
point is not elaborated upon. They also note however, that 
economic efficiency can provide useful b~nchmarks for 
subsequent analyses or policy discussions. 
Detailed consideration of the distribution of all the 
economic surpluses produced would be premature at this stage 
for a number of reasons. The first is the very undeveloped 
state of the theory and analysis, and the second is the 
preoccupation of many economists with rent maximisation. The 
third reason is the simple nature of the models used. 
The problem addressed by the model of Bishop and Samples 
(1980) was to determine the level of harvest for each of the 
two fishing sectors that maximised the NPV of the benefits of 
fishing. The first important result of the model was, that 
when the fishery is in an equilibrium state, the optimal 
pi 
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stock size ~~) depends on the relative magnitude of the net 
benefit functions of both recreational R(B) and commercial 
C(B) fishing. If these net benefit functions are not equal, 
then a maximum of net benefits will occur, only if one or 
other level of harvest eventually falls to zero, leaving a 
single-use fishery. Multiple use of the fishery is 
non-optimal except in the particular circumstances described 
below. 
Bishop and Samples (1980) stated that the eventual exclusion 
of one or other fishing sector was a direct result of the 
linear nature of the model used so far. The linear character 
came from the net benefit functions. Net benefits in both 
fishing sectors were assumed to relate simply to the stock 
size wi th marginal commercial net benef i ts being C I (B) and 
recreational R' ~). These relationships were obvious 
simplifications of the real situation, but were simply 
represented in order to ensure that the model remained 
manageable during initial development. The results produced 
by the initial model were thus less valid than might have 
been the case without simplification, but were none-the-less 
useful for the theoretical discussion produced by Bishop and 
Samples (1980). 
The optimum equilibrium stock size depends on the relative 
sizes of the two marginal benefit functions. If 
R' (B) > C' (B) then the optimal stock size for a recreational 
fishery will be ~~) . If c' (B) > R' (B) then the optimal 
commercial stock size will be found at ~~), see figure 
6.9a,b. The problem faced by fisheries management, on behalf 
of society, is to decide which optimum stock size should be 
the long-term management goal. 
There are two factors which will be critical to the choice of 
which optimal stock size to pursue. The first factor is the 
relative sensitivity of the net benefits contributed to the 
total net benefits from each sector to changes in the stock 
size. This sensitivity will be influenced by each of the 
respective net benefit functions, and the relative value of 
the user cost at different stock sizes. The second factor 
$ 
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( a) R' ( B) >C I( B ) 
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(b) C'(B) >R'(B) 
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A(t) 
R'(B) 
B 
FIGURE 6.9 OPTIMAL EQUILIBRIUM STOCK SIZES 
FOR JOINT FISHING. 
C'(B) 
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relates to the relative harvesting capacities of each of the 
commercial and recreational sectors. If one or both sectors 
are unable to fully exploit the available stock, then a case 
for limited multiple use may exist. 
Consider an example that may better explain the effects of 
the two factors which can influence the choice of the optimal 
stock size. First, assume that R' (B) exceeds C· (B) for all 
stock sizes (B). ~ priori a strong case exists for allowing 
only recreational fishing. The optimal biomass to be pursued 
can be calculated as Br and represents the stock level where 
the user costs begin to exceed the net benefits of increasing 
The decision to include a commercial harvest would then 
result from the consideration of two factors. The first 
factor concerns the ability of the recreational fishing 
sector to adequately maintain the level of harvest needed to 
ensure the stock size does not exceed Bf. If the 
recreational sector is unable to maintain the optimum stock 
size, then a part-time commercial harvest may be needed. It 
can be expected that a commercial harvest may be needed 
initially to reduce a large stock. 
The long-term involvement of commercial fishing in a 
predominantly reacreational fishery would depend primarily on 
whether the recreational sector was able to exploit the 
resource~effectively. Where the recreational harvest for 
some reason is unable to maintain the fish stock at the 
optimal level for recreational fishing, then short-term 
pulses of commercial fishing may assist and at the same time 
add to the net economic benefits. Commercial fishing is a 
viable solution only if its' use actually adds to the total 
net benefits. To do so the net benefits of coomercial 
fishing must be greater than the user costs at the greater 
stock levels. If commercial has to be used to maintain the 
recreational optimum stock Slze then Br may have to be 
reassessed. 
$ 
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C(B) >R'(B) 
R'(B) 
FIGURE 6.10 OPTIMAL EQUILIBRIUM STOCK SIZES 
ARE BOTH LESS THAN B. 
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FIGURE 6.11 OPTIMAL EQUILIBRIUM STOCK SIZES ARE 
BOTH GREATER THAN B. 
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In their analysis of fishing Bishop and Samples (1980) must 
have assumed that the fishing effort of each sector is 
infinitely flexible. However, no such assumption is 
exlicitly mentioned in their analysis. By assuming this 
flexibility, the model is able to ignore any extra costs 
associated with changing harvest rates from a maximum to zero 
or a harvest of the equilibrium production. Applying maximum 
effort in one season and none the next must incur opportunity 
costs of having capital idle during a period of no harvest. 
Such a situation could arise if a recreational fishery needed 
only intermittent help to maintain the stock at the optimum 
if-
size Br. 
A second scenario can be assumed to exist, where 
C' (B) > R' (B) stock levels, as is shown in figure 6.9b. 
Thisis an exactly symmetrical, but opposite analysis to the 
first one above. The results obtained are also exactly the 
reverse of the discussion above. Hence, commercial fishing 
predominates, and recreational fishing occurs only under the 
"* special conditions of the previous discussion. Bc would be 
the optimal stock size for a predominantly commercial 
fishery. 
A third scenario can be envisaged which is more complex than 
the two previous situations. Here we can assume that at some 
stock levels the marginal benefits of recreational fishing 
R' (B) exceed the marginal benefits of commercial fishing 
C' (B) and vice versa at other stock levels. It is possible 
for R' (B) > c' (B) at stock levels greater than some stock 
si ze 13' and C' (B) > R' (B) at stock levels less than 13'. The 
stock level ~ is where the net benefit schedule for 
recreational fishing changes its value and hence, its slope 
also, see figure 6.10. 
Bishop and Samples U980) give an example of an actual 
situation which such a scenario could describe. A large fish 
stock would allow the recreational fishermen a greater 
harvest with the relatively inefficient fishing gear of a rod 
and line. A higher stock biomass usually correlates with an 
increase in the average size of the fish, and hence, 
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recreational fishermen may gain more benefit from larger 
fish. Thus, R(B) will be high while the stock size is high, 
but decline as the stock size decreases. Net benefits from 
commercial fishing, 
to the stock size. 
empirical evidence 
there may be some 
on the other hand, may be less sensitive 
Bishop and Samples recognise the lack of 
to support these ideas, but suggest that 
intuitive justification for them. The 
situation is, none-the-less, an interesting one. 
Following the scenario described above and assuming that the 
harvesting capacity of neither fishing sector is not limited, 
then three possible situations can arise. Each situation 
depends on the relative values of ~, Bf and B~. Recall that 
Br is the optimal equilibrium recreational stock size and Bc 
the same for commercial fishing. 
* ~ ~ If Br and Bc are both less than .I::S (ie. C' (B) > R' (B) ), th e n 
Bc will be optimal and only commercial fishing is pursued at 
equilibrium, see figure 6.10. The commercial harvest rate 
t(-
will then be gmax when stocks are above Bc, and zero when 
stocks are less than Ba. If the stock is at B6 then only the 
surplus production f (B~) is harvested. Recreational fishing 
~ is only possible in the short-term when stocks are above Bc, 
and then only if the presence of a recreational harvest adds 
to total net benefits. 
The second si tuation assumes that both B~ and B~ exceed 13', 
i. e . R' (B) > R I (C). Her e the rever s e 0 f the ear 1 i e r 
situation applies. Stock size Br is optimal and recreational 
fishing is pursed at equilibrium. See figure 6.11. 
The third situation which can arise under the third scenario 
is more complex. If B~ < ~ < Bt then the optimum stock size 
to be pursued by management can not be determined ~ priori as 
in the above examples. Both stock sizes may be optimum, and 
the only way to differentiate would be to compare the net 
present values of the net benefits each stock size could 
attain. In this case the marginal benefits per pound of fish 
- R' (B) and C' (B) need to be set aside and total net 
benefits compared. This, however, is an empirical question. 
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Bishop and Samples (1980 ) then modify the linearity 
assumptions in their model to develop the analysis further. 
The net benefit schedules for both commercial and 
recreational fishing effort are now assumed to incorporate 
harvest rates as well. The net benefit functions now become 
R(B,h) and C (B,g). The marginal benefit schedules are now 
assumed to be downward sloping, so the net benefits not only 
incorporate rent from the fishery, but also a consumer 
surplus measure. For both net benefit functions an increase 
in stock is presumed to increase WTP, whereas an increase in 
the harvest rate is assumed to decrease WTP. There 
relationships are shown in figure 6.12. The downward sloping 
marginal benefit schedules also ensure a shared optimal 
harvest, except in a very special case which is not of 
significance to this discussion. 
VALUE 
$ 
harvest rate h(B) 
FIGURE 6.12 NONLINEAR MARGINAL BENEFIT SCHEDULE 
FOR RECREATIONAL FISHING. 
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Again the problem is to maximise the total net benefits from 
the fishery, subject to the constraints of a total harvest 
~ + h). Bishop and Samples U980) were able to define an 
optimal stock biomass B~ for the equilibrium state of the 
fishery. The optimal biomass then produces a surplus 
production yield of F(B~), which is shared between the 
commercial and recreational sectors respectively as harvests 
g (B*) and h (B*). The basis for the shared, rather than a 
single, harvest comes from the equimarginal principle which 
states that at the optimum stock size B~, the marginal net 
benefit schedules of each fishing sector will be equal, 
R [B*,g (B*)] = C [Bff,h (B*)]. Sutinen (1980) states this as 
one of the two necessary conditions for economic efficiency 
within a jointly fished fishery. The second condition is 
that marginal user costs equal 
This condition is implicit in 
determined by Bishop and Samples 
present marginal benefits. 
the optimum stock size B 
(1980) as the model incl udes 
the user cost in the optimization. 
Bishop and Samples (1980) also extend the use of their 
analysis to develop a model to examine the interactions of a 
predator-prey fishing system. The fishery has two fishing 
sectors where commercial fishermen exploit the prey species 
and recreational fishermen exploit the predator. The stock 
externality of the fishery quickly makes the situation much 
more complex involving mutliple equilibrium solutions for the 
optimal sizes of the prey and predator stocks. The results 
of the analysis suggests that it is possible to enhance the 
total net benefits of each fishery by maintaining a larger 
prey stock relative to the predator stock size. However, the 
degree of enhancement will depend on the nature of the 
predator-prey interactions assumed to occur, and on the 
marginal net benefit functions for the commercial and 
recreational fishing sectors. The optimal management in such 
a case would require a reduction in the size of the predator 
(recreational) stock, or an increase in the size of the prey 
(commerical) stock. 
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The concluding discussion Bishop and Samples (1980) points to 
a number of management issues. The first issue is that 
multiple use of the fish stock may be economacally optimal in 
certain circumstances and should not be ruled out ~ priori by 
management. The second issue concerns the comparison of the 
marginal benefits of commercial and recreational fishing. 
These benefit values should only be compared at the optimum 
stock level the net benefits of each fishery are likely to 
depend on the stock sizes So a range of stock sizes should be 
considered. The final issue is the role of analyses which 
have economic efficiency as an objective. Economic analyses 
can contribute to management discussions designed to resolve 
conflict, however, Bishop and Samples ask what other 
variables can be included in the analysis to ensure the 
solutions are equitable as well as efficient. 
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6.4 A Static Analysis. 
The final theoretical analysis of the interactions between 
commercial and recreational fishermen is that of Anderson 
(1980). The simple static surplus production model of Gordon 
(1954) and Schaefer (1954,1959) is used to describe the 
commercial fishing sector. Anderson's economic model of 
recreational fishing is discussed in detail in chapter five. 
an economic service for Recreational fishing is viewed as 
which participants are willing to pay. 
benefits which accrue to recreational 
Thus the value of the 
fishermen can be 
measured by relating these to the WTP of the fishermen. The 
result is an imputed demand curve relating WTP to various 
levels of fishing effort. Total WTP for a particular level 
of fishing effort can be used as a measure of the value to 
society of that level of fishing opportunity. Combining the 
static commercial fishing model of Gordon U954) with 
Anderson's (1980) static model of recreational fishing 
enables a model to be developed which describes a. simple 
joint fishery. 
To combine the two static fishing models described above, the 
yield equation of each has to be modified to allow each to 
take into account the two different types of fishing effort 
used. As noted in the discussions of the two previous 
dynamic analyses, although it is the total harvest which 
forms the basis f~r the interactions between the two fishing 
sectors, fishing effort allocation is the focus of the 
analysis. Effort can be used to represent the yield for each 
sector if it is assumed that the nature of any effort applied 
remains the same throughout the analysis. In the commercial 
fishing model effort ~) is assumed to be represented by the 
number of commercial fishing days. Recreational effort ~) 
is assumed to be represented by the number of recreational 
fishing days. It is assumed also that these measures of 
effort are directly comparable and can be added together to 
estimate the total effort. 
.... 
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Hence, yield can now be represented by: 
Y = 0(; (E+D) - 2 O<',Z(E+D) (6.6) 
where this is merely an extension of equation 3.11, the 
Schaefer (1954) yield equation. 
It can be assumed that the yield for each of the two sectors 
is proportional to the amount of effort in each sector 
relative to the total amount of effort E and D. Hence, the 
yield for the commercial fishing sector Yc can be expressed 
as: 
or by rearranging as: 
2-Yc = C>\iE - ~E -«.lED (6.8) 
where 0<.2 ED represents the negati ve eff ect of recreational 
effort (D) on the total yield of the fishery. The net 
benefit equation for the commercial yield is then: 
2 
net benefits = p(<<,E - ~E -~ED) - cE (6. 9) 
" where p is the price per pound for the commercial yield and 
cE represents the total costs of the total effort (E) used. 
The (O(2,ED) term in equation 6.9 not only decreases yield, but 
also decreases net benefits to the commercial sector. 
A yield equation for recreational fishing, similar to that of 
the commercial harvest (eq.6.8) could be developed. However, 
Anderson (1980) argues that the open-access imputed demand 
curve and the value equation are of more use. The 
relationship between the commercial and recreational yields 
derives from the fact that an extra unit of fishing effort 
applied to the commercial sector will decrease the size or 
quality of the recreational harvest and hence, its value. In 
terms of the recreational fishing model where the value of 
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the fishery to anglers was dependent on the total level of 
recreational effort D as represented by each of the KKi 
curves in figure 6.13 - adding the commercial effort E to any 
level of D means an increase in the level of total effort and 
hence, a new KK curve. 
New KK curves will change the value of the market demand 
curve CC. Note that under only recreational effort the CC 
curve was expressed as: 
d = d[ D~ X(Di)] (6.10) 
If for the sake of simplicity we assume the KK curves and the 
CC (demand) curve to be simple linear relationships then the 
above equation can also be expressed as: 
d = a - bD (6 • 11 ) 
where the parameters a and b represent the intercept and 
slope of the demand curve respectively. The slope parameter 
(b) is actually made up of two components. The first is the 
slope of the KK curves represented by the parameter (u) and 
second the difference in vertical height between two KK 
curves (z). Hence, b = u + z where z could be said to be the 
congestion parameter, and measures the reduction in WTP as a 
result of increasing congestion. In other words z measures 
the decrease in price that occurs due to a decrease in stock 
size or an increase in total effort. 
Thus for commercial fishing to be included in the measure of 
net benefits accruing to recreational fishing, the equation 
of WTP or demand changes from: 
d = a - bD (6.11 ) 
to 
d = a - zE - bD (6. 12) 
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$ (a) recreational effort and demand. 
= d(D,X(Di)) or d = a-bD 
$ (b) including commercial effort in recreational 
effort and demand. 
zE 
= d(D+E,X(Di)) or d = a-zE-bD 
FIGURE 6.13 STATIC FISHING DEMAND MODEL 
(a) recreational effort only 
(b) commercial and recreational effort. 
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In this case zE represents the decrease in WTP due to the 
extra commercial effort level E, recalling that z measures 
the reduction in WTP due to increasing congestion, i.e. 
adding the commercial effort E. Equations 6.9 and 6.12 now 
represent the respective WTP equations for commercial and 
recreational fishing effort under joint exploitation. Since 
a WTP schedule is equivalent to a marginal benefit function, 
then equating these WTP equations should enable an economic 
equilibrium result to be obtained. 
Anderson (1980) determines the open-access equilibrium effort 
levels by setting the value of the commercial fishery to 
zero. The zero value relates to the commons situation of the 
economic rent being dissipated because total costs equal or 
are greater than total benefits. He then assumes that all 
those recreational anglers who wish to fish at a zero price 
do so, which results in open-access effort equilibria in both 
fishing sectors. If equations 6.9 and 6.12 are set equal to 
zero and simultaneously solved for the levels of effort D and 
E, a pair of equilibrium effort values can be derived. 
Anderson does not attempt to solve these equations 
algebraically, noting that to do so would not be particularly 
useful as the mathematics quickly become very complex and 
difficult. Instead a geometric and graphical analysis is 
pursued. The two value schedules are represented in figure 
6.l4a. 
In figure 6.l4a the curves labelled Coa and Roa represent the 
commercial and recreational open-access marginal benefit 
schedules. The line Coa shows the amounts of commercial 
effort (E) that will provide an equilibrium in the commercial 
fishery for a given level of recreatiional effort ~). 
Similarly Roa shows the amounts of recreational fishing 
effort D that provide an equilibrium in the recreational 
fishery for various levels of E. The intersection of the two 
curves ~) represents a common point of equilibrium for both 
fisheries as the levels of effort in both sectors are in 
equilibrium. The point k thus denotes the point where the 
marginal net benefits of recreational fishing and commercial 
fishing are equal with the two corresponding levels of effort 
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being Doa and Eoa. If for some reason the curves intersect 
outside the positive quadrant of the diagram, as in figures 
6.14 band c, then one or other level of effort will be zero. 
In figure 6.l4b the commercial effort is zero and the 
recreational effort is Doa. Similarly in figure 6.l4c the 
recreational effort is zero and the commercial effort is Coa. 
The equimarginal principle will result in the total fishing 
effort being shared by the two fishing sectors, but the 
resultant equilibrium will not be economically efficient. 
The aggregate value of the benefits from the two fishing 
sectors has not been maximised. The negative effects of 
congestion, both within each sector due to open-access and 
between the two fishing sectors, will cause economic 
inefficiency within the fishery, and hence, lessen the net 
total benefits produced. Only when the net benefits produced 
by each fishing sector are combined to produce the greatest 
sum of net benefits will an economically efficient optimum be 
attained. The total effort associated with this economic 
optimum will be less than that associated with the 
open-access situation. 
The total net value of the recreational fishing sector is the 
area under the marginal benefit function. The area is the 
trapezoid under the relevant KK; curve for any level of 
effort. The equation which represents this area is: 
d == aDi - (z + ~ ) 02 - zDE (6.13) 
The corresponding equation for the commercial fishing sector 
is: 
(6.14) 
Simultaneously maximising both equations results in a total 
net benefit value of: 
TOTAL BENEFIT = ani - (z 
+ p (oqE 
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(6.15 ) 
which will provide the maximum value of the fishery for an 
equilibrium pair of effort levels E and D. 
The solution to the maximisation problem involves 
simultaneously solving the first derivatives of equations 
6.13 and 6.14 with respect to D and E. The derivatives are 
the marginal net benefit equations and so the solution 
provides the equimarginal value. Since the congestion or 
stock externalities are now implicit in each value function 
the equilibrium effort levels will also maximimse the net 
economic benefits from the fishery. 
benefit equations are: 
p (o(; - z ~E - 0(2D) - c - zD = 0 
and 
(a - zE) - (z + u) = zD + dc<2,E 
The two marginal net 
(6.16 ) 
(6. 17) 
The further investigation of these equations provides an 
insight into their composition. 
Equation 6.16 represents the marginal benefit schedule for 
commercial fishing. The first term in equation 6.16 
represents the change (increase) in the val ue of the 
commercial harvest generated by the last unit of commercial 
effort. The second term (c) represents the cost of the last 
unit of effort used. The third term (-zD) represents the 
loss of value due to the existence of a recreational harvest 
increasing congestion, and hence, is the stock externality 
term. Rearranging equation 6.16 gives: 
(6.18 ) 
This shows that commercial effort should be expanded until 
the last unit of effort produces the same increase in value 
as the amount of value lost due to the combined cost of the 
effort (c) plus the decrease in value it causes in the 
recreational fishery. This decrease in recreational fishing 
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value is represented as an opportunity cost to commercial 
fishing value. 
The equation which represents the marginal benefit schedule 
of recreational fishing is: 
(a - zE) - (z + u) = zD + dO{ZE (6.17 ) 
The first two terms denote the increase in value for an extra 
days recreational fishing. 
recreational fishing was: 
Recall that the value of 
d = ( a - zE ) - bD (6.12 ) 
The term zD in equation 6.17 represents the extra congestion 
imposed in the recreational fishery by the extra recreational 
fishing effort. The final term d~2E represents the loss in 
the value to the recreational fishery due to the extra 
commercial effort. Together these two terms represent the 
opportunity costs associated with increasing the total 
fishing effort. Again the equation suggests that 
recreational effort should be increased until the extra 
benefits equal the extra costs. The equimarginal principle 
once more. 
Anderson again elec~s to solve these equations geometrically. 
The algebraic solutions are again complex and difficult. The 
curves labelled ~ and ~ on figure 6.15 represent equations 
6.16 and 6.17. These curves will always be less than the 
open-access schedules. Each shows the optimal amount of 
fishing effort in the other fishing sector, given the effort 
levels present in the first fishing sector. The diagram is 
analogous to figure 6.l4a. The intersection of the two 
marginal benefit schedules ~) denotes the optimal 
combination of recreational D* and commercial E* effort. The 
optimal mix of effort depends on the shape and slope of the 
schedules. As in the open-access analysis there are cases 
where one or other sector will have a zero effort level at 
the optimum. It is also possible that the optimal effort 
combination to occur where the optimal effort in one fishery 
Do 
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sector is greater than that in the open-access situation. In 
such a case the effort level in the other fishery sector will 
be significantly smaller than under open-access. See figure 
6.1Sb. 
Two major conclusions can be drawn from Anderson's (1980) 
analysis. The first is that effort in one fishing sector can 
affect both the value of the other fishing sector and the 
value of the total fishery. If this interaction can be shown 
to exist and be potentially significant then joint management 
of the fishery will be necessary. The objective of 
management may be to minimise the negative effects in order 
to maximise the value of the fishery. Another management 
objective may be to allow a certain level of fishing effort 
in one fishing sector and then allow the optimal effort level 
from the other sector. In doing so it will be necessary to 
accept that the result will not be economically efficient, 
but still fulfills the other management objectives. 
The second major conclusion is that multiple use of the 
fishery is possible under an economic efficiency objective. 
There may be total effort levels which can be shared between 
two fishing sectors. 
of changes in the 
However, this will depend on the nature 
value of the fishery which in turn 
correspond to changes in the effort levels in each sector, 
ie. the marginal benefit schedules. It is even possible for 
one fishing sector to have an effort level greater than the 
other at open-access. It also possible for only a single-use 
fishery under economically optimal conditions. However the 
optimal level of effort cannot be determined a priori. 
Emipirical information is needed on many aspects of the 
fishery in order to establish marginal and net value 
schedules for both fishing sectors. In the equilibrium 
state, the equimarginal principles of Sutinen (1980) become 
important in the allocation of effort between the different 
harvest sectors. 
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6.5 Conclusions. 
Copes and Knetsch (1981) have pointed out many of the 
practical problems associated with attempting to integrate 
the management of a jointly exploited fishery. Among these 
problems are gear conflicts, selectivity controls, season and 
area closures and the use of fees or licenses as management 
tools. Despite the obvious fact that the desire to gain the 
greatest benefit from fishing is common to both fishing 
sectors. The translation of that goal to a management 
strategy is one of the most difficult tasks faced by 
fisheries management. Many factors and issues need to 
addressed. Among these are a number of economic issues, many 
of which have been noted at various places within this 
chapter. 
Among the economic and other issues that must be addressed 
when determining the optimal allocation of fish resources to 
the various user groups are the following: 
1. whether multiple or single use of the resource 
is optimal; 
2. the effects of one harvesting sector on the 
other via congestion and stock externalities; 
3. the optimal size of the exploited fish stock; 
4. the capacity of each sector to harvest their 
optimal allocation of fish; 
5. the problems of identifying and accounting for 
the needs of particular groups of fishermen or 
other users when allocating the fish stock; 
6. the problems associated with the use of simple 
biological yield models as the basis for more 
complex bio-economic models of fishing; 
7. the problems of estimating and valuing the 
recreational fishing catch: and 
8. the use of economic efficiency or optimality as 
an objective or criterion for analysis. 
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Some of these issues have been dealt with in earlier 
chapters, so only those not already covered will be discussed 
briefly here. 
Single or Multiple Use. 
The issue of whether multiple or single use of a fishery is 
optimal appears to have several different interpretations 
depending on which analysis you favour. McConnell and 
Sutinen (1979) conclude that it is possible for optimal 
allocation of effort to favour one user group or the other. 
However the extent of the effort allocation depends on the 
our-price elasticity of effort which measures the change in 
effort demanded due to changes in the marginal cost functions 
of effort. Bishop and Samples U980) however, conclude that 
with a linear model the exclusion of one or other fishing is 
the eventual result. The multiple use of the fishery would 
occur only in a number of particular situations. The first 
is if the favoured sector could not harvest at the capacity 
required to attain and maintain the optimal equilibrium stock 
size. The second is the size of the relative difference 
between the marginal value of the net benefits and the 
marginal user cost. Even if one sector cannot harvest the 
entire available stock, it will only be optimal to have 
multiple use if the benefits added by the other sector exceed 
the user costs that result from the extra eff~~t. 
Anderson (1980) uses the equimarginal principle for comparing 
the net benefits of fishing for each sector. The conclusion 
drawn is that multiple use is a possible use, but this 
depends on the relative magnitudes of the marginal benefit 
functions for each fishing sector. There are situations 
where one or other sector may be excluded or severely 
restricted in the allocation of fishery resources if a change 
occurs which moves management away from the previously 
open-access situation. However as with all the analysis 
discussed it is not possible to say a priori what the 
eventual allocation regime will be. This will be determined 
primarily by the shape and size of the net benefit or demand 
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schedules. 
Stock Externalities and Congestion. 
The effects of stock externalities on the value of fishing is 
an issue which is addressed only by the static analysis of 
Anderson (1980). The earlier dynamic models of McConnell and 
Sutinen (1979) and Bishop and Samples (1980) do not address 
this issue as the demand and net benefit analyses for each 
sector do not include parameters which can directly account 
for changes in fishing effort in the other fishing sector. 
Hence, a true stock externality can not be estimated. 
However, Anderson (1980) does do this by developing marginal 
benefit equations for each sector which explicitly include 
terms which account for changes in effort. Hence, the 
effects of changes in commercial fishing effort on 
recreational benefits and the effects of recreational effort 
on commercial benefits are directly accounted for. So too 
are the effects of congestion within each fishing sector. 
The Optimal Stock Size. 
The issue of determining and maintaining the optimal stock 
size at equilibrium is addressed by the later three analyses. 
However it is Bishop and Samples (1980) who develop it to the 
greatest degree. The optimum stock size is an important 
factor in determining the actual allocation of the effort in 
their analysis. The relative benefits to be derived from 
recreational or commercial fishing need to be compared at the 
optimum stock level. However since this stock level cannot 
be determined a priori without reference to the marginal 
benefit functions, so a range of different stock levels 
should be assessed when evaluating management strategies for 
allocating effort. 
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The Nature of the Assumptions Used. 
Anderson (1980) recognises the simple nature of the model of 
recreational fishing benefits and the joint fishing analysis. 
Simple bilogical and economic relationships are assumed. 
Total commercial catch and effort are related via a simple, 
static, surplus production model. Recreational catch rates 
are assumed to be related to effort and stock size. Althoug 
such relationships may be true, they are often not as simple 
as the assumptions suggest. Recreational benefits r the 
value of the fishery are assumed to be related to certain 
components of the fishing experience, such as catch rate and 
fish size, and that furthermore these values can be 
estimated. For such a model of fishing to be useful many of 
these assumptions must initially be made. However as the 
theory develops it will be possible for economists to relax 
some assumptions or incorporate new data and then analyse the 
new results produced. 
The Economic Efficiency Criterion. 
As these models for allocating fish resources to the various 
fishing usergroups have been developed by economists, it may 
be natural that they use economic optimality as an objective. 
Economic efficiency or optimality requires that the net 
benefits of fishing be maximised, either between sectors in a 
static model, and through time in a dynamic model. However, 
in the future, once the theory and analysis of joint 
fisheries has progressed somewhat further, merely maximising 
the economic value of the fishery will not be enough. Some 
investigation of where, within society, the benefits of 
fishing are being distributed to, will be necessary. It is 
not a proper function of an economist to judge the equity of 
the benefit distribution, merely note benefits which accrue 
to each sector. However, information on the distribution of 
the benefits of fishing should be available to fisheries 
managers and administrators so other objectives of fisheries 
management can also be addressed and evaluated. Perhaps a 
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further extension of Copes' (1972) and Copes and Knetsch's 
(1981) work to joint fisheries may one day be appropriate. 
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Part I: Concluding Comments. 
The chapter on integrating the economic analyses and theories 
of commercial and recreational fishing into a joint economic 
theory concludes the discussion of the principles of 
fisheries analysis. The development of theories of joint 
fishing reflects the need for fisheries analysis in general 
and fisheries bio-economics in particular to continue to 
develop and refine the theory in order to better describe and 
analyse fishing as a natural resource use. The major 
advances of recent years have been the development of 
economic and then bioeconomic theories of amateur fishing. 
The challenge now facing the theorists is to take the theory 
out of the literature and apply it to real world situations 
to see if it can be of use to fisheries managers. 
There is an obvious need for more consideration to 
to the sociological analysis of fishing. Just 
be 
as 
given 
the 
biological analyses have given way to a more or less 
bio-economic theory of fishing, so too must sociology 
eventually become an integral part of fisheries theory. 
Unfortunately the sociological investigation of fishing is 
sUffering from a very late start. Hence it may take 
sociology some time to become a major part of fisheries 
analysis. Some institutional aspects of fishing are included 
already, but these are primarily there due to the economic 
analysts. The real sociological analysis of fishing, whigh 
deals with the distribution within society of the costs and 
benefits of fishing and fisheries management are not yet 
sufficiently developed to be included in the review section 
of this report. 
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Part II: Practice and Policy of Joint Fishing. 
The five chapters which comprised Part I of this report all 
raised issues concerning the application of fishing theory to 
fisheries management. The objective of Part II of the report 
is to note some of these issues and attempt to aid the 
discussion and development of a policy for the management of 
joint fisheries in New Zealand. Chapter Seven is a brief 
description of the New Zealand inshore fisheries with 
emphasis on the management of amateur fishing. It should 
therefore, provide a useful background to the discussion of a 
number of issues which are currently of significance in the 
management of New Zealands inshore fisheries. Chapter Eight 
will be a brief discussion of some of the more important 
issues and concepts of fishing raised in all the previous 
chapters. 
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Chapter 7 
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The Management of New Zealands' 
Commercial and Amateur Fisheries. 
7.1 Introduction 
The fishing which occurs in the waters that surround New 
Zealand can be divided into two major types. The first is 
the offshore deepwater fishery of the 200 mile Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ). The second is the fishery of the 
shallower waters of the coastal margin and continental shelf 
termed the inshore fishery. Among the factors which 
distinguish these two fisheries is the existence of a major 
amateur component in the inshore fishery which is absent in 
the deepwater fishery. The purposes of this chapter are to 
first, briefly describe the commercial sector of the inshore 
fishery, second, to describe the previous and present 
management of the inshore fishery, third to provide a 
comprehensive discussion of the amateur fisheries, and then 
finally to discuss the issues arising from the earlier 
sections. 
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7.2 The New Zealand Inshore Fisheries. 
Although the EEZ of New Zealand is extremely large, the area 
with fish available to the inshore fishermen is relatively 
small. The reasons for this come from two sources; the 
first are natural constraints to the natural productivity of 
the fishery. The second are economic and industry 
constraints on the ability of the vessels and methods used in 
the inshore fishery to be used elsewhere. 
The natural factors which constrain the yield of the inshore 
fisheries are threefold. The first is the relatively low 
levels of nutrients in the waters which surround New Zealand, 
which limits the food available to the fish. Coastal 
upwelling areas and freshwater runoff provide enough 
nutrients to allow productivity to reach moderate levels in 
the limited areas of shallower coastal water. The second 
constraint concerns the types of fish which are available. 
New Zealand has a warm- temperate fish fauna characterized by 
a great diversity of relatively long-lived species which have 
lower stock sizes, and hence lower overall productivities. 
This is in complete contrast to the highly productive, single 
species fisheries of similar northern hemisphere latitudes. 
The final factor limiting the productivity of the inshore 
fisheries is the small area which is fished in comparison to 
the large size of the whole EEZ (see figure 7.1). Part of 
the reason for this is the very small area of shallow 
continental shelf and coastal waters which support fish 
stocks able to be fished by the local fishing industry. 
Natural factors also impose some constraints on the inshore 
fishing industry. The low overall productivity of the fish 
stocks effectively places relatively low limits on the 
sustainable yields available to be harvested in many species. 
The relatively small area of continental shelf, and species 
available limit the types of fishing methods which can be 
used. The vessels and fishing gear used in the inshore 
fishery are not readily transferable to the EEZ fisheries, 
either because the species sought are only found in coastal 
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waters or the vessels used are unsuitable - primarily because 
they are too small. Unfortunately these constraints have 
often gone unnoticed by both the fishing industry and the 
resource managers (Paul,1983). The result is an inshore 
commercial fishery which is under considerable biological and 
economic stress. 
Of all the factors which characterize the inshore fishery, 
the problems associated with overfishing place the greatest 
constraints on present and future use of the fish resources. 
The commercial fishing industry is about to undergo a major 
restructuring as part of a wider re-organization of the whole 
management of New Zealand's marine fisheries. The objective 
of the restructuring is to correct both the biological and 
economic problems faced by the commercial fishery while at 
the same time preserving and maintaining a satisfactory 
amateur fishery. One issue which will need to be addressed 
by the new management organisation is the allocation of the 
presently scarce fish resources to both the commercial and 
amateur sectors of the inshore fishery. 
The Species of the Inshore Fishery. 
The range of species caught in the inshore fishery is more 
diverse than the catch of the deepwater fishery. The inshore 
catch includes pelagic and demersal finfish species, pelagic 
squid, other more conventional shellfish species and 
crustaceans. In all, approximately 25 species or groups of 
species account for about 90% of all the commercial landings 
made by the domestic fishing fleet. The fish species caught 
can be used to subdivide the inshore fishery into four major 
fisheries: the pelagic squid and finfish fishery~ the 
deepwater trawl finfish fishery; the demersal finfish 
fisheries; and an assortment of shellfish and crustacean 
fisheries. Much of the information presented in section 5.2 
derives from a 1983 paper entitled Future Policy for the 
Inshore Fishery a discussion paper published by the 
National Fisheries Management Advisory Committee ~AFMAC, 
1983) • 
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Pelagic finfish are fished predominantly by purse-seining 
(12% of the total inshore catch of all species was caught by 
this method). The species caught include: trevallYi 
mackerel species; and kahawai with small amounts of some 
demersal species caught as by-catch. Arrow squid is also 
taken by midwater trawling (Paul, 1983). 
The demersal finfish fishery uses a number of methods to 
capture a range of fish species. The fishing methods and 
their contribution to the total domestic catch are: single 
trawling (42%); pair trawling (12%); set-nets (9%); lining 
(8%); danish seine «1%) ; and shore methods such as beach 
seine «1%) (NAFMAC, 1983). The species caught include: 
snapper; tarakihi; trevally; gurnard; warehou; rig; 
school shark; groper; flounders; red cod; john dory; 
monkfish; ling; and barracouta. 
Some species, such as barracouta, mackerel and trevally, are 
caught in all of the deepwater, pelagic and demersal 
fisheries due to their biological distributions. This 
complicates the categories of fishing slightly by creating 
overlaps in both fish species and fishing methods between the 
three different fisheries. 
The final group of species which constitute the shellfish and 
crustacean fisheries include: oysters; mussels; paua; 
scallops; and rock lobsters. The oysters, scallops, and 
mussels are harvested by dredging, and the fisheries tend to 
be very localized; oysters primarily in Foveaux Strait and 
Tasman Bay; scallops in Nelson, the Coromandel east coast, 
and the east coast of Northland; and mussels in the Kaipara 
Harbour. Paua are hand-picked by snorkel divers, primarily 
in the waters around the South Island. Rock lobsters are 
predominantly caught using pots. They are caught everywhere 
around the New Zealand coast, including the Chatham Islands. 
Potting accounts for 5% of the total inshore catch of all 
fish species. 
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The NAFMAC(1983) discussion paper provides a detailed 
analysis of the major fish species caught and the fishing 
methods used. Included in the analysis are: the regional 
catch totals for each species in the 1981-1982 season; the 
short- and long-term sustainable annual catch estimates for 
each species, also by region; and a brief discussion of the 
future fishing and management prospects for each major 
commercial inshore species. The paper also notes the 
important commercial species which may have significant 
amateur catches or value. 
Species of importance to amateur fishing included among the 
commercially caught fish species were snapper, kahawai and 
rocklobster. Very little is known of the non-commercial 
catches of these species. However, it is believed that in 
the areas most severely overfished- Northland; West 
Auckland; the Hauraki Gulf; and Bay of Plenty-the amateur 
catches of these and other prime finfish species may be 
significant and will warrant consideration in any management 
proposals offered for discussion. 
Many of the fish stocks harvested by the inshore fishing 
industry are 
overfishing. 
under severe pressure from biological 
Of the group of 15 species which constitute the 
prime inshore fishing species, eight require reductions in 
the total amount of each species caught, in both the 
short-and long-term. The species under greatest fishing 
pressure are snapper; trevallYi tarakihi; groper; and 
rig. The total nationwide short-term catch reductions for 
some species are as high as 65% (rig); 63% (trevally); and 
46% (snapper and tarakihi). Long-term catch reductions of 
63%, 46%, 24%, and 18% respectively are required for the same 
species. Catch reductions of this order have been suggested 
as part of the overall restructuring of the inshore fishery. 
fishery. All areas of New Zealand have overfishing problems 
to some degree. However, the areas with the greatest need 
for catch reductions in most species are: the east coast of 
Northland; the Hauraki Gulf; the west coast of Auckland; 
and the Bay of Plenty. Catch reductions in the South Island 
are also required, principally in the Canterbury Bight and 
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Tasman Bay. The full extent of the catch reductions for each 
of the fishing regions is disguised in the national figures. 
Some of the northern regions mentioned above need to reduce 
their catches by percentages greater than the national 
percentage. For example, the Bay of Plenty snapper catch 
needs to be reduced by 77% (national-46%)in the short-term 
and 46% (24%) in the long-term. 
The History of the Inshore Fishing Industry. 
For most of the 100 year history qf commercial fishing in New 
Zealand the fishing industry has been small, and fisheries 
management conservative. In 1963 important changes occurred. 
The recommendations of a Parliamentary Select Committee 
Inquiry into fishing in New Zealand heralded a new era in the 
management of inshore fishery. Licencing was abolished and 
replaced with a system of fishing permits which allowed much 
greater access to the fishing industry. The inshore 
fisheries entered an era of expansion. 
Among other developments occurring at the same time was the 
establishment of the Fishing Industry Board (FIB), and the 
introduction of government incentives to fishing. The Board 
was. charged with the responsibility to promote the inshore 
commercial fishing industry and the necessary shore-based 
industries associated with fishing. Not only did the fleets 
expand, but also the fish wholesale, processing, retail and 
export sectors. The incentive schemes ensured the expansion 
of all sectors. During the period 1963 to 1978 the catches 
of all the major species increased dramatically due to a 
larger total fleet size and improvements in fishing 
technology and techniques. The subsidy and tax rebate 
schemes endured until early 1984 when a moratorium was put on 
all govenment payments to the fishing industry. 
The declaration of the EEZ around New Zealand created what 
one observer has retrospectively called 'a blindfold rush' to 
exploit the' potential bonanza' (Jarman,1983). The result 
was not the development of a deepwater fishery, but merely 
increased effort in the inshore fisheries. The vessels 
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bought and built to exploit the deepwater species were large 
by the prevailing inshore standards, but not large enough to 
exploit effectively the fishery for which they were intended. 
Many simply remained in the inshore fisheries. Hence, 
joint-ventures were developed to provide New Zealanders with 
the appropriate vessels and expertise to effectively exploit 
the fish stocks of the EEZ. 
During the years from 1978 to 1982 the extra effort in the 
inshore industry resulted in steady increases in the total 
quantity of fish caught. Despite the overall increase in 
landings, however, the catches of the species presently 
identified as being under pressure declined. Groper is the 
only species for which catches have increased. The total 
landings increased, despite the decreased catches of prime 
species, because of substantial increases in the catches of 
other species. Many of these other species are commercial 
fishing 'discoveries'. Species such as orange roughy-from 
the deep-water fishery; barracouta; and kahawai had 
practically nil catches prior to 1978, yet today they provide 
major catches. 
NAFMAC (1983) defines eleven categories of fishing method 
used in the inshore fisheries. During the period 1978 to 
1982 the most important of these, in decreasing order of 
tonnage landed, were: single trawl; pair 
purse-seine; set-nets; and lining. There has 
trawl; 
been a 
tendency to move away from pair trawl to single trawl over 
this time. Purse-seine landings have also doubled since 
1978. Often vessels will use more than one method in anyone 
fishing year and in 1982 over 30% of vessels used two or more 
methods and caught 35% of the total catch. Another point 
noted by NAFMAC (1983) was that in 1981, 5% of the fleet 
landed 67% of the total 
landed only 20% of total 
catch, 
catch. 
and that 90% of the fleet 
Trawling provides the 
explanation for the disproportionate catch distribution. In 
1982 58% of the catch was caught by either single-or 
pair-trawling, making them the most significant catching 
methods. 
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It is widely recognised that the commercial harvesting sector 
of the inshore fishery is economically stressed. For the 
three years (1981-1983) the trawling sector has harvested 
approximately 60 this time it has cost these vessels more 
than $1.00 to harvest $1.00 worth of fish; for example in 
1981 it cost $1.09; in 1982, $1.07; and in 1983, $1.08 
$1.14). These figures are averages across all sizes of 
trawler, with the general result that larger trawlers are 
less profitable than smaller trawlers, which in turn are only 
breaking even (NAFMAC,1983). The total full-time inshore 
commercial fishery has been estimated to be economically 
over- capitalised by as much as $28 million. Nearly all of 
this ($26m) is concentrated in the same four areas requiring 
the greatest catch reductions: east coast Northland; the 
Hauraki Gulf; west coast Auckland; and the Bay of Plenty. 
The figure of $26m represents 44% of the present capital 
investment of the bone fide full-time fishermen remaining in 
the industry after the part-time fishermen were removed by 
the Fisheries Act in 1983. 
Recent Management of the Inshore Commercial Fishery. 
Prior to 1983 the management of New Zealand's inshore 
fisheries was done under the legislative guidance of the 
Fisheries Act 1908. The deepwater fisheries of the EEZ were 
controlled separately under the New Zealand Exclusive 
Economic Zone Act:. 1977. Under the Fisheries Act 1908 and 
its' regulation'.;) and notices, inshore fisheries management 
was implemented on a national basis for each species. 
Controls and restrictions normally applied throughout the 
whole biological distribution of the species concerned, 
effectively treating them as single stocks, although some 
areas did have further restrictions applied to manage local 
situations. The major management tools used were primarily 
aimed at biological conservation of the fish stocks and 
included: annual or seasonal catch quotas; fishing gear or 
method restrictions; and local closed areas. All fishermen 
could fish anywhere around the coast and were not restricted 
to local fishing grounds. 
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Since 1978 the emphasis of management has shifted to take 
some account of the economics of fishing. This was made 
necessary by the steady decline in the profitability of some 
of the inshore fisheries. However, the whole of the inshore 
fishery was still effectively a 'commons' resource subject to 
open-access. There were few restrictions on either the 
numbers of fishermen able to enter the fishery, or the amount 
of fishing effort applied. The only exceptions to the 
'commons' situation were the Controlled Fisheries. 
Controlled Fisheries were provided for in the Fisheries Act 
1908 by allowing the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries to 
declare selected species in particular areas to be subject to 
stringent licencing controls. The Fisheries Licencing 
Authority (FLA) was able to issue licences to selected 
fishermen to fish in these controlled fisheries. The 
objective of licencing was to reduce or control the total 
level of effort in these fisheries. Often a maximum number 
of vessels was established to control effort, and ultimately, 
catch. When developing policy for a particular controlled 
Fishery the Authority took a number of factors into account. 
These include: the status of the resource; current 
harvesting controls; profitability of fishing; and fishing 
or landing patterns. The use of Controlled Fisheries 
controls marked the beginning of the change in fisheries 
management in New Zealand from a national to a regional 
approach. 
The Controlled Fisheries were all easily defined by species, 
fishing method or geographical location. The first 
Controlled Fisheries were the rock lobster fishery, the 
scallop fishery, the dredge oyster fishery and the Lake 
Ellesmere Eel fishery; all were defined by species 
primarily. The most recent Controlled Fishery was the 
Hauraki Gulf wetfish fishery which was defined both by 
species and geographic location. The management of each of 
the Controlled Fisheries was based on the particular needs or 
problems that fishery exhibited. 
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The Hauraki Gulf Controlled Fishery was the first wetfish 
'patch' in New Zealand. The major consequence of licencing a 
number of fishermen to fish in such a 'patch' is that other 
vessels will be excluded, which merely shifts the excess 
capacity problem to adjacent or other areas. Some vessels 
are scrapped or taken out of fishing while leisure boats and 
others may continue to fish in the controlled area without a 
commercial licence as 'amateur' fishermen. The criteria used 
to decide what or who constitutes a 'bona fidel commercial 
fisherman eligible to remain in the fishery is described and 
discussed below. 
Even with the Controlled Fisheries controls implemented in 
the early 1980s, the government realised that additional 
fishing permits were necessary to restrict the entry of any 
more fishermen. A plan to recind the· moratorium on entry was 
to be developed after discussions had been held with 
commercial and other fishermen, under the auspices of the 
NAFMAC. 
The NAFMAC was established specifically to address the 
problems faced by the inshore fishery and present policies 
for future management. In 1983, NAFMAC proposed a two· phase 
plan for discussion. Phase one outlined options for 
immediate effort reduction, such as the cancellation of 
non-operated commercial fishing permits, the expulsion of 
part-time fishermen from the fishery, and the retention of 
the entry moratorium. Phase two involved options for 
restoring and maintaining the long-term viability of the 
inshore fisheries using policies such as a compensated effort 
reduction scheme ~RS), controlled fisheries, fisheries 
management planning ~MPs) and the use of individual 
transferable quotas (ITQs). At the present time it appears 
that all of these options will be implemented in a concerted 
effort to restore the biological and economic viability of 
the inshore fisheries. 
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The cancellation of non-operated permits was designed to 
ensure effort could not be increased by fishermen utilising 
fishing methods not used for at least the previous two 
seasons. It was also considered appropriate to exclude 
fishermen from using those methods exerting the greatest 
pressure on the resource. The methods to be restricted were 
trawling, setnetting, long-lining and danish- seining. 
As well as removing the use of particular fishing methods, 
part-time fishermen with commercial licenses were to be 
administratively excluded from fishing. All fishermen were 
to be delicenced and made to reapply, with eligibility to 
hold a full-time commercial fishing licence to be decided by 
reference to a number of criteria ~AFMAC,1983). Criteria 
that could be used. might be a combination of: 
1. A minimum level of gross income derived from 
all methods of fishing; 
2. Evidence of appropriate seamanship 
qualificationsi 
3. Evidence of vessel meeting survey requirements; 
4. Evidence of payment of FIB levy; and 
5. Evidence of having filed all fishing returns. 
The actual criteria to be used were included in the new 
Fisheries Act 1983 when it came into force in October 1983. 
These fishermen would then be 'bona fide' commercial 
fishermen. The actual criteria implemented are very similar 
to the proposals of the NAFMAC. 
In addition to the short-term management proposals was a 
compensated Effort Reduction Scheme (ERS). The scheme sought 
monetary compensation for those 'bona fide' full-time 
fishermen prepared to voluntarily leave the fishing industry. 
A number of variations of the E~ were proposed. Finance for 
the scheme could come from any of three sources: a 
Government grant; a levy on the industry; or a Government 
loan to be repaid by a levy on the industry. The level of 
financial compensation for each fisherman would be determined 
by a secret tender system involving all eligible fishermen 
simultaneously. One scheme would not include a vessel buy 
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back option. Each fisherman would keep the vessel to dispose 
of as they wished as long as it did not increase the total 
fleet size of any EEZ fishery. NAFMAC(1983) estimates that 
such a scheme would cost about $lSm. to decapitalize the 
$28m excess. A vessel buy back scheme would operate in a 
similar manner although the amount of vessels able to be 
purchased would depend on the method of valuation and the 
size of the purchase fund available. 
Once the effort has been 
of 
reduced in 
the fishery 
the 
has 
short-term, the 
been proposed to long-term management 
include: the use of controlled fisheries regulations-
the earlier Controlled operating in a manner similar to 
Fisheries; fisheries management planning - the new regional 
management approach provided for in the Fisheries Act 1983; 
the use of TACs -as is already done in the deepwater fishery; 
and the extensive use of individual transferable quotas 
(ITQs) in the inshore finfish fisheries. The rest of this 
section discusses and describes ITQs with fisheries 
management planning to be discussed in the next section. 
Individual transferable quotas are being considered as 
prefered the manage- ment option to form the basis of future 
management of the inshore fisheries. The Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries has published a discussion paper 
entitled: Inshore Finfish Fisheries; proposed policy for 
future management (Anon, 1984d) in which it defines ITQs as: 
'the right to catch a certain quantity of fish each 
year within a certain area.' 
The quotas are to be allocated to the fishermen in perpetuity 
and thus become the asset of the fisherman to be bought and 
sold as would any other asset. Once a fisherman has 
determined the size of the quota he will catch during the 
year, it is up to the fisherman to decide how it will be 
caught, but there will always be the incentive to catch the 
fish at the least cost, and receive the highest market price 
for it. Hence ITQs could be used to address the economic 
problems facing the inshore fisheries. 
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There are a number of benefits to both fishermen and 
fisheries management in using ITQs. These include: 
1. the use of TACs and ITQs will be less 
cumbersome administratively and make catch 
returns and statistical analysis easier; 
2. The ITQ secures the fisherman's equity in the 
resource and industry; 
3. the manner in which the fish quota is caught is 
left to the discretion of the fisherman, so 
that fishing can be planned to gain the maximum 
economic advantage; 
4. fishermen can now 
responsibility in 
resources; 
take a greater role and 
the management of the fish 
5. there needs to be fewer restrictions on 
fishermen, so conflict between methods of 
fishing should be reduced; 
6. the individual fishermen determine their level 
of involvement in the fishery by buying quotas 
to enter, trading quotas while fishing and 
selling the' quota when retiring from the 
fishery. 
One issue still be fully tested is the ability of the MAF to 
change the TAC. If this is needed, it is suggested that the 
TAC will be increased by issuing more quota (by tender) and 
decreased by the Government purchasing quota and retiring it. 
The immediate problem is that if the TAC is reduced then 
quota prices may rise, but when the TAC is to be increased 
quota prices will be lower. Campbell (1984) notes that an 
Australian scheme along similar lines is not expected to be 
self-financing because of these problems. 
No charge will be payable by the fishermen receiving the 
initial quota allocations, but future entry to the fishery 
will re~lire the purchase of a quota. Eventually a fee per 
tonne of quota held will be payable to the government as a 
resource rent, but only once the economics of harvesting 
improve. 
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A number of the long-term management options proposed by 
NAFMAC (1983) have been included or provided for in the 
Fisheries Act 1983. It is important to note that in all of 
the NAFMAC discussions concerning the future of the inshore 
fishery, there was very little, if any, discussion of the 
future of the amateur fisheries. This may have been due to a 
number of reasons. 
be: 
However, the most significant appear to 
1. the singular lack of reliable data on any 
aspect of marine amateur or recreational 
fishing; 
2. the apparent emphasis of the discussions on the 
implications for full time commercial 
fishermen; and 
3. the lack of an organized and vocal lobby to 
present the case for 
fishermen. 
the non-commercial 
These observations are made with the benefit of hindsight and 
are not meant to cast aspertions on any part of the NAFMAC 
discussions. It has been noted that only 2 the people 
attending meetings to discuss the policy proposals were 
recreational fishermen, ~non. 1983). 
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7.3 The Fisheries Act 1983. 
The new Fisheries Act became law on October 1, 1983. The aim 
of the new Act is to provide measures to combat the 
overfishing of New Zealand's inshore fisheries and to improve 
the management of all of the fisheries of New Zealand. Three 
significant provisions are now included in the Fisheries Act. 
The first is the concept of Fisheries Management Planning. 
This represents a major step towards regional management and 
is discussed more fully below. The second new provision is a 
restructured Fisheries Authority whose job will be to 
implement the Fisheries Management Plans as well as 
controlled fisheries. The third provision is a major change 
in the definition of a commercial fisherman, and in the 
registration and licensing procedures. for commercial 
fishing. Many former commercial fishermen are now no longer 
permitted to fish under a commercial licence. 
Commercial Fishing Status. 
To obtain registration for a fishing vessel and/or a permit 
to fish commercially an applicant must now meet the criteria 
which define commercial fishing. Commercial fishermen are 
now defined by section 2 (1) of the Fisheries Act 1983 as: 
- those who fish for sale (or intend 
doing so) all year, or for a 
specified season of the year and who 
rely wholly or substantially on their 
activities for their income; 
or 
- in the case of a company or body, 
that it has a sizeable investment in 
the fishing industry, or intends 
making one; 
or 
- individuals who fish solely for eels 
or take seaweed commercially and can 
prove their legitimate involvement in 
their business even if this does not 
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otherwise comply with the provisions 
of this definition. 
To be .considered to be wholly or substantially reliant on 
fishing for their income an individual must be able to show 
that they: 
1. catch and sell the equivalent of 
$10,000 worth of fish; 
or 
2. earn at least 80 non-investment 
income from fishing; 
or 
3. rely on fishing income for a vital 
part of annual subsistence. 
Applicants should also be able to support their application 
with either: 
1. a copy of their latest annual 
or 
accounts certified by a Chartered 
Accountant; 
2. sales dockets for fish for the latest 
12 month period. 
Initially it was expected that these provisions would affect 
about half of the previously registered fishemen. Although 
thes measures appear arbitrary, there is room for 
negotiation, particularly where strict adherence would cause 
hardship. For example fishermen in Northland and the 
Marlborough Sounds depend entirely on fishing for their 
income, but may earn less than $10,000 each year. In these 
places there are few employment alternatives and the effort 
contributed by these fishermen is small relative to the total 
catch. 
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The exclusion of many of the part-time or smaller commercial 
operators from the fishery may not cause the total amount of 
catch to decrease significantly. There are two reasons for 
this. The first relates to the distribution of the catch. 
NAFMAC(1983) notes that in 1981-82 only 20% of the total 
catch was taken by 90% of the vessels operating, including 
small or part-time fishermen. In fact the exclusion is 
expected to decrease catch by 5%. The second reason is that 
many of the excluded fishermen may still continue to fish as 
amateurs, albeit illegally. These de facto commercial 
fishermen are forbidden by law to sell any of their catch. 
The effort required to monitor and police these illegal sales 
may, however, outweigh any benefits to be gained. 
AI significant implication of the exclusion is that if these 
fishermen continue to catch fish illegally they need no 
longer furnish catch returns. With the amateur catch already 
a potentially significant part of the total catch of some 
species - albeit an unknown part - illegal commercial catches 
can only compound the problem. It may eventually be possible 
for excluded part-time fishermen to re-enter the fishery by 
buying quota. However, this will depend on whether the 
quotas can be bought in small enough amounts to provide a 
suitable income. The minimum quota size or holding has yet 
to be determined. 
Fisheries Management Planning. 
The most significant new provision of the new Fisheries Act 
is the section entitled 'Fisheries Management Plans' WMPs). 
The general objective of fisheries management planning is to 
develop a cohesive, regionally -based framework for the 
management, administration and enforcement of all marine 
fisheries. Such a framework would include a consultative 
network of user-groups and other interested groups, such as 
local and national government agencies, and environmental 
groups interest.ed in coastal or marine management. FMPs 
constitute a large change in both the practice and philosophy 
of fisheries management in New Zealand. 
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The purposes of fisheries management planning are defined in 
the Fisheries Act 1983. The first is to conserve, enhance, 
protect, allocate and manage the fish resources of New 
Zealand using such measures as may be necessary to achieve 
these purposes. Promoting and developing both commercial and 
recreational fishing is another express purpose of the Act. 
The final two purposes are to provide for optimum yields, and 
to maintain the quality of the yields without detrimentally 
affecting fish habitats or the marine environment. 
According to those legislatively defined purposes, fisheries 
may be classified as either commercial or recreational only. 
No definition of what constitutes a recreational fishery is 
given in the Fisheries Act. It can only be presumed that 
recreational fishing covers all that which is not defined as 
commercial. If this is so then all types of amateur fishing 
- including fishing for food, traditional Maori fishing 
rights and de facto commercial fishermen - are included. 
Amateur fishing may have been a better term to use, given 
such a diversity of uses exist as not all can be termed 
recreation. 
Another point is the use of the term 'optimum yield'. The 
term is defined in section 2 (10) of the Fisheries Act as: 
"Optimum," in relation to the maximum sustained 
yield from a fishery, means the maximum 
sustained yield from that fishery 
modified for the purposes of a management 
plan by any relevant economic, social, 
recreational or ecological factor. 
The definition is different from that mentioned in chapter 
three. The optimum sustainable yeild mentioned there was a 
mix of a number of different management objectives, each 
contributing equally to the determination of the actual fish 
yield. The N.Z. definition of optimum yield as above 
appears to be based on MSY and modified as necessary by the 
other factors. In practice the differences may not be 
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significant, although it is too early to determine how the 
legal definition of optimum yield is being interpreted by the 
fisheries managers because to date there has been little 
public discussion. 
Pope (1983) presented a concept which is analogous to optimum 
yield in that it incorporates a number of different factors, 
but approaches the problem from a radically different angle. 
The concept is called 'Minimum Sustainable Whinge
' 
~SW). 
Instead of attempting to optimise a number of factors to 
produce a single optimum yield value, Pope suggests that the 
managers define the minimum acceptable values for each factor 
and then combine the factors to produce yield values which 
are outside all the unacceptable areas. In other words, 
ensure each represented factor or sector gets at least its 
minimum expectations. Hence the minimum 'whinge
' 
philosophy. 
In the context of the management of New Zealand's inshore 
fisheries - where allocation conflicts already exist- and the 
use of FMPs with the consultative processes inherent in 
them-the concept of MSW may prove to have some relevance. 
This will be discussed further in chapter eight. 
The format and content of a FMP is likely to be similar to 
the following: 
1. Introduction, - this section will provide a general 
statement of the FMPs aim and area of control The main 
problems and issues to be addressed as well as the 
general intent of objectives and policies should be 
stated; 
2. Description of the Fish Stocks and Stock Levels,- this 
section will address the biology of the fishery and 
should include: research history; the life history of 
the species; a description of the stock units and their 
distribution,. any catch and effort data; and survey and 
sampling data collected; 
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3. Description of the Fishery, - this section will describe 
the history of exploit- ation; the stocks of fish 
involved; the present user groups; any interactions 
between the user groups; and a general statement on the 
present and possible future condition of the fisheries 
involved; 
4. 
5. 
Ecological Considerations, 
particular ecosystems and fish 
Fisheries Management Area (FMA) 
any concerns such as pollution 
affect habitat quality; 
in this section the 
habitats present in the 
are discussed, along with 
or mining which could 
History of Management,-
institutions and policies 
the FMP - particularly the 
management regime; 
the relevant management 
are reviewed in this part of 
effectiveness of any past 
6. Social and Economic Considerations, -the factors 
presented in this section may include such concerns as 
the economics of the fishery; allocation of stocks 
between user groups; any important factors which may 
modify the MSY; and the consumers of the fish caught; 
7. Optimum Yields, -this section outlines the species and 
multi-species optimum yields, their range and adjustment 
criteria and may even specify short-term TACs; and 
8. Management Alternatives, - this section should identify 
the major conflicts, controversies and problems expected, 
and state the rationale to be used by the FMP to resolve 
these issues. Of the options presented the preferred 
options should be identified and the reasons they are 
preferred discussed. This section provides the 
I 
philosophy for management and the specific logic for the 
provisions to be used. 
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The administrative and organizational structure of fisheries 
management planning is as important as the content of the 
FMPs. The regions for which the FMPs will eventually provide 
the management basis have already been defined and gazetted. 
A Fisheries Management Area (FMA) is the geographical 
expression of the distribution of a number of fish species 
and their associated fishing operations. It represents the 
boundaries within which a FMP operates and extends from mean 
high-water mark to the boundary of the EEZ. 
The New Zealand territorial sea and EEZ have been divided 
into six FMAs. Four are coastal: Auckland; Central; 
Challenger; and Southern, as shown in figure 7.2. The other 
one around the two are offshorei 
Kermadeci and one 
called Sub-Antarctic. 
Kermadec Islands, called 
around the southern offshore islands, 
As neither of the latter two FMAs have 
inshore fisheries associated with them they need not be 
considered further. Each of the coastal FMAs has also been 
informally sub-divided into a number of management zones. 
Auckland FMA has 4, the three other FMAs have 3 each. Each 
of the FMAs was sub-divided according to the fisheries within 
it. A more detailed description of the FMAs appears in 
appendix A. 
The organisational structure of the FMP system is shown in 
figure 7.3. It provides a succinct summary of both the 
organisational structure and the consultative links currently 
being developed. The successful development of a regionally 
based management programme, such as FMPs, relies very much on 
having good working relationships between the managers and 
the user groups. These relationships, in turn, are derived 
from an effective consultative structure. From the diagram 
presented in figure 7.3 two things are apparent about the 
organisational structure. The first is that the structure is 
clearly tiered, both within the Ministry of Fisheries and 
within the user-and interest group part of the system. 
Second, the two most important units are the FMP team, which 
actually develops and maintains the FMP and the Fishery 
Management Advisory Committee (FMAC) , whose job it is to aid 
in the preparation of proposed FMPs. The FMAC maintains 
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close links with all the regional groups affected by the FMP 
and advises the regional office and FMP team in relation to 
operative FMPs. 
The tiered organisational structure is a deliberate feature. 
The Ministry of Fisheries Head Office retains the 
responsibility for overall coordination of the FMP 
development and implementation, and does this through the FMP 
Group in Fisheries Management Division. This group's role is 
to: 
1. provide guidelines and timetables for FMP development; 
2. ensure consistency and compatibility between the FMPs 
particularly the four coastal FMPs currently being 
developed; 
3. develop the long-term FMP programme within each region in 
consultation with each of the four Regional Fisheries 
Management Officers ~MOs);and 
4. provide the technical, and administrative servicing for 
the Fisheries Authority. 
The second tier within the Ministry involves the four regions 
- the Fisheries Management Areas ~MAs). Each region has a 
FMP team which investigates, prepares and writes the FMP. It 
is the job of this team to seek advice, comment and criticism 
from the industry, user-groups and other groups shown in 
figure 7.3 from within their FMA. Close consultation with 
the Port or District Liason Committees is of particular 
importance in developing the FMP and the associated 
background and discussion papers. The FMP teams consist of 
Fisheries Management Officers (FMOs), the Regional Fisheries 
Officer (RFO) the Regional Fisheries Management Officer 
(RFMO) , and an executive secretary (who has the same role in 
the regional Fisheries Management Advisory Committee) which 
creates an integrated administrative link between the two. 
iZ 
225 
FIGURE 7.3. 
FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLANNING 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE AND CONSULTATIVE NETWORK 
REO 
I MINISTER OF FISHERIES I 
o 
MAF HEAD OFFICE 
I ECONOMICS DIVISION 
J FISHERIES RESEARCH DIVISION 
FISHERIES MANAGEM.ENT DIVISION 
DIRECTOR FMP GROUP 
o 
MAF 
REGIONAL OFFICE 
RFO RFMO 
/ / \ \ 
OTHER AGENCIES 
AND 
ORGANISATIONS 
• Fishing Industry Board 
• Universities 
/; rrz::\ ~ / I \ \ I I \ \ ..---'~ ____ ~~~ 
.----.:>=-____ ~~J._........ \ \\, FISHERY MANAGEMENT 
• Government Agencies 
- Ministry or Works 
FISHERY MANAGEMENT :..-J TEAM 
ADVISORY COMMITIEES (FMP Team) 
(FMACs) 
DISTRICT/PORT 
LIAISON COMMITIEES 
11 
USER GROUP 
ORGANISATIONS 
- Ministry or Transport 
K . Local Government 
'r-I _ Regional Councils 
- Harbour Boards 
(fran Cooper I 1985bt 
226 
At the regional level the tiered structure continues within 
the industry liason organisations. Each FMP is designed to 
be heavily dependant upon effective consultation and advice 
from all interested parties within the FMA, and accordingly 
the organisational structure designed to facilitate this is 
the Fisheries Management AdvisQry Committee (FMAC) for each 
region. This committee is supported by a number of district 
or port Liason Committees spread throughout the FMA. 
The FMAC for each region is established by the Minister of 
Fisheries under the auspices of the Fisheries Act 1983. The 
brief of the FMAC is to prepare proposed FMPs and give advice 
on operative plans. Members are appointed by the Minister of 
Fisheries and the Director General of MAE and represent 
commercial fishing, processing, wholesaling, 
recreational, Maori, and consumer intersts. As a 
part of their role is to maintain a close 
retailing, 
critical 
working 
relationship with user groups etc. within the region, FMACs 
should by virtue of their membership, location and 
structure - be able to best understand regional situations 
and offer recommendations for management. The primary role 
of the FMAC is to provide a forum where proposals, both from 
within management and from outside, can be discussed, debated 
and solutions to problems developed. It is also part of each 
FMAC's responsibilities to provide the forum for the Liason 
Committees within each FMA. 
A network of Liason Committees (LC) has been established in 
each FMA to provide local or district input into the regional 
FMACs and FMPs. The role of these committees is to provide a 
local forum for discussions between user-groups etc. and FMD 
staff. The discussions may be initiated by either management 
or user groups and may cover such ideas as FMP development or 
control proposals. The LC forum should be far less formal 
than is necessary at the management and policy levels. The 
membership of a Liason Committee is decided by the RFMO and 
BFO depending on local needs and requirements. Ideally the 
committee should have representatives from the local fishing 
industry sectors; of catching processing and retailing; 
recreational fishing groups; environmental groups, local 
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bodies etc.; and Maori groups. The Liason Committees 
constitute an important base upon which the rest of the 
regional Fisheries Management Planning system is built. 
The FMP programme of development and implementation is well 
underway. However, FMPs are a new tool for New Zealand 
fisheries management, so the changes involved in implementing 
them are being carried out in stages. The four stages are: 
I. preliminary; 
II. development; 
III. implementation; and 
IV. review 
The first stage aims to set up the administrative and 
organisational framework for FMPs, such as the FMA 
boundaries; FMACs and LCs; and the operating procedures. 
Much of stage I is complete. However, the MAP has yet to 
provide an initial broad statement of goals. Background 
papers on many aspects of management are already being 
developed and published. Stage I will end when all four of 
the initial FMPs become operative. At that time all the 
users and other interested groups will be able to properly 
assess the system as a whole. 
Stage II of the FMP programme will be a review and 
development phase. The effectiveness of the initial FMP in 
achieving short-term 
important consultative 
objectives and establishing the 
links will need appraisal. The need 
for urgency in dealing with some of the more pressing 
has meant that many 
Among these issues, 
developed, are; the 
marine farming; the 
problems facing the fishing industry 
issues have had to be left to stage II. 
for which background papers must be 
deep-water fisheries; marine reserves; 
fisheries environment; and socio-economic issues. Some 
notable and possibly unfortunate omissions from this list are 
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the related issues of amateur fishing, as represented by 
Maori fishing and recreational fishing. It may well be the 
intention of the MAF to address these issues, since it is the 
express purpose of FMPs to 'have regard to the promotion and 
development of commercial and recreational fishing'. At this 
stage of the process, however, this intention has not been 
made explicit. 
The third stage extends the review and discussion process 
which is a feature of stage II. The first operative FMP will 
be amended before being implemented as the second operative 
FMP, which will then become the long term FMP. In the final 
stage it is intended to produce a program to provide for 
regular review, amendment and updating of the FMP as 
necessary. The present (January 1985) status of the FMP 
program is that no FMPs are yet operative. All are well 
advanced, however, and some FMP teams are beginning stage II. 
229 
7.4 The Amateur Inshore Fisheries. 
The nature of what can be termed amateur fishing has changed 
with the passing of the Fisheries Act 1983. This Act clearly 
defines the commercial fisherman; the corollary of which is 
that anyone else is now an amateur, and subject to the 
amateur fishing regulations and management. provisions. The 
te~m amateur has always included the recreational fishermen 
who fished either from the shore or from small boats; the 
big game fishermen; and those people who take fish or other 
sealife primarily for food, such as the Maori residents of 
many coastal communities. 
overlap where fishermen were 
fish sometimes within 
There was occasionally some 
catching small quantities of 
the amateur catch limits and 
sometimes not - and selling them to fish shops or friends or 
in the local bars. Were these people commercial fishermen or 
amateurs? The distinction was often difficult to make. 
However, the distinction is now clear; 
licenced as commercial are amateur. 
all fishermen not 
The difficulties involved in describing the amateur fishing 
sector are twofold. The first is that there is very little 
data - other than anecdotes and fishermen have always been 
good at stories - on either the types of people to be found 
fishing as amateurs, or the fish which they pursue. The 
second difficulty is that the data available suggests that 
there exists a diverse range of types of fishermen, catching 
a wide variety 
methods. The 
of species, and using an extensive range of 
reasons people fish are equally diverse. 
However, the information available is not enough to enable 
the fisheries managers to know either the size or extent of 
amateur fishing. The New Zealand Atlas of Coastal Resources 
(Tortell,1981) introduces its section on recreational fishing 
by remarking: 
'it is impossible to estimate the number 
of people who have at some time fished as 
a pasttime. For many youngsters it can 
be considered as a stage in the process 
of growing up. Most holidays by the sea 
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would be incomplete without fishing. The 
primary activity by those who own a boat 
would be fishing.' 
Thus, much of the following relies heavily on the 
people involved in either recreational fishing or 
management. Tortell (1981) also notes that the: 
opinions of 
fisheries 
'greater earning capacity and raised 
standards of living, plus increased 
leisure time, have led to a steady 
upsurge in ilie numbers of boating 
enthusiasts, amateur fishermen and divers 
taking to the inshore waters for 
recreation right around New Zealand.' 
The increase in activity in the recreational fisheries has 
coincided with dramatic increases in the commercial effort in 
the inshore fishery. It is these increases which may have 
led to the rise in the number of apparent conflicts between 
the user groups. The major factors contributing to the 
importance placed on amateur primarily recreational 
fishing are: the enjoyment of the outdoors by most New 
Zealanders; the extent and diversity of a lengthy coastline 
relative to the land area and population size; the open 
access character of the resources; the accessibility of the 
equipment needed and used for fishing; and the nature of the 
weather and sea conditions particularly in the northern 
parts of both the South and North Islands. 
The levels of participation in recreational fishing have been 
estimated using a number of methods. The earliest survey of 
national recreational fishing patterns was the New Zealand 
Recreational Survey conducted in 1975. Of the respondants to 
the survey 6.7% listed salt-water fishing as one of their 
three most favoured forms of recreation, and 1.15% listed 
scuba diving the same way_ These figures would suggest that 
at that time 174,000 people in New Zealand were 'keen' 
fishermen and 29,000 were 'keen' scuba divers. Tortell 
(1981) also attempted to estimate the numbers of recreational 
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fishermen, by using assumptions based on the number of 
pleasure boats owned. The results suggested 100,000 
boat-borne recreational fishermen in the Hauraki Gulf and 
170,000 nationwide, representing 5.4% of the entire 
population. Active scuba divers were estimated at the same 
time to be between 80,000 to 100,000 people, which represents 
a 200% increase in six years. More up to date information is 
difficult to obtain. 
The Types of Fishermen and Fishing Methods. 
The amateur fisheries are certainly no less complex and 
diverse than the commercial fisheries of the inshore fishery. 
The reasons amateur fishermen fish could well be more varied 
than those for commercial fishing as the benefits received by 
amateur fishermen appear to be more diverse, and can come 
from both extractive and non-extractive uses of the 
resources. The range of methods used by amateur fishermen 
reflects the diversity of both the fish species sought and 
the wide variety of fisherman types. This section provides a 
description of both the types of fishermen, and the fishing 
methods they use. However much of the information is 
anecdotal, being supported by the informed opinions of many 
people involved in amateur fishing. It should be noted that 
almost no research has been conducted on these subjects. 
AlthOugh many amateur fishermen use the fish resources by 
capturing and removing the fish from the sea-to eat, to sell, 
or to stuff - there are a number who non-extractively exploit 
the fish stocks. The methods used include photography and 
game fishing where the fish is caught, tagged and released. 
This type of resource use is believed to be fairly limited 
and does not endanger the resource. The major places for 
passive and non-extractive uses of marine resources are the 
marine reserves and marine parks of the north of the North 
Island. Here divers are able to observe and photograph fish 
or other marine life; the Marine Reserve at Leigh being the 
major attraction of this type. Tag and release gamefishing 
is also prevalent in the north of New Zealand. 
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Among the extractive users of the fish resource are a number 
of different types of fishermen. These types of fishermen 
can be distinguished by both the reasons they fish and the 
methods they use. The major distinction is between 
recreational fishermen, and those with other reasons for 
fishing. These two types of fishermen can also be 
distinguished by the methods used to fish. The six types of 
fishermen distinguished here are necessarily arbitrary, 
however I believe the differences exist, even if the points 
at which the groups merge are indistinct. These groups are: 
sport-fishermen; recreational catch fishermen; divers; 
semi-commercial; subsistence fishermen; and cultural 
groups. 
The recreational fishermen are of three major types. The 
first is the true sport fisherman who fishes simply for 
recreation, a trophy and possibly a meal. Their enjoyment 
comes from the experience of fishing primarily, with other 
factors being secondary. The second type of recreational 
fisherman is the person who goes fishing to catch a small 
number of fish to eat, either from the shore or from a boat. 
They are there as much for the fishing as the fish catch. 
Fishing provides a recreational experience, but not to the 
same extent the true sport- fisherman who often called be 
called fishing fanatics. The third category of fishermen is 
the scuba diver. Many divers would be of a similar nature to 
the second type of fishermen above, but use completely 
different methods. Many divers spend as much time in the 
water observing fish as chasing crayfish or other species, 
either for sport or food. 
The amateurs who fish for reasons other than pure recreation 
can also be subdivided into three groups. Two of these three 
could be considered to be similar in that they appear to be 
semi-commercial and may use similar methods, despite having 
different reasons for fishing. The first is the fisherman 
who fishes primarily to supplement an income from other 
sources, and may have been a part-time commercial fishermen 
under the pre-1983 management system. The fish are caught 
using methods more akin to commercial fishing and the catch 
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sold illegally to local shops, neighbours or raffled in the 
pub. The second type of fisherman is the subsistence 
fisherman who fishes primarily to put food on the table. 
Again the methods used probably do not equate to recreational 
fishing. There are a number of such people who live in 
relatively isolated places such as the outer Marlborough 
Sounds or Great Barrier Island and rely on fishing as a 
significant source of food. 
The final type of non-recreational amateur fisherman is the 
Maori, and more recently, the polyn~Jfan fishermen and 
shellfish gatherers. These people .. tradi tionally rely on 
fishing to feed specific commup{ties with culturally 
significant foods, (e.g. the Maori Kai Moana). As far as I 
can ascertain the most sigpf'ficant amount of such fishing 
occurs in the North Island aGe to the high concentration of 
polynesian immigrants in Auckland and the Maori communities 
of many coastal regions. The most famous (or infamous) 
example being the Atiawa people of Taranaki who fish the 
reefs off the COqst at Motonui. It may be argued that this 
type of fisherman is simply a subgroup of subsistence 
fishermen, ~owever, I believe the significance of fishing in 
the culture of Maori and Polynesian peoples is enough to 
create a meaningful distinction. 
The methods used by amateur fishermen will often depend on a 
number of factors including: weather; the type of coastal 
terrain; the type of waters available; the area to be 
fished-due to species distribution; accessability; the time 
of year; and the fishing equipment available. A summary of 
the important methods, the target species and possible 
by-catch species is given in table 7.1. The species which 
have an amateur bag and/or size limit, or are controlled 
commercial fisheries, or are under severe commercial pressure 
are listed in table 7.2. Although important recreational 
species such as rock lobster, snapper, scallops and groper 
appear to have wide distributions throughout inshore waters, 
some species such as kahawai, kingfish, blue cod and the 
large gamefish are only important in particular regions. 
This can create problems for the management of these species 
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TABLE 7.2 Fishing method, target species and bycatch species 
of New Zealand amateur fishermen. 
Method 
Lining 
-hand lines 
-boat rod/trolling 
-longlines 
-surfcasting/kontiki 
Setnetting 
Drag nets/beach seine 
Underwater 
-spear fishing 
-scuba diving 
-snorkel diving 
Other methods 
-potting 
-hand picking 
-dredging 
Target species 
snapper 
blue cod 
spotties 
mullet 
kahawai 
sea perch 
snapper 
kahawai 
gurnard 
kingf ish 
mako shark 
mar lin 
groper (hapuku) 
snapper 
snapper 
kahawai 
gurnard 
flounder 
rig 
snapper 
butterfish 
moki 
elephant fish 
snapper 
flounder 
mullet 
garfish 
butterfish 
blue moki 
kingfish 
trumpeter 
scallops 
rock lobster 
kina 
paua 
mussels 
crayfish 
mussels 
paua 
rock oysters 
cockles 
pipis 
tuatuas 
kina 
toheroa 
scallops 
Bycatch 
barracouta 
tarakihi 
gurnard 
groper 
moki 
red cod 
various 
reef fish 
barracouta 
mullet 
tarakihi 
gurnard 
red cod 
rig 
school shark 
rays 
red cod 
sharks 
red cod 
kahawai 
tarakihi 
various 
reef fish 
oysters 
octopus 
kina 
rock lobster 
blue cod 
octopus 
crabs 
various 
other 
mollusc 
species 
dredge 
oysters 
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TABLE 7.2 AMATEUR FISHING CONTROLS 
Species 
Finfish 
min. 
length 
cm 
blue cod 30 
blue moki 40 
butterfish 35 
elephant fish 
flatfish (except 25 
sand flounder) 
garfish (piper) 
groper 
herrings 
kahawai 
mullet 
pilchard 
red cod 25 
red gurnard 
red moki 40 
rig 
sand flounder 23 
snapper 25 
tarakihi 25 
trevally 25 
Shellf ish, etc. 
cockles 
kina 
mussels 
dredge oysters 
rock oysters 
paua - black 
- yellow 
pi pi 
scallops 
toheroa 
tuatua 
red crayfish 
packhorse 
crayfish 
58 
125 
80 
100 
100 
152 
216 
Amateur 
restrictions 
daily# 
limit 
30 * 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
mesh 
size 
rom 
115 
108 
150 
100 
25 
25 
85 
85 
25 
100 
100 
115 
150 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Commercial 
status 
c=controlled 
o=overfished 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
. 150 
50 
50 
50 
250 
10 
10 
150 
20 
20 
150 
Sth.Island in season 
Nth.Island only 
c 
6 
6 
Only in season 
Only in season 
c 
c 
c 
c 
* Marlborough Sounds 12 only. 
# 50 total for all finfish species in 
the Hauraki Gulf Controlled Fishery. 
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on a national basis. 
Management of the Amateur Fishery. 
The management of the amateur fisheries relies primarily on 
the use of daily catch limits, species size restrictions, and 
gear restrictions-especially for nets and pots. The controls 
are imposed across the whole country as management minimums, 
with extra controls imposed locally to deal with particular 
local situations or conditions. As far as can be determined, 
the various amateur fishing controls have been introduced in 
a piecemeal fashion over a number of years. Each particular 
control was the result of increased fishing pressure on a 
particular fish species, due to either increased catches or 
the use of a certain method with the potential to damage the 
fish stock. There appears to have been no overall strategy 
or plan for the management of amateur fishing. The resource 
is still characterized by open-access and thus potentially 
subject to all- the abuses that may result. Perhaps FMPs may 
be able to alter this philosophy. Although present policy 
outlines an intention to conserve, promote and enhance the 
recreational fisheries no public statements exist to explain 
how these policy objectives will be achieved. 
The manner in which the national controls are implemented is 
through the Fisheries Regulations and Notices made pursuant 
to the Fisheries Act. Fisheries Regulations specify the 
types' of controls and restrictions available to the MAF, and 
Fisheries Notices contain the specific controls to be used in 
particular cases. The general provisions of the Fisheries 
~mateur Fishing) Regulations 1983 include a number of 
clauses designed to replace the section of the now repealed 
Fisheries Act 1908 which referred to Maori traditional 
fishing rights. 
The special provisions allow the Director- General of MAF to 
give authority to amateur fishermen of any type to exceed any 
management restrictions or controls that may be in force. 
Subject to any conditions he may think fit, the 
Director-General can also confer special fishing rights or 
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privileges on specified communities or groups of people. The 
conditions could relate to any aspect of fishing or 
management such as: boundaries; species; methods; gear; 
times; quantities; or any other conservation or management 
measures. These special regulations retain the provisions 
referring to Maori fishipg rights and extends them to include 
other communities as well - albeit at the discretion of the 
Director-General. 
Of the different amateur fishing methods listed in table 7.1, 
some are also 
controls on 
subject to controls. There are no 
the following methods: hand lines; 
extra 
surf 
casting; kontiki; trolling and boat rods; and handpicking. 
However, the following methods are subject to extra controls 
because of the type of fishing equipment used or the species 
sought: 
Longlines 
- limit of on per person 
- no more than 50 hooks 
- Floats to be marked with name of user 
Setnets 
- limited to 60m length 
- 1 per person 
- not to be placed within 60m of another net 
- not to be set more than one third of distance 
across a stream or tidal channel 
- must be reset every 12 hours 
- may not use stakes to hold it up 
- subject to fish mesh sizes 
- may not catch rock lobster 
Drag nets 
- no longer than 40m 
- must be hauled by hand 
- subject to fish mesh sizes 
Spearfishing 
- not to catch rock lobster 
Scuba 
- not to take or be in possession of paua or mussels 
Potting 
- six pots per person 
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- must have escape holes of a certain size 
- floats must be named 
Dredging 
- only to observe the closed seasons of both oyster 
and scallops. 
There are numerous local restrictions on one or more of these 
methods around the country. It is always advisable to check 
for any particular local controls. 
The amateur fishing controls for each species which are in 
force at present are presented in table 7.2. There are, 
however, a number of more specific restrictions for a number 
of the species sought by amateurs. The first to note is that 
for finfish species the daily bag limit is 50 fish within the 
Hauraki Gulf Controlled Fishery area only. For shellfish and 
crustaceans the following special restrictions apply: 
Toheroas 
- can be taken only during open season as declared by 
Director General of MAF 
Scallops 
- also have an open season 
February. 
Oysters (dredge) 
15 July to 14 
- in the South Island only a closed season from 1 
September to 7 March. 
Oysters (rock) 
- can be taken in the North Island only except in the 
Hauraki Gulf, Whangaruru Harbour and the Bay of 
Islands. 
- not to be opened whilst still adhering to rocks etc 
- shells not to be discarded on or near oysters. 
paua and Mussels 
- not to be taken on Scuba 
- no one to be in possession of both paua and scuba 
gear 
All shellfish 
- to be landed in the shell i.e. 
below mean high water mark. 
Rock Lobster 
not to be opened 
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- not to be taken while in soft shell or in berry 
- carrying external eggs. 
- not to use baited or set nets or devices able to 
puncture the shell. 
- use a maximum of six pots clearly labelled with name 
and initials. 
- closed amateur season in the Chatham Islands from 1 
March to 30 April 1984 
There are also two general regulations which apply to all 
amateur catches: 
1. none is to be in anyway sold as defined by the 
Fisheries Act 1983 s (2) ; and 
2. all unlawfully caught species are to be returned to 
the sea, unharmed if possible. 
The other major management restrictions which apply to 
amateur fishermen are the areas set aside as Marine Reserves 
or Marine Parks, or other such areas designated for similar 
purposes under FMPs. The number of such areas is at present 
small as there are only two marine reserves gazetted the 
Poor Knights Islands and Goat Island Bay - and two marine 
parks - Mimiwhangata Peninsula and Tawharanui Peninsula. All 
of these reserves are on the east coast north of Auckland. 
within these areas local prohibitions and restrictions on 
taking or disturbing all marine life apply. Other areas of 
coastal waters are closed to commercial fishermen at certain 
times of the year and left entirely for amateur use, such as 
the Okatoa Rocks area in the Bay of Plenty. 
The surveillance, monitoring and enforcement of the inshore 
fisheries, both commercial and amateur, are carried out by 
Fisheries Officers. Their job includes the checking and 
inspection of both catches and fishing gear - whether in use 
or not. Fisheries Officers, or other people deemed to be 
Fisheries Officers also, such as police constables and 
officers of the N.Z. armed forces, have wide powers to enter 
land ,stop vehicles or question people in the course of their 
investigations. They also have the power to seize not only 
an illegal catch, but also any vessel, fishing gear, vehicle 
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or container etc. used in the illegal taking or carriage of 
fish or aquatic life. Upon conviction fisherman may forfeit 
their fishing gear, catch, vessel and fishing licence (if 
commercial) to the Crown, in addition to any fine imposed by 
the Courts. 
Amateur Fishing in the Nelson/Marlborough Area. 
The draft Challenger Proposed FMP states that: 
'Fortunately, data available on 
recreational fishing in the Challenger 
FMA is better than average, with coastal 
recreational studies having been done in 
Marlborough and Nelson Bays .•. I 
The data available is however, derived from sources, whose 
purposes were not primarily to collect data on recreational 
fishing alone. Also much of the survey work is now between 
three and seven years old and can be relied on only for 
estimates of numbers of participants and not catch sizes. 
However, with these points noted, the FMP document states 
that in the Marlborough region there could be up to 10,300 
local fishermen using Queen Charlotte and Pelorus Sounds 
~hallenger FMP Team, 1984). Using visitor numbers and a 
number of assumptions, it was calculated that ther~ would 
have been some 100,000 fishing visitors to the Marlborough 
region in 1981. Collectively, residents and visitors would 
have accounted for some 239,700 fishing days in 1981 and 
18,900 diving days. As the peak recreational season is 
summer, from November to February, then in 1981 an average of 
1100 recreational fisheries and 100 divers could have been 
active on a typical day. 
In Nelson the major source of information was an unpublished 
survey of Nelson residents in 1982. The results suggest that 
the number of resident fishermen, divers and 
shellfish-gatherers in Nelson are approximately 27,000, 8700, 
and 12,000, respectively. The information on visitors to 
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Nelson each year suggests that another 35,000 fishermen visit 
the area, which gives totals of 60,000 for fishing 
10-12,000 for diving and 15-20,000 for shellfish-gathering 
each year. 
The major amateur fishing species sought in the 
Nelson-Marlborough region are believed to be: snapper; blue 
cod; scallops; paua; rock lobster; and to a lesser extent 
kahawai and flounders. However without catch estimates, or 
even basic data on which of these species are sought, 
management for or of the fish and the fishermen populations 
is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. A number of 
user-group 
developed in 
conflicts and other management issues 
the Nelson-Marlborough region which 
have 
affect 
amateur fishing. These issues will be noted and discussed in 
the next section. 
Amateur Fishing in the Auckland Area. 
Unfortunately there is even less information about the state 
of the amateur fisheries in the Hauraki Gulf, although some 
estimates do exist for the recreational snapper take. The 
Hauraki Gulf is surrounded by the city of Auckland. 
With almost half of the total population of New Zealand 
living within 100 miles of the Hauraki Gulf ~ew Zealand 
Official Yearbook, 1983),it was inevitable that the Gulf 
became a focus for marine based recreation, and especially 
amateur fishing. The fishing pressure has been so great in 
the inner Gulf in particular that species normally sought by 
amateur fishermen are difficult to find. Among these species 
are rock lobster, rock oyster, sea eggs, green lipped mussel, 
and some finfish species, the most notable being snapper. 
The New Zealand Atlas of Coastal Resources ~ortell, 1981) 
estimates that prior to 1981 there were 45000 pleasure boats 
(runabouts less than 7m long) in the Auckland area which 
suggested a population of approximately 100,000 recreational 
fishermen or boatees, without including shore fishermen or 
divers. Using the 6.7% for 'keen' fishermen from the 1975 NZ 
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Recreation Survey, and assuming it is the same for 1985, the 
Auckland area would have over 94,000 keen fishermen based on 
a population of 1.4 million in the Auckland area. The two 
figures for fishermen - 1975 and 1985 equate reasonably 
well. The apparent decrease in numbers is due to the 
assumption that the figure of 6.7% for 'keen' fishermen has 
not altered. However, the precision of these estimates is 
obviously open to question and only reinforces the need for 
more accurate information. It may also be reasonable to 
expect that there are more than the 80 100,000 active 
divers in NZ, as estimated by the Tortell (1981). If half of 
these live in or around Auckland then the local diving 
population could be as high as 50,000 people. 
The only information of any sort available on amateur catch 
rates in the inshore fishery comes form a snapper catch 
estimate based on some unverifiable 1979/1980 data (R.Boyd 
pers. comm.,1984) and a snapper tagging experiment. The 
1979/1980 data is for snapper catch in the Hauraki Gulf and 
estimates the annual recreational catch at 1,776 tonnes out 
of a total snapper catch of 5,702 tonnes. The recreational 
catch is approximately 30% of the estimated total catch and 
is based on 18 months data. Although the figure for the 
actual tonnage of recreational snapper catch is large, it is 
easily acheivable. If all of the estimated 100,000 
recreational fishermen each catch an average of only 20 
snapper weighing 0.8kg each, then the total catch would be 
1,600 tonnes per year. The other estimate 
1983-1984 Bay of Plenty Snapper Tagging programme 
is from the 
where the 
results to June 1984 showed that the amateur tag returns were 
approximately 30% (Anon. 1984c). This may mean that 30% of 
the catch is amateur, although it is believed that amateurs 
are better at returning tags than commercial fishermen. The 
non-return of tags from the catches of commercial fishermen 
decreases their percentage, thus inflating the apparent 
amateur catch. 
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Nonetheless, it has been suggested that amateur fishermen 
take up to 20% of the total Hauraki Gulf snapper catch (R 
Boyd, pers. comm. 1984). There is, however, no way that 
any confidence limits could be put on such an estimate. The 
more recent tagging data have shown an increase in the 
proportion of amateur returns, suggesting either an increase 
in amateur catches or an increase in the awareness of amateur 
fishermen of such tagging operations, or both. Even a figure 
of 20% would make the amateur catch significant and hence 
their contribution to the total catch needs to be considered 
seriously in any management regime. 
Other species, such as rock lobster and kahawai, are also 
showing signs of having significant amateur catches in the 
Auckland FMA and elsewhere. Much of the conflict which has 
arisen in the Auckland FMA has been over the allocation of 
catch between the various user-groups. Each group blames the 
other for the decline in the total catch of certain 
species-particularly snapper. 
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7.5 Conclusions: Conflicts and Issues in the Inshore Fishery 
To say the inshore fisheries are going through an important 
period of change would be an understatement. The commercial 
fishing industry is in the process of some of the largest 
rstructuring it has ever seen. Effort and catches must be 
reduced and the new management regime introduced in the 
Fisheries Act 1983 is being used to ensure the reductions are 
permanent. The whole management structure of the inshore 
fishery is in the process of being regionalized. Fisheries 
management planning has become the major process by which 
management will be pursued and this involves a great deal of 
administrative, organisational and attitude changes on the 
part of many people within the fisheries-both commercial and 
amateur,and within fisheries management in MAF. The new 
organisation places great importance on consultation and 
involvement in management by 
industry and amateur fishermen. 
will no doubt prove to be 
all sectors of the fishing 
In the long-term the changes 
invaluable. However in the 
short-term a number of issues are emerging which will need 
attention if they are not to cause problems or become sources 
of conflict. 
The recent fisheries management changes, in addition to the 
current problems faced by the inshore fisheries, have created 
a number of conflicts among the various groups interested in 
the state of the fishery. If the problems of the commercial 
fishing sector are put to one side for the moment, a number 
of other important issues remain. Many of these involve the 
allocation. of the fish resources and fishing rights among 
the various user groups, 
conflicts between the 
perceived. These issues 
present management of 
successful' . 
both amateur and commercial, 
same user groups, both real 
exist, primarily because past 
the fishery has been 'less 
or 
and 
and 
than 
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The question this raises is: what is 'successful' 
management? The answer depends on the perspective taken. 
For most commercial fishermen it would be the opportunity to 
catch and sell fish and make a profit doing so. For some 
amateur fishermen it may mean retaining access to traditional 
food gathering grounds and being able to still harvest these. 
For others it may mean ensuring a stock size which allows 
them to catch the limit bag each time they venture out to 
fish. The 'serious' sport fishermen may only see successful 
management as a means to retaining or enhancing a pleasant 
experience, as well as the chance to catch larger fish more 
often. 
Unfortunately for the present 
management has left them with 
fisheries managers, past 
a legacy of over-exploited 
stocks and an over capitalized industry. This does not in 
itself, however, mean that the primary objective of 
management is to provide for the interests of the commercial 
fishermen. Too little is known about the other users of the 
resource for them to simply be labelled as insignificant and 
this ignored in the interests of re-establishing the 
commercial viability of the inshore industry. Although the 
data base is slight, enough is known about certain aspects of 
the recreational fisheries to point to their significance. 
Orman (1983) made a bold statement in suggesting that in New 
Zealand the amount of money spent each year on marine 
recreational fishing was of the order of $60-70m. Admittedly 
the figure is an informed guess based on anumber of somewhat 
interesting assumptions. However, this is the first and only 
estimate to be found of the value of fishing to New Zealand. 
Much more positive work needs to be done to either 
substantiate, or refute this claim. The amateur fisheries 
need to be recognised as important recreational, tourist, 
economic and cultural activities. 
The issues which stand out in as being the most prevalent in 
the inshore fisheries at present are: 
- the problems of equitably and rationally allocating 
the available fish catches to the various fishing 
groups; 
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- the conflicts between the user-groups over fishing 
rights for particular species or areas~ 
- the lack of information and data available on all 
forms of fishing, other than full-time commercial; 
- the role of the amateur fishermen in the new 
management regimes being implemented; 
- the form and nature of the management controls to 
be applied to amateur fishermen in the commercially 
restructured inshore fishery~ and 
- the pseudo-commercial fishermen who may be called 
non-commercially. 
Each of these issues is complex and raises further points of 
interest. In chapter eight the more significant of these 
issues will be addressed with reference to the principles of 
fisheries management and analysis presented in Part I of this 
report. The objective is to generate useful discussion 
about the direction of fisheries management and the place of 
amateur fishing in the wider New Zealand fishing context. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
A Brief Discussion of some of the Issues which face the 
Inshore Amateur and Commercial Fisheries. 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters (two - seven) have provided a brief 
review and discussion of the major points, issues and 
questions associated with fisheries analysis and management. 
The first five chapters were designed to provide a review of 
the literature pertinent to the theory (primarily 
bio-economic) of fishing as a resource use, particularly when 
the fish are exploited by both amateur and commercial 
fishermen. Multiple use of the fish resource necessarily 
complicates the analytical framework within which many 
fisheries analysts and managers work. To merely review the 
bio-economic theories of commercial, recreational and joint 
fishing without providing a critical insight into their 
origins would have made the review of much less value. I 
believe it is important for both the fisheries analyst and 
the fisheries manager to be able to cast a critical eye over 
any advice provided to them from any source. Many of the 
issues raised warrant recognition and further discussion. 
The role of chapter seven was twofold. It provided both an 
opportunity for all of the inshore fisheries, commercial and 
amateur to be considered together, and to acquaint the reader 
with the state of amateur fishing in New Zealand. 
Unfortunately the commercial fishing sector is in a state of 
dramatic and urgent change, and this is occuring at the same 
time as the new management 
Planning is being introduced. 
regime of Fisheries Management 
Although enough of the scant 
information available on amateur fishing can point to its 
potential significance, the problems of over-fishing and 
over-capitalization in the commercial sector are 
overshadowing all else at present. The implementation of a 
new fisheries management philosophy and structure, the 
turmoil in the commercial fishing sector, and the increasing 
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recognition being given to amateur fishing, have all raised 
issues. Many of these issues may warrant the future 
attention of New Zealand's fisheries managers. Many of the 
issues or points noted in the review of the local fisheries 
complement or duplicate the issues noted in Part I of the 
report on the principles of fisheries analysis and theory. 
The major issues associated with the analysis and management 
of amateur, and joint amateur and commercial fishing fall 
into one of three categories. The first concerns management 
policy, goals and objectives for amateur and joint fisheries. 
In the second category is information or more precisely the 
lack of information about so many aspects of amateur fishing 
in New Zealand. The final category of issues concerns the 
allocation and practical management of the fisheries. Each 
of these three categories are obviously connected and the 
distinction between them not as clear as the above division 
would suggest. However, such an initial division will be 
useful as a starting point for this discussion. 
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8.2 Fisheries Management Policy and Objectives. 
Management objectives are normally the state~ goals of a much 
broader general policy. Often the objectives are implicit, 
but few, if any, management decisions are made without 
reference to some desired state or condition. This desired, 
but as yet unattained, state can be termed the management 
objective. The specific means by which the objective state 
is attained are called policy instruments. Hence management 
objectives are but one part of a management heirarchy. 
At the top is the necessarily broad statement of policy. For 
fisheries management one possible policy might be • to 
obtain the greatest amount of good for the greatest number of 
people. A vague statement of intentions, that lacks 
specifics. If it is decided that this greater good would 
come from producing the greatest amount of food to eat, then 
a specific objective would be to produce the MSY of the fish 
stock. Thus the MSY objective is a stated attainable goal, 
but no mention has yet been made of how MSY is to be 
achieved. It is at this point that the very specific policy 
instruments are used. A number of quite different means can 
be employed to ensure that the available MSY is harvested and 
nothing else. These policy instruments include gear 
restrictions, TACs and fiscal measures to control effort 
levels. If used properly, each can ensure only the MSY 
harvest is taken, but each policy tool has different effects 
on other aspects of the fishery such as fishermen's incomes, 
management costs or character of the fishing fleet. 
The particular management objective, or objectives, chosen to 
fulfil the overall policy depends on the philosophy of 
management being applied to that particular fishery. As 
noted in chapter two, the two objectives of MSY and economic 
efficiency are employed together and result in a single 
objective known as the maximum economic yield (MEY). 
Depending on which aspects of the fishery or of society are 
perceived to be important to the overall policy, then the 
management objectives can be almost anything. For example, a 
commercial fishery may have the objectives of maximising 
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catch, income and employment, or minimising fuel consumption. 
If all these are equal in importance, then such an objective 
or set of objectives creates a complex management situation. 
If one objective is allowed to dominate, such as maximising 
catch, then all the others merely become constraints on that 
objective. The problem is simpler, but not much. The more 
objectives stated, the more policy instruments needed to 
manage the fishery and the more complex management becomes. 
Fisheries management objectives are also dynamic. As evident 
in the discussion of sustainable yield philosophy in chapter 
two, the objectives of management have evolved over the past 
century. This change is, in part, due to a change in the 
overall policy and philosophy of fisheries management, but 
also due to increasing knowledge about the character of 
fisheries and the benefits they can produce. The early 
fisheries yield models produced MSY values and these became 
fisheries management objectives. Then the role of economic 
efficiency in fishing became significant and MEY developed. 
MEY is basically an objective of economic efficiency 
constrained by the sustainable physical yield of the fish 
stock. The prevalence of economic efficiency as an 
analytical, if not an actual, management objective is obvious 
from the discussion of the economic analyses of fishing 
commercial and/or amateur. 
The fisheries management objective then evolved into the 
concept of Optimum Sustainable Yield (OSY). Managing for OSY 
brought forth new factors to be reconciled in fish resource 
allocation. As well as biological factors, OSY requires that 
economic, sociological, and ecological factors all be given 
consideration. The new considerations require the 
development of research methodology to provide the extra data 
and information. Hence a new multi-disciplinary approach to 
both fisheries analysis and management is needed. 
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Stroud et al (1980) provide both a description of the history 
of 'optimum' or 'best' use allocations, and a discussion of 
the components of OSY. Economic factors, as OSY 
determinants, will include such questions as: what are 
anglers willing to pay for their share of a total harvest; 
and how do they value the opportunity to fish? Social 
factors stem from the need to know more than just so many 
fish are caught by so many fishermen. The questions which 
may need to be answered could include: what are 'acceptable' 
catches for recreational fishermen, in terms of fish numbers, 
sizes, or species? Ecological factors may address the 
interactions of predator-prey systems in the sea and ensure 
that non-human users of the fish resource, such as birds or 
marine mammals, are also allocated their share of the fish. 
Fish is not necessarily 'wasted', if it is not caught by 
humans. Nakamura (1980) also provides a discussion of the 
role of these different factors in the management of the Gulf 
of Mexico fish resource for their 'best' use. His conclusion 
is that the inadequacey of information on the ecological, 
social, and economic nature of the fishery will mean that 
socio-political forces (lobbies) will most likely play the 
most influential role in the allocation of the resource to 
recreational users. 
Optimum yield is a complex objective with all of the problems 
associated with trying to combine a number of separate 
management objectives into one value. It could be suggested 
that OSY is a logical step in the evolution of management 
objectives which started with the single biological objective 
of maximising yield and the progressed to maximising economic 
income subject to yield constraints. Now other social and 
institutional factors are included in OSY to ensure that the 
overall policy of gaining the greatest good has the widest 
possible application and interpretation. In fact, the 
Canadian definition of what constitutes OSY is so 
all-encompassing, as to be almost useless as a specific 
management objective ~arkin, 1977). In many cases OSY is 
virtually a restatement of the overall policy, which then 
requires more specific management objectives to be defined. 
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It is the first approach to the concept of OSY which appears 
to be the one adopted by the New Zealand fisheries managers. 
In the definition of Optimum Yield given in the Fisheries Act 
1983 the term is defined as the MSY with any modifications 
deemed necessary. This approach places the primary emphasis 
on maximising the yield and relegates other objectives to 
positions of secondary importance. Economists such as 
Anderson (1982) and Crutchfield (1975) would argue that MEY 
might provide a better basis for management for economic 
reasons. The discussion of the problems associated with MSY 
in chapter three would tend to also suggest that MSY is not 
an appropriate basis for any single yield estimate. 
Two major fisheries management approaches have been suggested 
that attempt to sidestep the problems associated with OSY as 
a management objective. The first is to rank or partially 
rank the various factors which are significant to OSY. The 
objective is still to determine an optimal yield value, but 
subject to the constraints imposed by other factors. The 
second approach rejects the idea that a precise and accurate 
single optimum value can be obtained from a complex mix of a 
number of different factors. Instead a theoretical 
'bargaining space' is set up for each of the factors 
concerned. The objective of the exercise is to identify the 
possible tradeoffs that could be made and eventually produce 
a range ~r an In' dimensional space) of possible 'optimum 
yield' values. The one chosen depends on the relative 
'bargaining power' of the different factors which contribute 
to the yield value. Both approaches retain the 
multi-disciplinary approach to fisheries management, but from 
different stances. 
The resulting optimum yield estimate is a compromise between 
OSY and MSY. However, the actual determination of the 
optimum yield value depends on the modification of MSY by a 
range of factors, many of which are measured in quite 
different ways. The spurious precision of a MSY value 
compounded by a number of equally ranked secondary objectives 
can make the optimum yield value appear to be a bit of a 
mystery, known only to the fisheries managers. To date, a 
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number to TACs for various species have been proposed by the 
MAP under the provisions of optimum yield. However, not one 
of these optimum yield values has been fully explained in 
terms of the factors stated in the Fisheries Act. This may 
be a result of the urgency required to reduce catches in the 
inshore commercial fisheries, but the TACs can not include 
consideration of such factors as recreational catches, as 
there is little, if any, information as yet on the factors 
upon which to base such optimum yields and TACs. 
The second approach to management is based on the concept of 
a 'bargaining space' in which the various management 
objectives are traded off against each other. Opaluch and 
Boekstael (1984) describe their interpretation of this new 
approach as 'satisficing'. The aim of satisficing is not to 
determine a single optimum value, but rather to provide an 
acceptable range of target levels of each objective. The 
minimum acceptable levels of the biological, economic and 
social objectives are determined and then these define an 
acceptable range of values. The final value accepted relies 
on the trade-off of the objectives within the acceptable 
range. 
Pope U983) described a similar process which he dubbed 
Minimum Sustainable Whinge (MSW). The whinges in pope's 
model define the constraints or minimum acceptable values of 
each factor. The aim of the analysis is then to define the 
acceptable portions of each objective and allocate the fish 
resource so as to ensure each objective is satisfied to at 
least its minimum value. Holling (1981) uses a similar 
method with his system of nomograms (yield isopleths). 
Peacey (1985) provides a discussion of the concepts of 
'satisficing'. He concludes that the approach is a 
'pragmatic response' to the problems of attempting to 
simultaneously optimise different, and often conflicting 
management objectives. Since optimization is no longer the 
objective of the process, less money need be spent to 
increase the precision of results. Uncertainty -the bane of 
fisheries managers- can be allowed for, and in some cases 
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even planned for. Satisficing can also improve the age-old 
problem of managers not explicitly stating management 
objectives. This approach needs specific and explicit 
objectives in order to determine acceptable values, which in 
turn become proxy criteria for success or failure. 
The fact that OSY philosophy does not, in itself, pinpoint 
specific objectives exemplifies two important points often 
not discussed. First, the primary goal of fisheries 
management is to provide and maintain a broad range of actual 
and potential opportunities for use, ~ilkins, 1968). The 
diversity of objectives and criteria for management under an 
OSY philosophy correctly mirrors the diversity found in 
society. Management programmes designed to meet or achieve 
only one of many possible objectives - without consideration 
of the implications on other users - may be inappropriate for 
modern resource management in general and fisheries 
management in particular. 
On the other hand, however, the diversity of objectives and 
criteria for managemen~ presents the opportunity for 
fisheries management to emerge as a separate 
discipline to those from which it has evolved. 
manager can become the co-ordinator and 
and distinct 
The fisheries 
evaluator of 
information - receiving input from economists, biologists, 
sociologists, politicians, fishing groups, as well as any-une 
else who believes they have something useful to contribute. 
The manager can then make allocation decisions based on the 
best available information. Optimum sustainable yield would, 
as a management philosophy, provide an approach to 
management, and not be seen as attempting to provide exact 
solutions. 
Management policy for Amateur Fishing 
Other than the vague statements of policy in the Fisheries 
Act 1983 and the Inshore Fisheries Policy booklet (MAF,1984), 
there is virtually no policy of any kind for amateur or joint 
fisheries in New Zealand. The former states that one of the 
two purposes of FMPs is to promote and develop recreational 
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fisheries. The latter states that one of the objectives of 
the inshore fisheries restructuring is to 'preserve a 
satisfactory recreational fishery'. In neither case are any 
explicit management objectives mentioned, nor the means by 
which the policies will be carried out. No criteria for 
'success' are given. Furthermore, recreational fishing has 
not being explicitly addressed in phase I of the FMP process 
and there is no mention of it in any published timetables for 
later phases. I have no doubt the development of management 
policy for amateur fishing 
- complete with objectives and policy instruments is a 
priority for fisheries management in New Zealand. However, 
the short time which has elapsed since the Fisheries Act was 
passed, the urgent remedial action needed in the commercial 
fisheries, and the overall paucity of information on amateur 
fishing has quite probably slowed the policy development 
process considerably. 
There is every indication that the FMP process should be able 
to address the many issues associated with the increasing 
popularity of all kinds of amateur fishing. The potentially 
significant amateur harvests of some species, potential 
conflict between various user-groups, and the allocation of 
the scarce fish stocks to the various amateur and commercial 
fishing groups are all issues for which specific management 
objectives may need to be formulated. Each of these issues 
is discussed later in separate sections of this chapter so it 
is not proposed to elaborate further here, except to note 
that information collection and dissemination must play a 
significant role in devising successful policy. 
Once the necessary preliminary information on the character 
and state of the amateur fisheries has been assembled, the 
wide variety of fishermen expected to be found may require a 
variety of separate objectives. Where there are a number of 
objectives a range of policy instruments will normally be 
required. Such a finding could require the present amateur 
management regime, based largely on bag limits, to be 
reassessed. However, although this is largely speculative at 
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present, other fisheries overseas have been 
investigated and similar suggestions made. 
intensely 
Berkes ~978) reports on two different management objectives 
for a Canadian recreational fishery; the first, open-access 
and large harvest, the second, oriented towards conservation 
and multiple use with low level harvests. The two objectives 
also required quite different management strategies to 
implement them. The former used less controls and imposed ad 
hoc management for local stock depletions or conflicts. The 
latter was necessarily more strict and used daily bag limits, 
closed seasons, and fishing sanctuaries. These controls were 
also backed up by access restrictions through local 
outfitters and fishing camps, to provide a set of mutually 
reinforcing measures designed to achieve adequate control. 
This provides an illustration of the need to choose a 
specific and explicit management objective. The end results 
of each are likely to be quite different and the management 
controls required to reach the chosen objective are also 
likely to be different, both in their nature and effects. 
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8.3 Economic Efficiency. 
Economic efficiency as an objective for commercial fishing 
has been present for some time. The maximum economic yield 
concept is based on an economic efficiency criterion. 
Restricting the New Zealand inshore commercial fisheries also 
has an economic efficiency objective. The 'buy-back' scheme 
is designed to decrease effort over-capitalization and ITQs 
are to be implemented to ensure economic efficiency is 
maintained in the commercial sector. Hence, the use of TACs 
and ITQs as management tools for commercial fishing mean that 
biological conservation and economic efficiency are at least 
implicit management objectives. 
The models of recreational and joint fishing also use 
economic efficiency as a management objective. It is assumed 
in all of these models that the value of the recreational 
fishing experience can be estimated. Hence, the value of the 
recreational fishing sector can ,be compared directly with the 
value of the commercial fishing sector in order to determine 
the economically efficient allocation of ~e harvest. Often 
it will not be possible to estimate the value of present 
recreational fishing, let alone ~e value of either 
recreational or commercial fishing in the future. The 
problem is not one of accuracy or precision but one of not 
yet having economic tools that- will enable measurement or 
forecasting of such non-market values. Economic theory and 
hypothetical models are of assistance, but more work is 
needed to actually generate the empirical data. 
The problem still remains that success in the commercial 
sector can be accurately measured in money terms, but amateur 
fishing success is much more difficult to measure in dollars. 
Thus, although economic efficiency can be a useful objective 
for commercial fishing, it is far less useful in recreational 
fisheries and could even be misleading in joint fisheries. 
McConnell and Norton (1976) noted that there was at that time 
an increasingly obvious need for some sort of dollar value to 
be put on recreational fishing. Often decisions were being 
made about the allocation of public money to resource 
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development projects but recreational fisheries either were 
not receiving money or were bearing the costs of the other 
projects, simply because the values associated with fishing 
were not clearly stated in economic terms. 
Similar misallocations of resources, both of money and of 
fish stocks may occur if the economic objective of fishing 
becomes predominant in New Zealand fisheries management. It 
is possible to estimate the dollar values of amateur fishing, 
but gathering the necessary information could prove more 
costly than the information is ultimately worth. So, 
although the final allocation of fish might be 'economically 
efficient' for fishing, it will be so only if the costs of 
collecting the data are ignored. On the other hand the 
situation may arise where the value of the recreational 
fishery is extremely high, but is difficult to measure 
accurately. If no value is available, the allocation of fish 
may favour commercial fishing simply because it can provide a 
value. Both of these cases are extreme examples. However 
they illustrate the problems of using economic efficiency to 
allocate fish or other resources where one sector is market 
orientated with low information costs and the other sector is 
non-market orientated and may have high information costs. 
It is easy for decision-makers to become biased towards the 
sector which has the more definite information - particularly 
if it is expressed in dollars. 
The solutions to the economic efficiency dilemma might be 
found by considering two aspects of the efficiency objective. 
The first is to place less emphasis on economic efficiency 
and more on the distribution of costs and benefits. If a 
range of objectives are used to determine the success or 
value of a fishery, then identifying the affects of the 
various costs and benefits of these other objectives could 
lessen the need to give the fishery a purely economic value. 
The second aspect of using economic efficiency as an 
objective or criterion is to be more rigorous about the 
economic valuations carried out. In many cases it may be 
immediately obvious that the costs of acquiring more detailed 
economic information are going to outweigh the value of the 
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information gathered. However, in other cases the initial 
impression could be different. One such situation is the 
Hauraki Gulf snapper fishery. The information reviewed in 
chapter seven suggests it is a significant amateur fishery 
worth investigating further. 
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8.4 Information and Data 
It is self-evident that before an issue or problem can be 
investigated and addressed properly, a certain amount of 
information must first exist. For the amateur fisheries of 
New Zealand only the barest amounts of reliable information 
are available. However, these data indicate that a more 
thorough investigation into the significance of amateur 
fishing in New Zealand is warranted. 
The major gaps in the information base also appear to 
coincide with some of the more important aspects of fishing 
and fishing management. Included among these aspects are the 
following: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
the numbers of amateur fishermen; 
the most prevalent or significant 
the preferred species of fish and 
the amateur catch for each species 
methods used; 
the size of 
4. what is the economic value of the amateur 
fisheries as tourist or other resources?; 
5. the nature of the amateur fisheries controls; 
6. what are the likely social, cultural or 
economic consequences of particular management 
options or controls?; and 
7. what should the management objectives be for 
the amateur fisheries, how will these be 
achieved, and how will success be measured? 
The problems that arise because of the lack of reliable 
information on amateur fishing add to the other issues 
mentioned above and below. It is difficult to develop and 
pursue meaningful management objectives for fishing when 
there are large gaps in the information base. For the same 
reason it is difficult to devise research projects when the 
objectives of management are unclear or vague. The solution 
may be to take the available data and develop preliminary 
management objectives which can be altered subject to new 
information. Often conflicts arise due to false or scarce 
information. Thus the better the data base and the 
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information dissemination system, the more informed people 
can be. This need not lessen the basis for conflict, but it 
can often aid the resolution of the conflict. 
Frequently the type of data required to develop the general 
management objective statements amount to little more than a 
broad picture or description. If the numbers of recreational 
fishermen are high, then a policy statement suggesting a need 
for a successful recreational fishery is enough initially. 
As more data is collected it might show that particular 
species are preferred, or that fishermen are after bigger 
fish. In these cases the specific objectives of management 
will change to suit the requirements of the fishermen and 
management agency. It may be totally inappropriate to have 
an objective to maximise fish size when fishermen are fishing 
for food and trying to catch bag limits of fish. Thus 
information is needed to develop the management process. At 
present even the most basic data, such as amateur catch 
sizes, is not available and one of the possible consequences 
of this is that misallocations of fish stocks could occur. 
The types of information required by management agencies, and 
other interested parties, will depend on a number of factors. 
Among these factors will be: the management objectives 
specified for the fishery - MSY, MEY, or OSYi whether the 
fishery is a recreational fishery or a joint fisherYi the 
expected size or extent of the fishery; and budget 
constraints imposed on the research. Other factors which may 
be important to the research are the techniques available to 
collect the required data, and the size of the sample 
population, i.e. will it be a national, regional or local 
project. A number of authors have presented discussions of 
the types of surveys used to gather data on recreational 
fishing. 
Charbonneau (1980) presented a discussion of the merits of 
national surveys. He states that these can be effective in 
collecting some of the data necessary to plan long-term 
fisheries management programs. A national survey can provide 
a broad view, which can be compared with the results of 
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regional surveys to help determine trends in recreational 
fishing preferences. The identified trends can suggest 
directions for the long-term management for recreational 
fishing, other recreational uses of fish habitat, and fish 
resource protection. 
Deuel (1980a) presents a discussion of the merits of special 
surveys to obtain the data needed for fish resource 
mangement. The u.s. National Marine Fisheries Service has 
concluded that previous surveys of U.S. recreational 
fishermen, as well as the ongoing national survey have not 
provided adequate information about particular groups of 
fishermen or about particular species of fish. Therefore the 
NMFS has investigated the possibility of conducting special 
surveys in order to obtain the information required. The 
surveys are called special surveys because they are unique to 
a particular area, species of fish population of people, or 
due to their timing. The people sampled are normally a 
subset of the people associated with the particular fishery, 
such as the fishermen who fish in a specific area, but do so 
only from charter boats. The survey methods used and data 
collected in special surveys is similar to other surveys 
conducted, but the data collected in special surveys may be 
more detailed, or unavailable from a larger survey. The 
actual survey methodologies used to collect the information 
include both telephone surveys and intercept surveys (creel 
censuses). Deuel (1980b) provides a more detailed discussion 
of the methodologies used, the data they are designed to 
generate, and the modifications the NMFS has made to the 
basic designs in order to make them more effective for their 
purposes. 
The TAC figures for many New Zealand fish stocks are soon to 
be determined in order to allocate the ITQs to the 
restructured commercial fishing industry. However, these 
TACs do not appear to take account of the size or value of 
amateur catches. Not only is this contrary to the spirit, if 
not the letter, of the Fisheries Act 1983, but it must also 
be reflected in the amounts of fish available for both 
commercial and amateur fishermen. If the optimum sustainable 
263 
yield for a fish stock is determined and then a commercial 
TAC derived from that optimum yield, without considering the 
size of the amateur catch, the stock could become overfished 
again. The size of the amateur catch, therefore, could be an 
important factor in determining the size of the commercial 
catch. 
If the optimum yields do not allow for the correct size of 
the amateur catch and too little is available, then another 
problem may arise. Having already allocated the available 
TAC to commercial fishermen, the only way to retrieve these 
fish so that they would be available for amateur fishermen is 
for the MAF to purchase the quotas from the commercial 
fishermen. It may be financially or politically difficult 
for that to occur in the future unless the available 
information points to the fish being of greater value to 
amateurs than to commercial fishermen. 
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8.5 Catch Allocations. 
Dill (1980) descr i bes I alloca tion I 
measures. It may be the assignment 
or stock of fish to a single group of 
States the black bass ~icropterus 
soley recreational fishing resource. 
as one of several 
of the use of a species 
users. In the united 
spp. ) have long been a 
with respect to a 
particular species, 
catch it in certain 
it may be that commercial fishermen may 
geographical areas and recreational 
fishermen may catch it in other areas, such as the Tawharanui 
Marine Park north of Auckland. The same situation applies to 
particular areas 
use regardless of 
example of this 
Knights Islands. 
of sea which are set aside for a particular 
the species found within that area. An 
would be the marine reserve at the Poor 
In freshwater angling it is not uncommon 
for areas to set aside for fishermen using particular fishing 
gear, i.e. fly-fishing, or even for particular species to be 
restricted to a particular fishing method. A final type of 
allocation is the allotment of particular portions of the 
resource to different types of commercial fishing. For 
whatever reasons, or in whatever ways the resource is 
apportioned among the different users the result is likely to 
be unacceptable to someone, and hence conflicts will arise. 
The issue of the allocation of catch between amateur and 
commercial fishermen has a number of points associated with 
it •. The first is the unstated policy for fish catch 
allocation that seems to favour multiple use of the fish 
species. Even when under biological stress, there are few 
species which are either totally amateur or totally 
commercial. The second point concerns the lack of 
information on amateur catches. How can the optimum yield, 
the TAC, or the amateur catch be determined in the absence of 
such information. The third point, which follows on from the 
first two, concerns the criteria for allocation. Given that 
the respective commercial and recreational catches can be 
estimated from historical data, how will the allocation of 
the catch be made? A number of criteria are possible 
including economic efficiency (discussed in section 8.3). A 
final point concerns the question of who will decide the 
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allocation of the scarce stock and catch? At present it 
would appear that the mechanics would be done by the FMP team 
and the decision left to the FMAC or possibly the regional 
FID. 
The multiple use policy for fisheries management is implicit 
in the new FMP process being implemented around the country, 
The objectives of FMPs include both recreational and 
commercial fishing egually, as neither has been given 
legislative precedence. In practice, commercial fishing has 
been given management priority due to the economic and 
biological state of the inshore fisheries, although the MAF 
has stated that an improvement in the position of the 
commercial fishery will also preserve a satisfactory 
recreational fishery ~AF,1984). Obviously the management 
priority given to the commercial sectors need not continue 
once the proposed restructuring is completed. However, it is 
possible to speculate whether true multiple use or equal 
significance will be given to the commercial and recreational 
fisheries? 
This is not to suggest that in allocation decisions each 
sector should be given equal weight and the available catch 
shared equally. It simply means that some mechanism will 
have to be devised that ensures that the economic value, 
cultural and traditional significance, or the social 
importance of amateur and recreational fishing can be weighed 
against the equivalent values of the commercial fishery. 
Such a task is presumably included in the role of the FMPs 
and the FMACs which have the necessary constitution to 
consider the many facets of an allocation decision. The 
final allocation will presumably be made either by the RFMO 
or the MAF:FMD head office. 
The lack of information on amateur catches has already been 
discussed. However, it may be noted again that it is in the 
interest of all users of the resource for the total harvest 
to be known so that management can include the full resource 
and not just selected portions. After all, the stock fished 
is a large 'commons' resource from which all fishermen derive 
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benefit. Being a common stock, the catch of one fishing 
sector can affect the catch of the other. 
The criteria for determining the allocation of fish between 
commercial and recreational interests is another aspect of 
joint fishing that deserves discussion. One possible way 
might be to determine the greatest TAC for commercial fishing 
that still leaves some fish for other amateur users of the 
resource. This is the probable result if the amateur fishing 
catches and values remain unknown or at best vague and 
unreliable. The second possible way may be to determine the 
historic catches and then allocate the fish resource to both 
fishing sectors based on these data. This is the method 
being proposed for the allocation of the TACs and ITQs in the 
restructured commercial catches. A third method may be to 
allocate the catch based on its value among the various 
fishing sectors. This would require not only the catches for 
each sector, but also some measure of their economic value to 
be known. The catch would then be allocated to those users 
who place the most value on the catch, 
administrative allocation or a public auction. 
either by 
Moving from the first of the three suggested allocation 
mechanisms to the last, a number of factors change. The 
amount of information required for each increases and so too 
does the complexity of the policy instruments needed for 
management. The property rights for the recreational 
fisherman associated with each allocation also increase in 
specificity and exclusivity. However, it should also be 
noted that any allocation based on a change in the 
open-access property rights presently associated with 
recreational fishing might meet some opposition from the 
public. 
The question of who would decide the actual allocation of the 
fish stock depends on the method chosen to allocate the 
stock. The market could be used to provide the allocation 
method, if exclusive property rights cquld be defined for 
recreational fishing, however this is an unlikely 
eventuality_ An administrative agency is the most probable 
g 
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allocation method. The question that remains is whether the 
agency will allocate the catch to both fishing sectors 
explicitly, or to only one, with the other receiving an 
allocation by default. Unless there is a radical change of 
policy, the latter, which is the present method, appears set 
to remain. Commercial fishermen are allocated a TAC, and 
amateur fishermen get the rest. The problem is that in many, 
if not all, cases the extent of the amateur catch is unknown. 
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8.6 User-group Conflicts. 
A further issue concerns the conflicts between commercial and 
amateur fishermen. Despite indications of a good spirit of 
harmony and cooperation between the two sectors noted by 
Orman (1983), actual or perceived conflicts between fishermen 
continue to surface. Examples of such conflict are noted in 
the proposed Challenger FMP document and in the Auckalnd FMA 
background papers where, according to recreational fishermen, 
the commercial fishermen are to blame for the decline in 
their fishing success. Other suggestions of conflict are 
made in the background papers produced for the Auckland FMP, 
where trawlers are accused of trawling too close to the west 
coast surf beaches and thus catching fish otherwise caught by 
the surfcasting and kontiki fishermen. 
Fox (1982) notes that some degree of conflict is a virtually 
unavoidable consequence of the public management of natural 
resources. The different groups of society with an interest 
in the management of a resource will all have different 
preferences and priorities. If the resource could be 
allocated through an economic market then prices would 
determine allocation in a socially acceptable manner. 
However, in the case of a natural resource which is under 
some form of public ownership, such as a fishery, the 
management agency must allocate the resource and hence 
contend with the conflicts that will arise. Unfortunately, 
there are no universally accepted measures of value which 
could determine how these resources should be allocated, so 
conflict can arise not only in the actual allocation of the 
resource but also from the mechanism which is used. 
Types of Conflict 
Lord et al (1979) define three types of conflict: cognitive; 
value; and interest. Cognitive conflict originates from a 
difference of opinion in the expected consequences of a 
policy or project. Often the conflicts are, therefore, the 
results of different professional or technical perceptions 
made on the basis of technical information. An example might 
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be the differences in the professional opinions of a 
fisheries biologist and a fisherman over the issue of 
biological overfishing in a particular area. The conflict 
can be resolved by reaching an agreement about the 
consequences of the policy in which all the interested 
parties can have technical confidence. 
Interest conflicts arise from the incidence and distribution 
of benefits and costs arising from a proposed policy. As 
with any management policy or program fisheries management 
will produce winners and losers, and hence each of the 
interested parties will be in conflict. In fishing, for 
example, interest conflicts can arise between commercial and 
recreational fishermen, each pursuing the same scarce fish, 
but only one or the other can be successful. The resolution, 
or at least the diminution, of interest conflicts can occur 
if it is practicable to modify the policy or program to 
reallocate the costs and benefits. Compromise or 
compensation can be useful tools to assist the resolution of 
interest conflicts, and both are proving useful in the 
proposals to restructure the inshore fisheries. 
Value conflicts are the most difficult to resolve. They 
arise from differences in the implicit values or ideologies 
of the individuals or groups involved in the conflict. Two 
groups may agree fully on the physical or biological facts of 
a particular project, such':as a marine reserve, but can 
differ widely in their opinions as to the value of the 
biological environment the reserve will protect. Often the 
two sides can be termed the 'greenies' and the 'greediest; 
the former representing environmental protection and the 
latter advocating industrial development. Mangrove swamps 
and other wetland areas are an area of the natural 
environment where such conflicts often arise, as the 
intrinsic biological and other values they have are in direct 
conflict with their potential value as pasture or arable 
land. 
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There is no obvious way of resolving value conflicts, 
although education in the values of the other parties can 
often help. The parties must agree to either modify their 
values or accept a negotiated compromise or an impartial 
decision from a superior authority, increasingly the Planning 
Tribunal. Although bargaining and negotiation can result in 
tradeoffs or compromise solutions, often the stand taken by 
one or other group is absolute and non-negotiable. In such 
cases, or where the physical nature of the project requires a 
'yes' or 'no' answer the government or its arbitration agency 
may find it necessary to choose one or other set of values 
and risk offending the losers. Fortunately such situations 
or decisions appear to occur in the minority of cases. 
The aforementioned division of conflicts ihto three 
categories can aid in the understanding of the potential for, 
and the limitations of, resolving conflict situations. 
Seldom are the distinctions so clear-cut, and conflicts often 
fall into more than one category. Value or interest 
conflicts can lead to cognitive conflicts, particularly when 
differences in professional opinions can be exploited to the 
advantage of one or other group. In some cases the values of 
one group conflict with the personal interests of another. 
Often such cases arise when an environmental group which has 
no direct involvement becomes the lobbyist or champion of a 
cause involving the development for profit of a part of the 
environment. In some cases all three types of conflict are 
present. A recent example of such a conflict situation was 
the Clyde Dam, which involved interest conflicts on the part 
of the local orchardists, value conflicts from the Save the 
Clutha Campaign and cognitive conflicts on the specifications 
of the dam required. 
Conflict Management 
Messer and Messer n982) describe three strategies for 
resolving conflict situations. There may be a number of ways 
to actually solve the conflict, but each way will fit into 
one of the three categories of: win-lose; lose-lose; and 
win-win. The names describe the outcome of each strategy for 
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each of the conflicting parties. A win-lose strategy has one 
party forcing the other into submission, using political 
strength or some other means. This is the result when the 
parties are unable to accept the others objectives, such as a 
diference in values. A lose-lose strategy is normally a bad 
compromise or the result of an imposed solution, where a 
third party is required to decide. Neither party is able to 
fully achieve its' objectives, so the conflict has affected 
both detimentally. A win-win strategy allows the conflict to 
be treated as a mutual problem which requires the attention 
of both parties. The solution should focus on the objectives 
of the parties 
understanding. 
and promote both communication and 
The ideal solution is obviously one which results in a 
win-win situation. As an ideal it is subject to limitations. 
However, the objective of the solution should be to emphasise 
the positive aspects of the situation, and then to focus on 
the interdependence of the parties. If both parties 
recognize the interdependent relationship of their respective 
objectives then the two groups should be able to work out a 
solution to their mutual benefit, and decide how best to 
implement it. 
Fox (1982) identifies three approaches to conflict 
management: the do-nothing option; the control conflict 
with bureaucracy and silence option; and the consultation 
with all parties option. All involve the public agency to 
some extent, although the do-nothing option is generally 
regarded as being politically unacceptable since it implies 
that there is no management. The two major conflict 
management alternatives are then either to control conflict 
by only involving those parties which support the policy and 
attempting to shut all opposition out with an information 
blockade, or to widely consult by opening up the decision to 
all interested parties. 
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The conflict control option is widely practiced by 
governmental agencies. They set their own policy, have the 
resources and authority to implement it and then 
singlemindedly attempt to do so, 'come hell or high water'. 
Fox (1982) states that he does not believe that this approach 
is motivated by mal-intent or insincerety, although it is 
possible there are enough cynics to disagree with him. Often 
the conflicts arise due to the actions of limiting or 
suppressing relevant information, or by pursuing a preferred 
alternative without the apparent consideration of 
alternatives. Such an approach is a natural response to a 
potential conflict within a large bureaucratic organisation. 
Alternative courses of action are suppressed in order to 
avoid the stimulation of conflict which may unnecessarily 
create delays or cost increases. 
This 'bureaucratic control' approach has two major drawbacks. 
First it is not always possible to control the most powerful 
offensive weapon in a conflict, information - particularly 
information which is not supportive of the proposed action. 
The conflict will be heightened if the information is 
dbtained by an uninvited interest group through its own 
capability or more especially if it is leaked. The second 
drawback is that although conflict may have been averted 
prior to the decision, it may emerge in a more critical 
manner during the more obvious policy implementation phase 
when the potential or actual consequences of the policy are 
revealed. Both drawbacks can create intense distrust and can 
needlessly destroy the confidence any interest groups have in 
the agency, even those it has allied with for a particular 
occasion. 
The third approach to conflict management is to hold open 
discussions prior to the decision being made, i.e. 'public 
participation'. Such an approach involves identifying the 
range of possible management alternatives, the possible areas 
of conflict, the 'interest' groups, and a discussion of all 
the significant effects arising from each policy alternative. 
The process must necessarily be two-way and should not be 
seen as an attempt by management to mount a public relations 
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campaign designed to market a single 
effort from all involved parties 
concept. A conscious 
is needed to ensure the 
final decisions is the 'best' possible, and this can only be 
obtained in an atmosphere of mutual trust and co-operation. 
Fisheries management in New Zealand is placing emphasis on a 
consultative approach to management in general and conflict 
resolution in particular. The current inshore fishing policy 
discussions are an attempt to involve interest groups in 
decision-making, although the policy options proposed could 
be said to give the commercial fishermen very little choice. 
The FMP process and organisational structure appears to be 
designed to allow for as much public discussion of management 
proposals as possible, both before and after decisions have 
been made. The final arbiter of any disputes or conflicts 
arising from an FMP will be the Planning Tribunal an 
impartial decision-making body. Hopefully the system of 
consultation at all levels of management will avert the need 
to involve the Planning Tribunal too frequently. The need to 
use the Tribunal at all implies at least a partial failure of 
the consultative system. 
The consultative approach is unlikely to resolve all 
disputes, but it should help to resolve present conflicts and 
aid future decision-making. The 'best' solution will be one 
which all parties involved consider was made following a fair 
hearing of their grievences by an impartial mediator. It 
need not matter that the approach becomes institutionalized, 
as in the case of the Planning Tribunal, so long as the 
decision can be made in a manner which allows all parties to 
eventually accept the result. 
Whatever procedure is chosen to resolve the conflicts and 
facilitate the decision, it must not become a dominant 
feature of the decisionmaking process. Too often the costs 
of time and money spent making these decision are large 
relative to the benefits to be derived from the chosen 
policy. A system which causes the decision-makers to become 
inaccessible to the interested parties due to time or cost 
constraints defeats its own primary purpose. Not only must 
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all the players of the conflict resolution game have all the 
facts and know all the rules; to get a fair result they must 
all have the opportunity to play. 
Lyman (1979) notes that in the u.s. the allocation process 
has become too rigid and institutionalized. The difficulties 
stem from the need for the legal system to be more flexible 
when dealing with the allocation of natural resources. The 
system of appeals that the Fisheries Conservation and 
Management Act 1976 provided has become full of legal 'red 
tape tangles' and favours commercial interests. The red tape 
derives from the inability of the Regional Councils to ammend 
the management plans fast enough to account for changes in 
the size of the fish stocks. The same problem may not arise 
in New Zealand, if the fisheries managers are able to change 
the TAC or Optimum Yield estimate easily. However, this 
remains to be seen. The emphasis towards commercial 
interests comes from the requirement that Council members 
have expertise in the marine fisheries field. The commercial 
fisheries are much older and have historically attracted more 
attention, so members of the Councils are normally much more 
conversant with, or aware of commercial fishing. 
The list of conflicts in fishing - either real or perceived 
-appears to be large. Regardless of whether the conflicts 
have substance or are unsubstantiated, they will continue to 
prove a stumbling block to effective and successful 
management until they are resolved. As with the previous 
issues, information and education will playa major role. If 
it is possible to show some of the user groups that their 
fears are unfounded, or that credible solutions exist to the 
conflicts they face ,then a major portion of the problem may 
disappear. The important points to note are embodied in the 
words 'credible solutions'. 
The less than successful past management of the inshore 
fisheries has reduced the credibility of the Fisheries 
Management Division W~) of MAF. It will take some time for 
that to be restored and it should be a high priority for FMD. 
Hence a final part of the solution to conflict resolution in 
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fishing and fisheries management may lie in the judicious use 
of rational and credible, but also imaginative and 
innovative, management controls. The objective must be to 
manage the fish stocks and the fishermen so as to create, or 
provide the opportunity for the least direct conflict and the 
greatest benefits. 
Other analysts who address the resolution of conflict in 
recreational fishing include Bryan (1982) and Cicin-Sain 
(1982). Bryan introduces the concept of a 'social carrying 
capacity' which relates as much to the management of actual 
conflicts as to the management of peoples' perceptions and 
expectations of the fishing experience. Hence the need to 
include research on the aspirations of fishermen in any 
future investigations or surveys. 
276 
8.7 Management Controls and Restrictions. 
Another issue facing management of the inshore fisheries 
concerns the nature of, and form that, amateur controls will 
take in the wake of the commercial restructuring. The 
success of fisheries management, as a whole, seems to depend 
heavily on the use of management restrictions which allow 
control to be exercised. However, in amateur fisheries the 
resource is expected to remain open to public access 
in commercial fishing the management philosophy 
different. Property right mechanisms such as ITQs 
successfully employed. Thus it may be appropriate 
fisheries managers to review the controls to be 
whereas 
may be 
may be 
for the 
used in 
amateur fishing in order to be able to better avoid some of 
the conflicts noted previously. 
Three general situations can be envisaged where the use of 
amateur and/or commercial fishing controls will be necessary. 
The first is the simple case where only recreational or other 
amateur fisherman are involved. The second case concerns a 
fish resource sought by both commercial and amateur 
fishermen, but direct conflicts other than a simple stock 
externality do not occur. The ability of each sector to 
harvest the resource may be limited and the methods and gear 
used ensure few direct interactions. The third case is 
similar to the second, except that direct couflicts arise 
which lead to confrontations or disputes over such issues as 
the gear used, the fishing methods employed, the times of the 
year that fishing can occur, or the geographical areas each 
fishing sector fishes. The questions to be asked in each 
case are: 
1. what are the causes of any disputes?; 
2. what control options are available?; and 
3. what would be the most useful or appropriate 
management controls in each case? 
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The options available for restricting either amateur or 
commercial fishing in such situations include: 
- method and gear restrictions; 
- minimum fish or shellfish sizes; 
- individual daily quotas or bag limits; 
- closed or restricted areas or seasons; and 
- licencing. 
The use of any particular type of control measure will depend 
on a number of factors, such as the particular problems 
faced, the biology of the fish species, and the management 
objectives for that fishery. A number of examples might best 
illustrate the possible use of these methods in the 
situations outlined above. 
The first situation mentioned was that of a predominantly 
amateur fishery. This could be represented in two ways. 
First, as a recreational fishery where the commercial or 
other amateur catches were less significant than the 
recreational catch. The second, as an amateur fishery used 
primarily as a food source such as a Maori shellfish fishery. 
Each of these is explained further below by an example. 
A recreational fishery example could be the blue cod of the 
Marlborough Sounds, where the amateur fishery is believed to 
be so significant as to make the commercial catch less than 
the amateur. One possible objective for the fishery may be 
to maintain and enhance the fish resources for the 
non-commercial benefit of the region. The problems involved 
have been narrowed to ensuring the most recreational benefit 
is obtained without endangering the resource. Since most 
amateur methods of catching fish are far less efficient than 
commercial methods the chances of over-fishing the resource 
are lessened, although they still exist. Hence biological 
controls could be kept to a minimum, unless the actual 
fishing pressure warrants stricter controls. Bag limits 
might be desirable to stop wastage of the resource or 
• pseudo-commercial' fishing. 
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Choosing simple, straight-forward controls ensures that the 
fishermen can enjoy fishing without too much 'interference', 
yet still expect to get a reasonable catch. Another factor 
which needs to be borne in mind in setting controls is that 
monitoring recreational fishing is often vastly more 
difficult than commercial fishing, and hence the costs of 
management may increase. It may be necessary to place limits 
on commercial fishing also, although a properly determined 
TAC and allocation of ITQs should provide adequate control. 
The second situation involving a primarily amateur fishery 
could be the traditional food gathering of Maori communities. 
As the 'Kai Moana' (or food from the sea) plays an important 
role in the culture and tradition of the Maori people, this 
needs to be recognised in management practices. Using the 
special provisions of the Fisheries Act 1983 it is possible 
to set aside areas of coastline for the almost exclusive use 
of local communities of any kind. In the past the needs of 
Maori communities have been at odds with the existing normal 
fishing controls. For instance if a tangi or hui requires 
large amounts of food for one occasion, this was not allowed 
under the normal amateur regulations although the shellfish 
populations would normally be harvested only once and then 
left to recuperate again. In such a situation the concept of 
bag limit controls becomes unnecessarily obstructive. Often 
'~he welfare of such an area of coastal reefs is of prime 
importance to local communities. It is in their interest to 
ensure that the resources are not over-fished and depleted. 
It should be appropriate for such communities to have a say 
in how the resources are to be managed. 
The idea of giving a particular community exclusive rights to 
harvest the fish resources may not receive widespread public 
accptance, particularly since the general philosophy of 
amateur fishing is open-access. However, ITQs alienate 
public rights in a fishery by allocating harvest rights to 
the commercial sector. Some access rights are still retained 
by the amateur sector, but the amount of fish available 
depends on the commercial TAC and any amateur controls. 
There may be a scarcity of fish if the TAC has not been set 
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proper ly. 
The third example illustrates the situation where amateur and 
commercial fishermen are both catching the same species in 
significant quantities. The catch of each sector affects the 
overall size of the stock and thus can lead to indirect 
conflicts. Such is the nature of the Hauraki Gulf snapper 
fishery conflicts. Much of the blame for the decline in the 
amateur fishery catches has been attributed to the activities 
of the commercial fishermen, -mainly the trawlers. According 
to Paul (1977) these complaints started in the very early 
1900s and have not stopped since. 
The explanation of why recreational fishermen are unable to 
catch the fondly recalled 'sugarbags' of large snapper- at 
least 2 lb or 0.8 kg ~. Everton, pers.comm.)- in the inner 
Hauraki Gulf anymore' is possibly a combination of many 
factors. The first is the increase in both commercial and 
recreational effort. Both have accelerated dramatically over 
past years, so even if the stock and catch remained static 
average catches per fisherman would have declined. The 
second factor involves the spawning of the snapper stocks. 
Paul (1982) has noted that snapper recrui tment success is 
dependant on sea temperatures, and a number of recent cohorts 
are depleted due to unfavourable water temperatures at 
spawning. h third factor could well be the general state of 
the Hauraki Gulf as a habitat for fish. Pollution from 
Auckland and the removal of mangroves may have deleterious 
effects on water quality or food availability in the inner 
gulf and hence create less than suitable conditions for 
snapper feeding or breeding. A fourth factor may just be 
simple over-fishing by local fishermen of both sectors. All 
of these factors may have contributed to the apparent decline 
of the recreational fishery and without a great deal of 
careful study the actual cause may never been established. 
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To combat over-fishing, if indeed that is a contributing 
factor, the actual catches of each sector must be determined 
in order to allocate the resource. The solution would then 
be to limit the catches of each sector. The prohibition of 
one or other fishing sector would be a drastic step and would 
need very strong evidence to suggest it was necessary before 
being implemented. Physical separation of fishermen, by 
setting aside recreational or even commercial fishing 
reserves, may be a compromise solution. This should reduce 
the likelihood of direct conflict. Another solution may be 
stock enhancement although this will have both economic and 
biological implications which would need to be thoroughly 
investigated before being implemented. 
The final example is of a situation where direct conflicts 
between commercial and amateur fishermen exist. Some direct 
conflict is apparent on the major west coast beaches of the 
Auckland FMA. Trawlers seeking snapper are known to trawl 
close to the beach and amateurs claim this has the effect of 
depleting these areas of snapper for weeks at a time. The 
west coast beaches are popular f6r surfcasting and kontiki 
fishing and there have now been a number of requests that 
trawling be banned from within one kilometer of the beach 
The question which remains unanswered still is: are the 
trawlers likely to lose income because of tbe measures, and 
is that loss offset by the extra enjoyment gained by the 
surfcasters? Furthermore, should such gains and losses be 
used as criteria to determine either 
management or the resolution of conflict? 
the success of 
In such a case the physical separation of the different 
fishermen could be a useful management tool. The actual size 
of any fishing reserve or buffer zone would need to be 
carefully investigated. Too large an area would unneces-
sarily penalise commercial fishermen since the shore-based 
amateurs could not fully exploit the area, and too small an 
area would only retain the original problem. Since part of 
the conflict also involves the one or two large amateur 
fishing contests,it may be a useful tool to introduce an even 
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larger buffer zone for the month or so prior to the 
competitions to enhance the possibility of satisfactory 
amateur catches. In this way the confrontation need not 
occur and the trawlers could not be held responsible for any 
lack of fish. 
The role of management policy and objectives was discussed 
earlier in this chapter. It is perhaps useful to note again 
however, that the management objectives used will, to a large 
degree, determine both the types of policy instruments 
implemented and the criteria used to determine management 
success. One policy instrument that I shall propose for 
discussion in section 8.10 involves an amateur marine fishing 
license of a similar nature to that used in freshwater 
fisheries. It is a suggestion aimed at encouraging a 
discussion of the merits or otherwise of a saltwater fishing 
license for the New Zealand recreational fisheries, similar 
to those used in other parts of the world. 
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8.8 The Role of Amateur Fishermen in Management. 
The seventh issue concerns the role which recreational and 
traditional amateur fishermen will play in the new management 
and advisory structures. Quite possibly it is too early to 
make any statement on the usefulness of the' FMACs and LCs, 
since many have only been constituted for a short time. 
However, the presence of representatives of the major 
recreational fishing groups, as well as Maori 
representatives, suggest a willingness on the part of the new 
fisheries management structure to recognise the rights of 
these resource users. 
At present the composition of a typical FMAC is: three 
commercial harvesting representatives; one fish processor; 
one retailer; one consumer representative; one Maori 
member; and two recreational representatives. Of these 
latter two, one represents the NZ. Underwater Association 
~ZUA) and the other the NZ Recreational Fishing Council 
(NZRFC). Thus amateur fishermen have three representatives 
and the commercial fishermen three, with the rest of the 
shore-based fishing industry having two. Had the NZRFC not 
been set up to represent the interests of the many and 
various groups of recreational fishermen, then there may well 
have been one less member on each FMAC. The formation of 
NZRFC has given the previously fragmented recreational 
fishing sector a single voice and united lobby, as well as an 
internal system for improving the communications and 
consultation between the many recreational fishing groups. 
The role of FMACs as a forum for the discussion of management 
proposals also provides a mechanism for conflict resolution. 
However, the major types of conflict in fishing appear to be 
interest conflicts. Having representatives of the different 
interest groups on the FMAC to resolve the conflicts between 
themselves may not be the most suitable solution. The 
consequences of such conflicts of interest could mean that a 
change ought to be made to the constitution of the FMAC, or 
their role as a discussion forum modified. Neither 
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suggestion seems logical, so another solution might be to 
ensure that there is an impartial arbitrator on the FMAC -
preferably a senior member of the FMD - to ensure decisions 
concerning management conflicts are given fair consideration. 
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8.9 Pseudo-commercial Fishermen 
One issue prevalent in the Hauraki Gulf, that also arises 
elsewhere in the country, concerns the 
different types of amateur fishermen. 
management of the 
Of concern to 
legitimate commercial fishermen is the 'pseudo-commercial' 
fisherman who catches large amounts of fish under amateur 
regulations and may then attempt to sell the catch illegally. 
Such sales should slow or stop under the monitoring system to 
be implemented with the proposed ITQs. However, even if the 
catch is being disposed of legally, such as feeding a Maori 
community, it would be important that the numbers of fish 
caught were known to FMD to be included in catch estimates 
for the whole stock. If 150 fishermen were each able to 
catch 30 snapper per day which weighed an average of 0.8 kg, 
for 300 days per year, the total catch would exceed 1000 
tonnes of snapper. This figure is only 200 tonnes less than 
the total amount of snapper caught by commercial long-liners 
each year from 1979 to 1982. 
Such an unreported catch could be significant in optimum 
yield or TAC calculations. Management needs to decide what 
it wants to do. Do they outlaw the large pseudo-commercial 
catch and hope it does not occur despite enforcement, or do 
they allow it to continue, but under controlled conditions? 
If it is to continue then the conditions or mana~ement 
controls to be used need to be examined and new policy 
instruments provided. 
Commercial fishermen believe the present amateur daily bag 
limits are too high and will encourage poaching and illegal 
sale of fish. One solution which could solve both the 
problem of unknown amateur catch totals, and allay the fears 
of commercial fishermen would be to lower the catch limits on 
many of the species to better reflect the actual catches of 
true recreational fishermen, if in fact such data could be 
determined, and then to ensure that the ITQ system can allow 
small catches. In such a situation the avid amateur who can 
catch 10 snapper of 0.8kg per day, all year a total of 
approximately 2,500 kg of fish - can buy quota. A minimum 
285 
limit might be set at 200 kg per year, which is only 4 kg of 
fish each weekend, but the advantage is that the daily bag 
limits no longer apply. The fish can be disposed of legally 
by sale or barter and the catch data collected can contribute 
to the annual totals. Other issues this suggestion raises 
include: the price to be paid for the quota; the adminis-
trative feasibility of documenting and recording catches and 
quota transfers; the political acceptability of using 
commercial controls on 'amateur-like' fishermen; and whether 
monitoring and enforcement could be effective. 
Another management alternative could be an amateur licensing 
system. This is discussed next. 
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8.10 A Marine Recreational Fishing License for New Zealand 
Despite the apparent success of a freshwater angling license 
system in New Zealand, no obvious moves have been made to 
introduce, or even discuss the introduction of, a similar 
system for marine fishing. It may be that none of the 
parties involved in amateur marine fishing perceive a need 
for such a system. It could be equally possible that the 
disadvantages associated with such a management scheme exceed 
any probable benefits to be received. However, it is 
suggested that regardless of any final decision made on the 
merits of a marine amateur fishing license, this option 
should be openly discussed so all parties can provide 
informed comment. 
American Marine Recreational Fishing License Deliberations 
In 1979 almost the whole of the fourth Marine Recreational 
Fisheries Symposium (Clepper, 1979) 
discussion of the issue of a marine 
was devoted 
recreational 
to a 
fishing 
license. The points discussed included: 
the concept of a recreational fishing 
the development of 
license ~ the 
institutional structure of such a license; and the 
biological, economic and social factors which would make a 
license either an acceptable or effective solution to the 
problems facin~ marine fishing as a whole. It should be 
noted at this point that a part of the discussion centred on 
the unique legal and management institutions found in the 
United States of America. However, much of the rest of the 
discussion remains pertinent for three reasons: 
1. the theory of a fishing license should apply to 
2. 
3. 
most fishing situations; 
New Zealand has a new fisheries management 
program which is substantially based on the 
u.S. system; and 
New Zealand is at, or fast approaching, the 
same juncture in both its awareness of the 
significance of recreational and other amateur 
fishing, and the need for innovative concepts 
for successful fisheries management. 
287 
A brief review of the u.s. fisheries management situation, 
and a discussion of fishing licenses, and the benefits their 
introduction could bring, will quickly illustrate why, New 
Zealand could initiate a similar discussion. Since 1976 u.S. 
marine fishing has been managed under the Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act WCMA). The FCMA legislation 
prescribed the most complex fisheries legislation yet enacted 
in the u.S. The management regime is based around eight 
Regional Fishery Management Councils (RFMCs) whose job it is 
to establish optimum yields for each regional fish stock and 
also to formulate fishery management plans ~ordon,1979). 
Amongst other things, the FCMA included a statutory 
acknowledgement of recreational fishing and hence provided 
fisheries managers with 
effectively include 
the challenging responsibility to 
recreational fishing as part of 
management strategies. It is interesting to the resemblence 
of these responsibilities to the recently adopted New Zealand 
fisheries management regime. 
The FCMA also had other implications which quickly became 
apparent. It gave recreational anglers a statutory 
recognition in fish allocations, but no power base from which 
to lobby for their allocations. Other problems included a 
critical lack of basic data on recreational fishing 
particularly socio-economic data, and a lack of funding for 
recreational management programs. In commercial fishing all 
of these problems are, at least partially, solved by 
licensing commercial fishermen. These licensees then pay 
license fees, provide catch returns and other data, and have 
formed effective and powerful lobbies to support their cases. 
Even a datum such as the number of currently valid fishing 
licenses has value. It provides managers with a crude 
estimate of effort or a statistical population to sample for 
other data, and it provides the fishermen with an estimate of 
their potential power as a lobby. 
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Washington (1979) noted that in the past, legislatures have 
often ignored, or assigned low management priorities to, 
marine recreational fishing and its associated management 
problems. There are three possible reasons for this. The 
first could be the lack of an organised political lobby as 
mentioned earlier. The second reason may be the lack of 
basic data on almost every aspect of recreational fishing. 
The final reason is the lack of an obvious financial (tax) 
input from the recreational sectors into the management of 
marine fisheries. As most management funds come from general 
tax revenues and the rest from commercial sector licenses and 
taxes, public management agencies have often been inclined to 
favour commercial fishing. Such uses of the fish resources 
have associated with them obvious economic benefits and the 
need for capital investment to enter the fishery. It appears 
that this is also the case in New Zealand. 
If fish populations begin to show signs of declining as a 
result of overharvesting, recreational fishermen are often 
the first to feel the effects. Not only do their catches 
decline faster than than those of commercial fishermen, 
because of the more inefficient methods and gear 
management measures or compensation tend to 
commercial sector. This is because of 
used, but 
favour the 
recreational 
fishermen's: (1) free entry to the fishery (open-access); 
(2) their inability to prove their use of the resource ~at~h 
records); and (3) their inability to demonstrate economic or 
other tangible benefits associated with their costs of 
fishing. Thus, a case can often be made for restricting the 
catches or fishing seasons of both sectors equally. However, 
rarely can a case be made for reducing commercial effort or 
catches more than recreational fishermen, unless it is 
associated with some form of compensation, such as a buy-back 
scheme. Recreational fishermen are seldom, if ever, 
compensated. 
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Thus, the reasons advocated by the symposium for the 
implementation of a marine recreational fishing license were 
as follows: 
1. it could provide direct baseline data such as 
angler numbers, effort levels and catch sizes; 
2. it could also identify a statistical population 
of anglers which managers would then sample to 
obtain whatever other data they required; 
3. it could be a cheaper way of obtaining such 
data than other methods currently available; 
4. if a license fee was taken, it could provide a 
source of funds for research, management, and 
enforcement; 
5. such funds would reduce the need for public 
money to be spent on the same things and so 
would be more in line with the 'user pays' 
principle of management; 
6. it may add political power to the management 
lobby of recreational fishermen; and 
7. it may make the recreational fishermen feel 
that they are contributing to the management of 
the resource, and would hence be more receptive 
to other management measures. 
The first five advantages are primarily for the management 
agency, whereas the final two favour the fishermen. However, 
each advantage noted does have some implications for both 
management and fishermen, and often for the good of the 
fishery as a whole. Better overall management has its own 
rewards. 
As noted earlier in section 8.3, the lack of reliable 
information regarding recreational fishing is one of the 
major problems facing management. The advocates of a marine 
recreational fishing license suggest that it could provide a 
unique way of obtaining the needed information. When an 
angler either purchases or is given a license a number of 
conditions might apply_ The least information the angler 
could be expected to supply is simply a name and contact 
address. A short questionnaire could also be included, to be 
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completed and returned either on the spot or at a later date. 
Another condition of the license might be to provide catch 
returns, or be available for inclusion in a more 
sophisticated and complex survey later in the year. 
The very least data a license will provide is still a great 
deal mOre than anything currently avaialable in New Zealand. 
It will give an estimate of both the number of anglers and 
their least WTP value of the fishery in the form of total 
license receipts. At best it 
reliable statistical population 
surveys, without the need to 
identify the fishing population. 
would provide a reasonably 
of fishermen for any future 
initially spend money to 
The inclusion of a license fee is seen by some as a benefit 
and 
1. 
2. 
3. 
by 
to 
to 
others 
improve 
improve 
as a nuisance. The fee can provide the funds: 
the collection of much needed data; 
managemerit and enforcement; and 
the financial commitment to management needed 
by recreational fishermen to give them more say in 
fisheries management. 
to provide 
By setting a high fee to imit entry, a fee could be used as a 
management tool in its own right. The general public might 
accept a fee, if it decreases the amount of public money 
needed in fisheries, since the license fee might be perceived 
as an example of the user pays principle. 
On the other hand the charging of a fee is seen by some 
people as a negative aspect of a fishing license. The extra 
costs of fishing may discourage some fishermen from 
participating as it would add to the overall costs of 
fishing, and so act to limit access to the resource. Such a 
result may not accord with an objective of open-access 
fishing. If having a license also requires extra monitoring 
and enforcement to ensure only those fishermen who have paid 
their license fee are allowed to fish, then the extra 
revenues could be depleted simply by the extra management 
costs. 
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The final two reasons given for the adoption of a marine 
recreational fishing license are primarily advantages for the 
fishermen. However, the whole fishery should also benefit 
from having all fishing sectors contribute to the overall 
management. If the policy for fisheries management is to 
ensure that the greatest benefit comes from the fish 
resource, then all benefit values need to be considered. As 
was noted earlier, recreational fishermen have often been 
overlooked in favour of commercial fishermen, so their 
contribution to the costs and benefits was also often 
ignored. Henry Lyman, the then publisher of Salt Water 
Sportsman, once said 'the only sure way to have a salt water 
fishing license is for the industry to demand that it be 
imposed on itself' . The co-operation of fishermen will aid 
management and reduce costs. 
Among the objections mentioned by Johansen and Kemp (1979) to 
adopting a marine recreational fishing license are three 
which concern the administration of either the license itself 
or the fund it would generate. The first is the problem of 
the money collected being lost in general funds and diverted 
to non-fishery uses. Johansen and Kemp (1979) argue that such 
fears are groundless as the proceeds from freshwater licenses 
have tended to end up in special funds dedicated to the 
management and enhancement of recreational fisheries. The 
second objection to a recreational license suggests that such 
a program would require the creation of yet another agency 
within an already extensive bureaucracy, with the need for 
the funds to be spent on administration. Stroud (1978) notes 
that such a fear is also without foundation as, on the 
average, the various states use only 10% for administration; 
5% for public information and education; and 25% for 
monitoring and law enforcement. This leaves 60% for 
research, development of fishing opportunities, and 
non-enforcement management. The final objection concerns the 
stability of license fees as a source of income. In many 
cases the objective of having a license is not to use it as a 
form of tax collection, so the revenues should never form a 
significant part of an agencies budget. If this was the 
case, then annual fluctuations in license sales income should 
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also not be significant. 
Other objections to the idea of a license relate to its 
reciprocity between states or, in the case of New Zealand, 
between FMAs. The first objection notes that if the license 
was totally reciprocal across a number of states its value in 
compiling management data would be diminished. The 
activities of the anglers would be difficult to determine 
without further, more complex research. On the other hand, 
having to buy a license for every area fished could be 
burdensome for the traditionally mobile recreational 
fishermen, and particularly for fishermen astride a fishing 
license boundary. Thus, a rationale for license reciprocity 
between adjoining management areas seems reasonable. 
The second issue concerning reciprocity of a license concerns 
the distribution of any funds collected. A state such as 
Florida or an area such as Nelson in New Zealand attract many 
fishing visitors. If each fishing visitor purchases their 
license in their home area, but fishes whilst on holiday, the 
costs and benefits accrue to different areas. On the other 
hand, if the license was purchased in the holiday area where 
fishermen and fish are numerous, the fisheries of the home 
state, which could be in need of funds, miss out. Once more 
this suggests the need for strict reciprocity between 
adjoining areas. 
It is interesting to note that, despite the array of both 
advantages for and objections against a license, Pfeiffer 
(1979) in his summation of the discussions on the license 
issue, believes it to be an emotional controversy. The 
conflict is between the threat of change, further government 
intervention and taxation on one the hand, and the need to 
protect the resources for the future, on the other. A key 
point must be the credibility of the management agency. 
Fishermen have on at least one occasion, rejected a license 
proposal simply on the basis of a strong distrust of the 
government agency involved and a lack of understanding of the 
intricacies of marine fisheries management (Figley,1979). 
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A Marine Recreational Fishing License for New Zealand? 
If a marine recreational fishing license were to be proposed 
for this country, a number of issues need first to be 
addressed. These include: 
1. what are the immediate advantages and disadvantages of 
a recreational fishing license as a management tool? 
Many of these were discussed above, but the major advantages 
are data collection, management funds, and a sense of greater 
worth for recreational fishermen. The disadvantages include 
the need for more government intervention in fishing, the 
payment and use of a fishing fee, and the general 
administration of the license and any funds collected. In 
many cases in New Zealand the advantages could outweigh the 
disadvantages, but only if the MAF:FMD could boost its 
credibility to the fishing public. Once done, fears of 
bureaucracy or the diversion of funds could be readily 
overcome by the advantages of better management resulting 
from the availability of more comprehensive data. 
Another question to be asked concerns: 
2. despite any advantages, is a license the best method of 
achieving the desired result or, in other words is a 
license needed? 
For New Zealand two major advantages of a license system 
provide significant reasons for its introduction. 
The first reason is data collection. The statistical 
sampling a license system could provide, even for the most 
basic information, would be of considerable benefit. 
However, on its own it is not a sufficient reason for its 
introduction because the administrative costs of a license 
system may be greater than the costs of sampling the entire 
population for the same data. All a license would do is 
identify the fishermen in advance. The second possible 
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reason for the introduction of a license is the increased 
flexibility it can provide for fisheries management. The 
following example illustrates this view. 
New statistical information has suggested that the types and 
distribution of recreational fishing varies around the 
country. In Auckland, the majority of fishermen are fishing 
from either a boat or from the shore with rods and do so 
primarily for recreation, and secondarily for food. In 
Taranaki, the recreational fisherman is primarily involved in 
set-netting for food and there is a large cultural component. 
The differences between two such fisheries is almost as great 
as between commercial and amateur. To manage each fishery 
effectively, different management objectives and controls are 
needed for each. Different information on the needs of each 
fishery, and the types of controls which could be most 
effective will also be required. The complexity of such 
situations can not be reconciled by a static set of controls 
across the entire country nor by specialised local controls. 
A license system which allowed for different situations 
could prove effective. It may be that licensing is only 
initially warranted in specific areas, such as the Hauraki 
Gulf. If it was accepted as a useful tool to deal with their 
specific problems, local Gulf fishermen may accept a license 
more readily than someone of the west coast of the South 
Island where the need is not so great or urgent. A license 
may also allow for different uses in the same area. One type 
of license could be for strictly recreational fishing and may 
have associated daily bag limits of 10 fish per species per 
person. Another type could be for larger scale amateur 
catches such as a Maori community or a holidaying family 
where the daily catch limits are greater, but other 
restrictions would apply, such as not being able to fish in 
recreational fishing reserves. The cost of each license and 
the penalties for breaching the management controls could 
also be different. Some fish species may come under only one 
or other license. The possible permutations of the license 
are large in number. It could be expected that a fishing 
license would be pocket size, waterproof and be expected to 
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be produced if required. It might be valid for a day, a 
week, a month, or a year. It could apply to a particular 
local area, such as the Hauraki Gulf, or Marlborough Sounds, 
or a whole FMA, or the whole country. It may also apply only 
to particular species or groups of species, such as shellfish 
or finfish. Since some members of society, such as children 
under 10, could be exempt from needing a license to fish, 
childrens licenses and fees could be introduced. The license 
could also apply to particular types of gear or methods of 
fishing. Despite the possible complexity, the management 
flexibility of such a system could prove to be either 
extremely effective or extremely cumbersome. 
However, two things are obvious. First, if the recreational 
fishermen are to expect to reap the benefits of improved 
fishing, then they are going to have to bear their share of 
the management costs. Costs are not confined just to those 
measured in dollar terms, since costs can also include 
assistance in gathering information, as well as generally 
assisting management efforts. with the extra power of 
statutory recognition also comes extra responsibilities to 
ensure successful management of the fish resources for the 
benefit of all users. Second, the complexity of management 
generally needs to reflect the complexity of the resource 
use. If the recreational fisheries prove to have significant 
catches, then management must also reflect this significance. 
Simple measures such as national daily bag limits for 
amateurs could prove to be totally ineffective. One result 
could be the decreasing of bag limits to one, or even less, 
fish per day. 
Such a situation may seem ridiculous, but if the amateur 
snapper catch in the Hauraki Gulf is about 1500 tonnes and 
each fish is an average of 0.5kg, then this catch represents 
approximately 3 million fish. This gives each of the 100,00 
plus fishermen of the Gulf 300 fish each to catch. To ensure 
the catch is no more than 1500 tonnes, a daily bag limit of 
less than one fish is needed. If each fisherman caught one 
fish per day all year then the total take would exceed 365 
million fish, or approximately 1800 tonnes. This may seem an 
296 
extreme example but it should be remembered that the number 
of potential fishermen is always increasing, and the numbers 
of fish nearly always decreasing. 
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Part II Concluding Comments. 
The allocation of available fish resources amongst the 
various competing user-groups has become a complex issue. 
The increasing diversity of both the uses and users of New 
Zealand's inshore fish resources has contributed to this 
complexity. It is likely that the issue of resource 
allocation will become a significant feature of New Zealand 
fisheries management. Allocation will be an important issue, 
both during the proposed stock recovery phase, and 
afterwards, when greater fish resources are expected to be 
available. Two issues concerning the allocation of fish 
resources are now both obvious and urgent - particularly 
where marine recreational fishing is involved. 
The first issue concerns the need to develop management 
policy and objectives for recreational or joint fisheries. 
The present policy for the inshore fisheries appears to be 
inadequate in these areas. The only offical statement of 
policy for recreational fishing management is: 
'to preserve a satisfactory recreational 
(Anon, 
fishery' , 
1984b). 
This statement is an objective for the proposed inshore 
fishing policy, but is the only reference to recr~ational 
fishing policy or management. No mention is made of a policy 
for the allocation of the fish resource. 
A policy for recreational fishing should include at least 
some of the following points: a definition of recreational 
fishing; a statement of explicit management objectives; 
criteria for determining management success; and how the 
policy relates to other policy - particularly the allocation 
of catch. Until a more comprehensive management policy can 
be developed, for both recreational fishing and catch 
allocation, fisheries management is likely to remain ad hoc. 
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An example of a proposed policy for the allocation of fish 
resources could be: 
"Recognizing the diveristy of fishermen 
and their interests, it is policy to 
allocate a sustainable segment of the 
aquatic resources to each user group and, 
in recognition of both the dynamic and 
changing nature of the resource and the 
environment that produces it, continually 
review the propriety of the allocations 
and of the value systems on which they 
are based. Further, in implementing this 
policy, to engage vigorously in the 
generation, exchange and evaluation of 
information required for equitable 
allocation and perpetuation of fishery 
resources and their multiple values." 
JEAN-LOUIS GAUDET, Secretary 
European Inland 
Commission (EIFAC) 
Fisheries 
of the 
Advisory 
Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, in Gaudet (1980). 
The second issue related to the allocation of fish resources 
concerns the need for information. An optimum yield 
management policy requires information about the relevant 
factors noted earlier. One of these factors is recreational 
fishing. The sole responsibility for gathering the necessary 
information should not rest with the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries. A greater role for recreational fishermen in 
management requires that they also bear responsibility for 
gathering information. The New Zealand Recreational Fishing 
Council and the New Zealand Underwater Association have been 
given representation on the 
Management Advisory Committees. 
should, in turn, be expected 
all~important Fisheries 
Both the NZRFC and the NZUA 
to assist in both policy 
formulation and research for management. 
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Thus the two most urgent areas for future research concern 
these two issues. Initial management policy and objectives 
should be developed and amended as further information 
becomes available. Hence, research into the many facets of 
recreational fishing is also required. The relationships 
between the information available, the development of 
management policy, and future research, are both dynamic and 
interactive. Successful long-term resource planning in 
fisheries management needs to be based on adequate 
information, and explicit and specific management policy. 
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Appendix A. Management Criteria 
The overall objective of fisheries management should be to 
exploit the fish resource in a manner which provides the 
greatest benefit to society, both at present and in the 
future (Anderson et al., 1984). Although the two most common 
objectives of management are biological conservation and 
economic efficiency the affects, on other societal 
objectives, of attempting to attain these two objectives can 
be significant. Hence the effectiveness of any management 
strategy or tool should be weighed against a number of 
different criteria to ensure that all the important or 
significant costs and benefits are indentified and accounted 
for. Clawson (1980) advocates a 'five fold approach' to 
consideration and assessment of resource policy: 
1. Physical and/or biological feasibility and the 
consequences of each action or failure to act; 
2. Economic efficiency, relating all costs and 
benefits whether marketed for cash or not; 
3. Economic equity, identifying who gains and who 
loses from any action; 
4. Social and cultural acceptability; the other 
values of society; exclusion of economic costs 
such as morality and ethics; and 
5. Operative or administrative practicality; 
possible or practical to do. 
is it 
From the above discussion it is possible to identify four 
major categories of management criteria for fisheries. These 
are: biological; economic; social; and management 
criteria and each can be further sub-divided into questions 
which address the particular effects of any strategy. 
Elaboration of these four criteria can aid in the assessment 
of both the overall effectiveness and the effects of 
management policies and instruments. 
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The biological criterion can be sub-divided into sub-criteria 
which address the affects on: 
1. the catch composition, ie. 
maturity of fish caughti 
2. the catch size; 
age, size, sex, and 
3. other fish stocks or fisheries, due to the mobility 
of fish, fishermen and gear; and 
4. the fish habitat and marine ecosystem quality, by 
recognising the links between fish species and 
their habitat. 
The economic criterion can also be 
sub-criteria to assess the affects on: 
sub-divided into 
1. economic efficiency, the over-investment in capital 
and labour; 
2. cost-effectiveness of harvesting, as a possible 
second best alternative to absolute efficiency; 
3. fishermen's incomes; and 
4. the market compe~itiveness of fish and fish 
products ie. the supply, quality and cost of the 
fish. 
Social criteria have become increasingly acknowledged by 
fisheries analysts as being important $ryan, 1976; 
Burch,1976; Orbach,1978; Cicin-Sain et al., 1978; 
Cicin-Sain, 1980; and Clawson, 1980). Included in this 
category of criteria are: 
1. the equity of the distribution of any costs and 
benefits, both actual or perceived; 
2. Amateur fishing, where different values and issues 
are important; 
3. traditional fishing rights, the cultural effects of 
management are not always obvious; 
4. employment, both in terms of number and in terms of 
how employment patterns can reflect other social 
5. 
factors; 
conflicts, 
fishing 
and 
particularly between 
user groups in the 
potentially scarce resources. 
the different 
allocation of 
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Management criteria involve examination of the effects of the 
operation and administration of fisheries. As public money 
is often used to manage fisheries, the recognition of any 
administrative effects is more than an academic exercise. 
Criteria such as the following deserve scrutiny: 
1. the flexibility of proposed actions, as fisheries 
are dynamic and often unpredictable and require 
adaptive management responses; 
2. the costs of management, to give cost-effectiveness 
in research, administration and enforcement; 
3. the simplicity or complexity of management; 
4. political feasibility which involves the acceptance 
of management policy by both the fishermen and the 
public; and 
5. the level of any resource payments as fees, 
royalties etc. 
Although long, this list is far from comprehensive. Many 
issues and affects of management policies are not listed and 
those that are need not be useful in every case. However, 
the management philosophy attendant which management policies 
such as OSY and Fisheries Management Planning require that a 
wider range of criteria be used to assess the effects and the 
effectiveness of fisheries policy instruments. 
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Appendix B: Management and policy Instruments. 
The mechanisms by which management instruments are created 
and defined has been discussed in the text in Chapter Two. 
Burch (1976) proposed a four way allocation method for 
defining and allocating the ,property rights which constitute 
the bases for any fisheries management policy. Anderson 
(1983) has now provided a clear way of defining two more 
attributes of policy and management instruments. 
In a discussion of the policy development process for 
fisheries management, Anderson defines four important 
components of management. These are: the management 
objectives; the operational attributes of the fishery; the 
attributes of the harvest; and the control measures 
available to be used. These four components are shown in 
figure 1. 
Having defined a particular management objective it is 
possible to effect the objective via one of three pathways. 
Either the catch is altered or the operational attributes are 
altered or both are altered by control measures. The basic 
problem is to select the control measures which best achieve 
the management objectives chosen. As each control measure 
can influence both the catch attributes and the important 
fishery attributes, this is not a simple problem. The 
problem then becomes a need to find the control measures 
which achieve the required results in the most effective 
manner. 
The possible types of control measures can be categorized 
into four groups; each defined by the type of control 
mechanism and the attribute of the fishery that it affects. 
The catch attributes shown in figure 1 can be affected by 
controls on either price or quantity, or both. The price can 
in turn be affected by controls on inputs to fishing such as 
taxes on gear, or outputs such as taxes on catch. In a 
similar fashion the quantity of fish harvested can be 
affected by direct controls on either the inputs or outputs 
to fishing. Hence the four types of control measure are: 
330 
input controls on fish price; output controls on fish price; 
input controls on the quantity of fish caught; and output 
controls of harvest quantity. These relationships are shown 
in figure 2. 
A full discussion of each of the various control measure is 
not necessary in this report. However, other sources of 
information exist which discuss the affect various controls 
can have 
control 
on fisheries 
measure in 
and the 
achieving 
relative efficacy of each 
the stated management 
objectives. The following sources will provide more detail: 
Crutchfield (1961) i Pearse (1979); Anderson (1977, 1980, 
1983b); and the Central Fisheries Management Planning Team 
(1984). 
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Appendix C: Description of the Coastal Fisheries Management 
Areas. 
The content of this appendix comes directly from Cooper 
(1985a). 
AUCKLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT AREA 
Area Description. 
Auckland FMA encompasses: the east coast of the North Island 
south to Cape Runaway; the west coast down to Tirua Point; 
and waters seaward to the EEZ boundary. ~ap 1.) 
This area includes structures associated with the Norfolk and 
Kermadec Ridges and the continental shelf off east and west 
Northland, Auckland, the Hauraki Gulf and the Bay of Plenty. 
The domestic commercial fishery is predominantly for trawl 
and line caught snapper, with an important fishery for 
skipjack tuna, coastal pelagics, groper (deepwater line 
fishery), harbour species such as flounder and scallops. 
New Zealand's major recreational and traditional ~aori) 
fisheries for finfish and shellfish are located in this FMA. 
Marine farming of rock oysters is important to the local 
economy. 
The area has four fisheries zones: 
~) West Auckland 
West Auckland encompasses: 
(i) A major trawl fishery for barracouta, snapper, gurnard 
and trevally, and more recently for barracouta and 
kahawai, with tarakihi as an important by-catch species; 
(ii) A seasonal pelagic fishery for skipjack tuna and 
coastal pelagics; 
(iii) Set net fisheries in harbours and estuaries for 
flounder and mullet; 
M 
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(iv) Manukau harbour and west coast beaches providing 
important recreational fisheries; 
(v) Hokianga providing much of New Zealand's pterocladia for 
agar production and a potential agar resource, 
gracilaria, in the Manukau harbour. 
~) Northeast Coast. 
The Northeast coast commercial fishery is predominantly 
lining for snapper and groper with some trawling and set 
netting. The Auckland Region's most important skipjack tuna 
fishery is located here and in the neighbouring Bay of Plenty 
zone.' Scallops form a small recreational and commercial 
fishery. The Bay of Islands is the centre of New Zealand's 
rock oyster farming industry. 
~) Hauraki Gulf. 
Hauraki Gulf lies within the boundaries of the old Auckland 
Fisheries Management Area. New Zealand's most important 
snapper fishery is centred in this zone. Other Important 
fisheries include gurnard and flounder (Firth of Thames). 
The most important fishing methods are longline, trawl 
(primarily single trawl) and set net, although an important 
Danish seine fishery for snapper is also present in the Gulf. 
~) Bay of Plenty. 
The Bay of Plenty pair trawling and Danish seining 
prohibition area prescribes this fishery. This zone contains 
some of New Zealand's most important fisheries for coastal 
pelagics ~ackerels, kahawai and trevally). Purse seining is 
the most important fishing method in the fishery for coastal 
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pelagics. Other important species include snapper, tarakihi 
and groper. Trawling, longlining and netting are the main 
methods used for demersal species. Whitianga is the centre 
of the major North Island scallop fishery, and Opotiki in the 
east for pterocladia as a source of agar. 
CENTRAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT AREA 
Area Description 
Central Fishery Management Area includes the waters off the 
coast of the southern North Island from Cape Runaway in the 
east, through Cook Strait, to Tirua Point in the east. ~ap 
2). Central FMA, as originally proposed, encompassed the 
east coast and Cook Strait fisheries zones (including the 
north east coast of the South Island to the southern most 
limit of the Conway Canyon system) . This proposal 
incorporated the main geographic spread in central New 
Zealand of groper (Hapuku) bass, moki and warehou and 
associated fishermen. 
The present Egmont zone was the northern part of Challenger 
FMA, an extension of demersal species such as barracouta and 
tarakihi and the west coast squid and jack mackerel 
fisheries. 
The Marlborough zone (Challenger FMA) was extended southwards 
to incorporate the area between Cloudy Bay and the Clarence 
River. 
The Cook Strait line between Challenger and Central FMAs was 
established to reflect the administrative structure of FMD 
and fishermen's requirements to respond to management centres 
adjacent to their fisheries. 
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The area includes: 
The continental shelf off Taranaki and the 
Manawatu~ 
A small area of deep water north of the 
Challenger Plateau; 
The continental shelf and slope off Gisborne, 
Hawkes Bay, Wairarapa and Wellington; 
Prominent banks (Ranfurly, Madden); 
Cook Strait and its canyon systems. 
The area has three fisheries zones: 
East Coast and Cook Strait 
Tarakihi and warehou are the important trawl species in the 
Wellington/wairarapa area; tarakihi, gurnard, flounder and 
snapper in the Hawkes Bay, Gisborne coastal section. 
Cook Strait zone has limited trawl grounds. A small and 
large boat trawl fishery for tarakihi, flatfish, snapper, 
warehou, and red cod, barracouta, gemfish, hoki, orange 
roughy and alfonsino occur. 
New Zealand's major bottom line 
located on banks and canyons 
particularly in the Cook Strait 
fishery for "groper" is 
from East Cape to Kaikoura, 
Canyon area. A set net 
moki, blue warehou and fishery for rig, school shark, 
butterfish occurs throughout. 
Rock lobster and paua are important locally. 
Foreign licensed vessels longline for southern bluefin tuna 
in the zone. 
Egmont 
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A trawl fishery for snapper is located north of the Waitara 
River and for mixed species in the south Taranaki Bight and 
on grounds south of Wanganui. 
A once important set net fishery for school shark, warehou, 
moki and rig shows drastic overfishing for some species. 
Lining centred on the Viti Canyons, once an important 
fishery, now declining, lands mainly hapuka and ling. 
Mackerel and squid are significant under-utilised resources 
for the domestic fishery in the area, although exploited by 
foreign licensed and chartered vessels. 
Pteroclaida is collected for agar production on the Wairarapa 
coast. 
CHALLENGER FISHERY MANAGEMENT AREA. 
Area Description 
Challenger Fishery Management Area lies between: the 
southern boundary of central FMA: the western boundary of 
the EEZi and in the south a line west of Awarua Point, Big 
Bay. The eastern boundary delineates areas north oL the 
Clarence River. (Map 3). 
The area encompasses: 
1. that part of the Challenger Plateau lying within the EEZi 
2. the continental shelf between Cloudy Bay and the Clarence 
River; Tasman Bay/Golden Bay; NW Nelson; Karamea 
Bight; the west coast and south westland. 
Fishery Zones 
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The inshore fishery of the area can be broadly divided into 
three fishery zones, although considerable overlap is 
ev ident: (Map 3). 
(a) Marlborough Fishery Zone Lining is the most significant 
finfish fishery landing mainly school shark and hapuka. 
Trawling is important in Cloudy Bay and south of Cape 
Campbell for barracouta, red cod, hoki and tarakihi. 
There is a small scale trawl fishery for snapper, 
flatfish and red cod; and beach seine, longline and set 
net fisheries for snapper and other species in the 
Marlborough Sounds. 
Purse seining for kahawai is important in Cloudy Bay. 
Marlborough Sounds has a major recreational fishery for 
blue code and snapper, and to a lesser extent for rock 
lobster and scallops. Valuable fisheries for paua, rock 
lobster and scallops also occur. 
(b) Nelson Fishery Zone 
Tasman Bay /Golden Bay snapper, flatfish, rig and 
barracouta constitute the demersal fishery of this zone. 
Purse seining throughout this zone yields large catches 
of kahawai, blue mackerel and some jack mackerel. There 
is also a small resource of anchovy, pilchard and 
sprats. 
The area also supports a dredge fishery for scallops and 
oysters. 
(c) West Coast Fishery Zone This zone lies between Kahurangi 
Point and Awarua Point. 
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Locally based vessels trawl the inshore grounds for 
flatfish and red cod and troll for albacore and bluefin 
seasonally. 
Large vessels fish the deepwater hoki grounds and for 
red cod and barracouta on the outer shelf. 
A longline fishery for ling, shark and "groper" are 
located in the Hokitika, Cook, and Knights canyon areas. 
Albacore and bluefin trolling and lining constitute a 
summer/autumn (albacore) and winter/spring (bluefin) 
fishery. 
SOUTHERN FISHERY MANAGEMENT AREA 
Area Description 
Southern FMA (Map 4) has a common boundary to the north with 
Challenger FMA on the West Coast, Central and Challenger FMA 
on the West Coast, Central and Challenger FMA on the east 
coast of the South Island. The southern boundary is 
approximately equivalent to the present northern boundary of 
Area E. 
The inshore domestic fishery is characterised by rig, red 
code, flounders, soles and barracouta. 
Foreign licensed and chartered vessels land large quantities 
of orange roughy, oreo dory, barracouta and ling from the 
eastern part of the FMA (Area D) and from Area F off the 
Stewart Island shelf and the Solander Corridor. 
New Zealand's major rock lobster and paua fishery is centred 
here. 
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Within the area lie; 
The Chatham Rise including the Mernoo, Veryan and 
Reserve Banks; 
The Puysegur Bank; 
The Solander Trough; 
The continental shelves and slope of 
- Chatham Islands 
- Canterbury/Otago 
- Southland 
- Stewart Island 
- Foveaux Strait 
- Snares Island 
There are four fisheries zones; 
(a) Southland Fisheries Zone 
Dredge oyster and rock lobster fisheries are the most 
important domestic fisheries of the area. 
A trawl fishery for flounders and sales occurs off: 
Foveaux Strait; east of Waikawa; on the eastern side 
of Stewart Island; the edge of Puysegur Bank; the 
northern end of the Solander Trough. Puysegur Bank is 
an important ling fishery. School shark is caught with 
set nets and lines. 
Blue cod is an important developing line and pot 
fishery. 
Paua is an important local fishery. 
(b) Otago and Canterbury Fisheries Zones 
These two zones encompass the major inshore 
fishery of the South Islands east coast. 
trawl 
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principle species landed are rig, tarakihi and school 
shark. 
Rig, elephant fish, school shark and tarakihi are the 
basis of geographically distinct and important set net 
fisheries. 
Line and more recently a set net fishery for "groper" 
occur in canyon areas. 
Paua and rock lobster fisheries are important locally. 
~) Chatham Fishery Zone 
Rock lobster and paua are the major fisheries with 
intermittent landings of blue cod and of other finfish. 
